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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation charts the ways in which migrants from the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire crafted new forms of identification in the United States, complicating 
their relationships with their home and host states. Transatlantic migration and 
migrants’ heightened nationalism were, I argue, causative factors in the 
dismantling of the Habsburg Empire into ethnically-based states after Word 
War I. Rather than focusing on a single ethnic group, Migrant Nation-Builders 
looks broadly at early multilingual immigrant institutions, Austro-Hungarian and 
American perceptions of panslavism, and the splintering of immigrant 
institutions in the United States along linguistic lines. The project traces the 
long arm of the homeland authorities, especially the Hungarian government, in 
trying to manage migrant loyalty in America, and follows return migrants from 
the United States back to East Central Europe to track their influence on 
domestic politics. Finally, it examines the dual effects on migration of new 
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Introduction 
“[Immigrants] thought of themselves as fighters, lovers, poets, dancers, singers, 
and children of the Almighty before it occurred to them that they were also members of 
definite national and political groups,” Slovene-American author Louis Adamic wrote in 
his 1932 book, Laughing in the Jungle.1 This dissertation will explain how immigrants 
came to think of themselves as “members of definite national and political groups” by 
explaining the relationship between mass transatlantic labor migration from Austria-
Hungary to the United States and the rapid spread of separatist nationalism, leading to the 
Habsburg Empire’s dissolution. In addressing this relationship, we learn about United 
States history, Central and Eastern European history, migration history, ethnic history, 
diplomatic history, and the history of nationalism itself. The story features an ensemble 
cast of governmental officials and migrants, and is set in both the North America and 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
Previous generations of scholars sometimes argued that national oppression in 
Eastern Europe caused emigration, citing examples like Štefan Osuský, who migrated to 
the United States as an adolescent and became a leading Slovak politician in adulthood. 
According to Osuský, members of Slavic minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire like 
himself migrated to the United States because of an oppressive national climate at home. 
“In spring of 1905 the [Hungarian] minister of education, Count Apponyi, came to the 
lyceum to pay an inspection visit,” Osuský explained. “He came to our class when we 
had Latin. Latin was my favorite subject and I was very good in it,” he continued. “After 
the exam Count Apponyi called me and asked me in Hungarian, ‘What is your name, 
                                                       
1 Louis Adamic, Laughing in the Jungle: The Autobiography of an Immigrant in America 
(New York: Harpers & Brothers, 1932), 104. 
 2 
young lad?’ I answered, ‘My name is Osuský.’ ‘Where are you from?’ ‘From Brezová.’ 
He replied: ‘Brezová, isn't it the nest that breeds all the revolts against Hungarians? You, 
however, are going to be a good Hungarian!’ He didn't ask me whether I'd be a good 
Hungarian citizen, but simply if I'd be a good Hungarian,” Osuský reflected. “I 
remembered the words of my father's not to mix into politics. . . . I paused a little to think 
about the best answer. Obviously, I could not agree to be a good Hungarian, I could not 
even force myself to say anything like that, so I remained silent.’”2 Osuský no doubt 
experienced this incident of Count Apponyi’s national chauvinism, but his personal 
trajectory — feelings of national animosity spurring migration — are, I argue, not 
representative. For the vast majority of migrants, migration came first, followed by a 
swelling of separatist nationalism while abroad.  
Much more typical, I argue, is the story of Andrew Lichanec, who immigrated to 
the United States from Klenóc, Austria-Hungary in 1913.3 When he arrived in 
Logansport, IN, ethnicity and language very suddenly took on a new significance in his 
life. “I spoke more Hungarian at that time,” he explained to an interviewer for the Ellis 
Island Oral History Project. But when he arrived in the United States, his uncle told him, 
"You're not a hunky, a Hungarian.” This negation of a Hungarian identity in America 
meant that Lichanec had to learn not one but two new languages and take on multiple 
new identities. To fit what should have been their mother tongue and ethnic affiliation in 
Austria-Hungary, his father told him to learn Slovak. “So here my father was teaching me 
                                                       
2 “Czech Republic and Slovakia - Štefan Osuský, . . . ideas defining a free society,” 
(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, n.d.). 
3 This dissertation will use the official place name of the location in the time period that 
is being referred to, recognizing that this is an imperfect approach. In many cases I will 
indicate what country that municipality is in today. Very large cities, like Vienna, will be 
referred to by their standard English name. In quotations, I will retain the author’s usage. 
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Slovak, then I went to school, they were teaching me English. And I tell you, I had a little 
problem there,” he recalled. Lichanec himself, like his father, began to identify nationally 
as a result of his migration and the proliferation of Eastern European nationalisms in 
migrant communities.  
When migrants from Austria-Hungary came to the United States in the late 
nineteenth century, as Lichanec’s story illustrates, their identifications frequently 
sharpened, dissolved, and coalesced again. Lichanec and his family members became 
more culturally Slovak as they became American. Countless migrants from the Austro-
Hungarian Empire experienced similar ethnic fashioning and refashioning. At churches, 
social clubs, bars, butcher shops, and newsstands from Connecticut to Michigan, migrant 
nationalists persuaded those they deemed co-nationals to join them in building up a local 
exclusive ethnic community and lobbying for the best interests of their “nation” back in 
Austria-Hungary. But which possible articulation of ethnic identity an immigrant would 
choose – German, Austrian, Hungarian, Jewish, Slavic, Bohemian, Moravian, Czech, 
Slovak, Czechoslovak, Ruthenian, Polish, Ukrainian, Transylvanian, Romanian, 
Yugoslav, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Wend – was not as forgone of a conclusion as it 
may seem to readers today.  
The United States was a critical venue for the nurturing of new identities among 
migrants and encouraging political action. In the United States, migrants encountered 
multiple American regimes of categorization, a free immigrant press, increased mobility 
and opportunities for association, and limits on the powers of the Austro-Hungarian 
government in clamping down on ethnic separatism. Upon arrival, many individuals 
prioritized their home regional or religious identity over an ethno-linguistic one, as the 
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national movements of many Slavic peoples in Central and Eastern Europe were still in 
the making. Rather than all having a clear national identity upon arrival, the experience of 
living abroad inspired the national identity of many immigrants from Austria-Hungary. 
Some maintained hybrid identities or remained indifferent to an exclusive ethnicity, but 
over the course of the early twentieth century the strengthening of national movements on 
both sides of the Atlantic transformed many of migrants into nation-builders. The success 
of American immigrant nationalists determined, to a large extent, which national projects 
in Central and Eastern Europe would achieve states and which would not, in concert with 
the World War I priorities of the United States government. American bureaucrats had a 
sizable influence on which Eastern European groups came to be considered sufficiently 
defined or cohesive nations and therefor potentially worthy of a state at the close of 
World War I. The Immigration Bureau, the U.S. Census, and social scientists all had 
different and evolving conceptions of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but the roster of nations as the U.S. saw 
them in the 1910s was codified in the Versailles Treaty. This dissertation will reconstruct 
the transatlantic debate over identities that started in controversy and led to world war, 
with lasting consequences for migrants well into the twentieth century.  
This project joins a small group of works that looks at the process of ethnic 
identity formation (also referred to as “ethnicization”) for the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
from a transatlantic perspective. While scholars have already argued that the experience 
of migration was significant in inaugurating or augmenting the national or ethnic 
consciousness of some Europeans, they have yet to fully explain the significance of 
nation-building abroad for a multiethnic state like Austria-Hungary where nationalizing 
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projects were fiercely contested. The role of migration in national identity formation is 
different for immigrants coming from a unifying state like Italy, on which many scholarly 
models are based, than for a splintering empire populated by people increasingly 
identifying as different ethnicities.4 Historians have observed the pride that many 
American immigrants displayed once their co-nationals in Europe achieved an 
independent state, but have been less attuned to the role of those immigrants in attaining 
that state, not to mention the hardships that new state borders created for immigrants 
from the so-called “belt of mixed populations.”  
Since the research for this project began in 2012, several significant new books 
have appeared that make this study one of a cohort of critical scholarly appraisals of 
North American-Austro-Hungarian migration, and new studies in relevant subfields have 
undergone a “transnational turn,” further informing this project and the questions it asks. 
Nicole Phelps’s U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference, Tara 
Zahra’s The Great Departure, and Annemarie Steidl, Vladimir Fischer-Nebmaier, and 
James W. Oberly’s From a Multiethnic Empire to a Nation of Nations. Together, these 
works have thoroughly updated the history of migration from Austria-Hungary to the 
United States, reflecting several historiographic developments.5 The study and writing of 
                                                       
4 For analysis of the Italian case, see Mark Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy 
Abroad (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008).  
5 Phelps, U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty 
Transformed (Cambridge, Mass,: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Zahra, The Great 
Departure: Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016); Steidl, Fischer-Nebmaier, Oberly, From a 
Multiethnic Empire to a Nation of Nations (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2017). Also 
worthy of mention are Brian McCook, Borders of Integration: Polish Migrants in 
Germany and the United States, 1870-1924 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011) and 
Ulf Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State 
since the Late Nineteenth Century (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2016), which focus 
on geographically adjacent areas and include parts of the former empire. Before this new 
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history has benefitted tremendously in recent decades from the transnational turn, 
revealing overlooked global connections and new opportunities for research and 
interpretations. This is evident in U.S. immigration and ethnic history in the increased 
attention to migrants’ home states; in Eastern European history in the proliferation of 
studies of borderlands and the interconnected histories of lands formerly encompassing 
the Habsburg Empire; and in the reconceptualization of U.S. diplomatic history as the 
study of “America and the world.”  
Scholars of nationalism have delved more deeply into how ethnically-based 
definitions of nations have been historically constructed and have argued against the 
omnipresence of firm ethnic descriptors and ahistorical tellings of nation’s origins. In the 
process, they have conceptualized a variety of expressions of identification that defy rigid 
ethnic categories, including hybrid identities and the concept of “national indifference.”6 
Much of the migration literature on migrants from Austria-Hungary, until recently, was 
written before the rise of critical nationalism studies and focused on single ethno-
linguistic group. While a tight focus on a narrowly defined community can have many 
                                                                                                                                                                     
generation of literature, classic works from the 1980s included the works of Julianna 
Puskás (on Hungarians), M. Mark Stolarik (on Slovaks), and Paul Robert Magocsi (on 
Carpatho-Rusyns). Notable works in the intervening years include subsequent books by 
Puskás, Stolarik, and Magocsi; June Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism and 
Robert Zecker, Streetcar Parishes; and several books by Tibor Frank and Steven Béla 
Várdy. Significant works on European migration include studies by Leslie Page Moch 
and Josef Ehmer, et. al., European Mobility. Full ctiations can be found in the 
bibliography. 
6 For theoretical frameworks, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Ernest 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, and the works of Anthony D. Smith and Rogers 
Brubaker. Notable studies on the evolution of ethnic identities in the Habsburg Empire 
and its successor states include Pieter Judson’s Guardians of the Nation, Jeremy King’s 
Budweisers into Czechs and Germans, Tara Zahra’s Kidnapped Souls. A forceful 
articulation of the place of the United States in these processes is Kathleen Neils Conzen, 
David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli, “The 
Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.,” Journal of American Ethnic 
History 12, no. 1 (1992), 3-41.  
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benefits, many of these studies drew strict and somewhat artificial boundaries around the 
groups that they were studying, ignoring evidence of multilingualism, integration with 
other Austro-Hungarian migrants who spoke different languages, and the coalescing of 
communities around religion and place rather than ethnicity. “With few exceptions . . . , 
those who have described the process of ethnicization have either totally ignored 
evidence of mixed identities during the wary stages of immigrant settlement or, because 
of the spares and inconsistent nature of the evidence, at best have dismissed it with a few 
passing comment,” historian Béla Vassady noted.7 Works that treat immigrant 
communities’ embrace of panslavism at the turn of the twentieth century, for example, 
remain very few. Many turn-of-the-century nationalists admitted knowing that nations 
were at least partly constructed, even if they believed that blood mattered.  Migrant 
journalist and author Thomas Capek described famous poet Ján Kollár as “By birth a 
Slovak, by affiliation a Bohemian, but by preference a ‘Slavonian patriot’”8 Many 
transatlantic migrants could be described in similarly varied ways, and many considered 
themselves Americans on top of their mix of European identities. This work builds on 
recent studies by nationalism scholars to showcase a range of ethnic self-identifications 
                                                       
7 Bela Vassady, Jr., “Mixed Ethnic Identities among Immigrant Clergy from Multiethnic 
Hungary: The Slovak-Magyar Case, 1885-1903,” in The Ethnic Enigma: The Salience of 
Ethnicity for European-Origin Groups, ed. Peter Kivisto (Philadelphia: The Balch 
Institute Press, 1989), 47. Vassady was one of the few historians, until recently, who 
directly addressed this historiographic problem directly in own work. Despite the 
challenge of multiple language and sometimes competing narratives, Ewa Morawska’s, 
For Bread and Butter, Dominic Pacyga’s Polish Immigrants and Industrial Chicago, 
Josef J. Barton’s Peasants and Strangers, Michael P. Weber and Roger Simon’s Lives of 
their Own, and David C. Hammack, Diane L. Grabowski, & John J. Grabowski, eds. 
Identity, Conflict, and Cooperation also grappled with these questions on the city level. 
“The streets of Chicago created ethnic consciousness in a peasantry that had tended to 
identify with their village and region rather than the larger concept of Poland,” Pacyga 
concluded (xv).  
8 Thomas Čapek, The Slovaks of Hungary: Slavs and Panslavism (New York: 
Knickerbocker Press, 1906), 18. 
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and governmental labels, from individuals who described themselves by region of origin 
or religion rather than ethnicity to the most ardent separatist nationalists.9  
Modern historiography about the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and its 
successor states faces an uphill battle against powerfully nationalist historiographies. 
Even scholars who accept the constructedness of ethnicity struggle against a current of 
primordialist views and narratives that focus on national foundings. Particularly 
problematic is the concept of Austro-Hungarian governmental sources and especially 
interwar Hungarian histories require carefully reading to distinguish the imperial bugaboo 
of panslavism – synonymous with disloyalty, agitation, and betrayal – from panslavism 
as concerted action among individuals from different Slavic-language-speaking groups 
from within and sometimes without Austria-Hungary to argue for autonomy or formal 
recognition within the Empire. Panslavism historically, in Europe and the United States, 
has taken many forms, from a Russian-led movement to unify all Slavic-speakers; to 
Austro-Slavism, usually proposing a tripartite rather than dual configuration for the 
Habsburg lands; to South Slav (later Yugoslav) and Czecho-Slovak alliances.10 In all of 
these forms, opposition to panslavism and Slavic nationalisms one thing that Austria and 
Hungary, still adjusting to and seeking to protect the dualism of the monarchy, could 
largely agree on, especially in their foreign policy in the United States.   
The reasons for Austria-Hungary’s dramatic dissolution remain a central question 
in Central and Eastern European historiography; this study argues that transatlantic 
migration must be part of the answer. Although studies looking at the rise of nationalism 
                                                       
9 This work also reappraises terms like “panslav” and “magyarone” that were once 
common in describing political affiliations in relation to nationalism but have fallen out 
of use since. See, in particular, Chap. 2.  
10 Alexander Maxwell, Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language 
and Accidental Nationalism (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009). 
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in the Habsburg Empire have examined every possible factor contributing to heightened 
separatist nationalism, analysis of the place of emigration and return migration in many 
of these studies is surprisingly sparse. A secret memorandum from the Hungarian 
Undersecretary of State to the Prime Minister in 1902 clearly explained, “For the 
institution of national statehood it is absolutely necessary that the ruling race . . . become 
the majority of the population. . . . Providence . . . has granted another population factor 
which has significantly raised the proportion of the Hungarian element at the expense of 
the nationalities,” he continued. “This important new factor is the mass emigration of the 
non-Hungarian population.”11 Austrian and Hungarian governmental authorities 
recognized great significance of emigration in the functioning and the politics of the 
Empire, and historians of nationalism in the Habsburg Empire can no longer sideline 
migration. Around 3,547,000 emigrants departed Austria-Hungary for overseas 
destinations between 1876 and 1910, amounting to 7–8 percent of the 1910 population.12 
While Pieter Judson’s recent The Habsburg Empire: A New History makes a compelling 
case for an empire brought asunder by military defeat rather than undermined by internal 
ethnic tensions, external ethnic tensions in the form of separatists nationalism among the 
Empire’s emigrants in the United States played an important role in the shaping the post-
war future of Austria-Hungary.13 
                                                       
11 Quoted in Puskás, Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: 100 years of Hungarian Experience 
in the United States (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2000), 90. See also Monika Glettler, 
Pittsburgh-Wien-Budapest: Programm und Praxis: der Nationalitätenpolitik bei der 
Auswanderung der ungarischen Slowaken nach Amerika um 1900 (Vienna: Austrian 
Academy of Sciences, 1980), 401-6. 
12 [William P. Dillingham], Emigration Conditions in Europe (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1911), 351. 
13 Pieter M. Judson, The Habsburg Empire: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2016).  
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Aggregately, migrants from Austria-Hungary were the fourth-largest contributor 
to the United States in the two decades before the First World War, but their significance 
in American history and historiography is often understated. This is particularly the case 
when they are divided up by post-war national group. Austro-Hungarian migrants joined 
Irish, Italian, and German workers in transforming industrial labor in America, and were 
among the central subjects in many of the famous incidents of and classic literature on 
U.S. immigration history and labor history.14  Scholars of U.S. migration and ethnic 
history as well as scholars of U.S. foreign affairs have all turned their attention to issues 
of mobility and the relationship between migrants and their home and host 
governments,15 showing a strong convergence of interests in to subfields that previously 
had little in common. This dissertation makes a compelling case for the benefits of 
further integrating migration history and diplomatic history to ask new questions and also 
to find new sources to answer old ones. 
This study draws on archival material from both sides of the Atlantic and brings 
together governmental sources and sources produced by migrants themselves. The 
holdings of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, the Austrian State 
Archives, and the Hungarian National Archives, particularly underutilized by previous 
scholars, are rich repositories of information on both governmental affairs related to 
                                                       
14 For examples, see hallmark studies Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of 
the Great Migrations That Made the American People (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2002), John Bodnar, The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in 
Urban America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), and John Higham, 
Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 2002). 
15 Recent studies that have informed the methodology of this work, alongside those 
already mentioned, include Donna Gabaccia, Foreign Relations; Erez Manela, The 
Wilsonian Moment; Roger Daniels, Coming to America; Mae M. Ngai, Impossible 
Subjects; Madeline Y. Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home; and many others 
cited below. 
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migration and on Central and Eastern European migrants’ lives in America. While 
Austria-Hungary’s linguistic diversity and its status as two states under one emperor-king 
pose several challenges to historical study, it also has some archival benefits: many 
documents appear in both Vienna and in Budapest or in both German and Hungarian, 
creating a second opportunity to decipher difficult handwriting or faint type, and 
materials collected by various branches of the Austro-Hungarian government were 
routinely translated into German and/or Hungarian from a host of languages. 
Governmental sources are put in conversation with the personal papers of individual 
migrants found in small archives across the United States, records of immigrant clubs and 
churches in the United States, and a wide variety of newspapers. 
Understanding the process of Central and Eastern European nation-building in the 
United States requires exploring a series of overlapping and intersecting histories, which 
unfold in the chapters that follow. Chapter 1 explores multilingualism and the founding 
and dissolution of multiethnic immigrant organizations in the United States, charting the 
timeline of ethnic splintering in America compared to back home. Chapter 2 traces the 
long arm of government of Austria-Hungary in affairs of the Empire’s subjects in the 
U.S., as well as the American government’s views on migrants from Eastern Europe and 
Austro-Hungarian governmental interference on U.S. soil. Chapter 3 follows return 
migrants back to Austria-Hungary, analyzing homeland governments’ competing desires 
to entice migrants home but exclude individuals and ideas that they perceived as a threat 
to the imperial order. Chapter 4, set primarily during World War I, reveals the turn to 
separatism among migrant nationalists and the expansive role that some of them received, 
with the help of the U.S. government, in determining the post-war order. Finally, chapter 
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5 analyzes the dual effects of new European borders after 1918 and American 
immigration restrictions passed in the early 1920s on Central and Eastern European 
immigrants in the United States. Post-World War I borders, accompanied by the 
staunching of the flow of new immigrants by the war and restrictive quotas in the United 
States, together recast the relationship between many immigrants and their homelands. 
Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the First World War peace treaties remained a 
contentious issue in the interwar era for many migrant groups whose nations were losers 
in the settlement, and affects politics even into the present.  
 13 
Chapter 1 
Austro-Hungarian Migrants and Ethnicization Abroad 
Migrants to the United States from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were notoriously difficult to categorize. The 
Empire was home to over a dozen linguistic groups, with varying degrees of affiliation to 
a group identitifcation based around language or the idea of a nation. As we will see 
below, religious and regional identities were far more salient for most migrants than 
ethno-linguistic ones, particularly in rural areas. Nationalism was concentrated much 
more heavily among the bourgeoisie, and even there it competed and often coexisted with 
cosmopolitan imperial patriotism. Many migrants were multilingual in various ways, able 
to communicate in two or more of the empire’s many languages. Yet for decades, 
scholars assumed a natural, preexisting, even biologically determined ethnicity among 
Austro-Hungarian subjects, both at home and as migrants to the United States. Part of this 
assumption comes from official sources. Austro-Hungarian census records and U.S. 
naturalization records list only a single nation of origin or mother tongue, so statistical 
information on the multilingualism of imperial subjects is famously hard to come by. The 
vast majority of immigrant studies discussed a single ethnic group, and assumed that 
migrants had a fixed national identity before stepping foot in the United States. The 
dismantling of Austria-Hungary made such an approach seem appropriate, as many 
Slavic nationalist projects achieved states. Furthermore, many of the sources that 
historians rely on to write migration history were written by committed nation-builders, 
who continually called on their fellow migrants to reorient their worldview to a national 
identity. Histories thus frequently gloss over the abundant evidence of other affiliations 
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and cooperation among those who might later consider themselves members of different 
nations. This chapter will illuminate the process by which many migrants from Austria-
Hungary came to develop a more fixed, exclusive ethnic-national identity as a result of 
their migration to and their time in America. I argue that migration to the United States 
was, for many, a critical process for forging an ethnic affiliation. Migrants who arrived in 
the United States with a fixed, conscious national identitfication were the exception 
rather than the norm.  
Migration abroad was the key factor in people’s ethnic fashioning and 
refashioning. “National consciousness among the immigrant peasants was much stronger 
than among those who had staid in the old country,” historian Julianna Puskás explained 
of migrants from the Kingdom of Hungary near the turn of the twentieth century. 
“Forming ethnic groups was the first step in the process of adaptation, and it was here 
that many immigrants first became really aware of their Magyar consciousness.” Puskás 
suggested “the pressure of the prejudices of American society” as the key factor in the 
development of their national consciousness.16  Puskás’s language, however, still 
suggests that Magyar consciousness was an innate thing that Hungarian migrants 
inherently had in themselves somewhere and had to discover. M. Mark Stolarik, foremost 
among the historians of Slovak America for decades, complained of the “common 
American error” “incorrectly label[ing]” Slovaks as Hungarians.17 Stolarik’s framework, 
like that of countless historians of his generation who wrote Eastern European migration 
                                                       
16 Puskás, From Hungary to the United States (1880-1914) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 
1982), 
173. 
17 M. Mark Stolarik, Growing Up on the South Side: Three Generations of Slovaks in 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 1880-1976 (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University Press, 
1985), 63. Geopolitcally, it was not an error. 
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history, employs “ethnic origin” as the primary category of analysis long before many 
migrants themselves recognized national identity or ethnicity as the primary way of 
identifying who they were. Historians must consider each migrant on a full spectrum 
from nation-builder to nationally indifferent. Each underwent a constant evolution in his 
or her place on this spectrum and was influenced by factors like class, family, and what 
communities they are migrating from and to. Indeed, even long ago a few scholars 
astutely noted that the “borders between Croat and Slovene identity,” for example, 
“which seem so firm now to scholars of ethnicity and then to nationalists, were capable of 
great elasticity”18 and that nation-building was a “complex, erratic, paradoxical 
phenomenon within immigrant communities from the heterogeneous ethnic regions of 
Austria-Hungary.” Beginning in the late nineteenth century, nurturing a national identity 
seemed to become a moral imperative in many nationalist circles. Nation-building is 
revealed to be a much more elastic process when we look at the views and choices of 
migrants themselves alongside those of competing governments and blustering nation-
builders. As one historian described it, nation-building and national identity formation 
were “complex, erratic, paradoxical”19  As Conzen, Gerber, Morawska, Pozzetta, and 
Vecoli synthesized in “The Invention of Ethnicity” in 1992, scholars now see ethnicity as 
created rather than primordial, and this study agrees. Ethnicity is “continuously being 
reinvented in response to changing realities both within the group and,” in the case of 
migrants, “the host society.”20   
                                                       
18 Robert Harney, Toronto: Canada's New Cosmopolite. Occasional Papers in Ethnic 
and Immigration Studies (Toronto: The Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1981), 
16. 
19 Vassady, “Mixed Ethnic Identities among Immigrant Clergy,” 47. 
20 Conzen, et. al., “The Invention of Ethnicity,” 5. 
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This chapter will discuss, first, the fluid, mixed identities of Austro-Hungarian 
migrants through their multilingualism, arguing that one’s dominant language did not 
simply equate to an obvious ethnic affiliation for an individual. This began to change as 
migrants began to identify increasingly be ethnicity. Governmental agencies in Europe 
and the United States externally categorized them according ever-changing national, 
ethnic, and racial labels, contributing to the stiffening of ethnic categories. The 
ethnicization process was due not only to blatantly political national activity in the United 
States, but also to the changing relationship between religious and ethnic identity and the 
soft power of migrant social institutions. All of this culminated in the splitting of 
migrants’ early multiethnic institutions and their individual association with a single 
ethnicity, based primarily on tongue. The timelines for the politicization of ethnic 
identification and separatism in the United States unfolded earlier than in East-Central 
Europe. Rather than fleeing from a nationally repressive, crumbling empire, migrants 
came to the United States seeking opportunity and in the process changed the way they 
saw themselves both individually and communally.  
It is critical to remember that migrants seldom considered nationality in their 
decisions to migrate; their motives were overwhelmingly economic. Although political 
complications stemming from national identification figured prominently in the 
emigration of a notable few, push factors for most migrants were dominated by concerns 
relating to work and taxes, followed by land. In 1904, the Hungarian government 
collected reports from the sheriff of each county that had seen high rates of emigration. 
County officials were tasked with explaining the causes and magnitude of emigration and 
what changes could potentially stem its tide, breaking down their discussion into different 
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language groups. The causes that the county officials cited were overwhelmingly 
economic. Their proposed solutions dealt at length with the struggles of agricultural 
families, particularly as they related to their tax burden, the availability and unavailability 
of work at different times of the year, and landlessness. In Bereg County, the sheriff 
proposed a decrease in taxes and reform of interest laws, governmental coordination of 
off-season home production of baskets and straw products to generate off-season income, 
and public assistance for obtaining more and better farming implements and machinery. 
Some sheriffs explained that speakers of different languages tended to cluster around 
certain occupations that faced somewhat different economic challenges or labor needs in 
many counties; for example, local Hungarian-speakers were more geared toward farming 
and local Slovak-speakers more geared toward herding. But others stated that the reasons 
for emigration were the same for the area’s Slovak-, Rusyn-, and Hungarian-speakers 
(when they could even be distinguished). Ethnicity was not a salient push factor for 
emigration in any of the county reports. The closest were some Hungarian-speaking 
migrants from Zemplén County, who chose to migrate to the United States after seeing 
that some Slovak-speakers had made good money abroad. Even as Budapest officials 
asked about nationality in the migration equation, village and county officials continually 
responded with answers about occupation and class (seasonal unemployment and high 
taxes), reflecting the factors that migrants themselves cared about the most.21 Migration 




                                                       
21 MNL OL, K26, 630 cs., XVI tét. 
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The Multilingual Migrant  
 Multilingualism was a fact of everyday life in much of Austria-Hungary and 
among its migrants. Immigration to the United States was particularly strong from the 
northern counties of the Hungarian Kingdom, where Slovak, Rusin, Hungarian, German, 
and Yiddish were all spoken. Bohemia, Transylvania, and Vojvodina were also linguistic 
borderlands, and German was widely spoken in many cities and larger market towns, 
even in areas that were not otherwise German-speaking. The Empire’s extensive school 
system contributed to multilingualism. With public schools supplemented by a host of 
religious schools, instruction could be received in an array of languages. Even in non-
German-speaking areas, German knowledge expanded through the school system.22 As 
German was the primary bureaucratic language of Austria, all those with aspirations to 
work in government and civil service learned it. But German was far from the only 
language used in official matters. Emperor Joseph II’s attempts to make German the 
official language of the empire in 1784 produced an aggressive backlash among the 
nobility in Hungary, who used Latin as the official language of Parliament and favored 
the use of Hungarian instead, thwarting the greatest opportunity to implement a single 
imperial language. Hungary’s Nationalities Law of 1868 mandated official record-
keeping in Hungarian in the Hungarian half of the Empire and enumerated minority 
language rights in areas where at least one fifth of the population requested them; while 
the promised minority language rights were honored only selectively, the law nonetheless 
heightened multilingual knowledge.23 An 1880 decree made Czech a language of 
                                                       
22 Schooling in others languages was, however, much more common is Cisleithenia than 
in Hungary.  
23 See László Kontler, History of Hungary: Millennium in Central Europe (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), Mark Cornwall, Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multi-
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administration in Bohemia, elevating the status and careers of civil servants who spoke 
both Czech and German.24 The Imperial & Royal Army encouraged multilingualism, 
giving all soldiers a working knowledge of German-language commands, authorizing the 
use of other regimental languages, and allowing for greater social mobility for non-
Hungarian speakers than most other occupations in Hungary.25 So, too, did imperial 
commerce, which connected disparate parts of the empire through trade.  
Migrants, not surprisingly, then, had rich and varied linguistic histories, reflecting 
the richness of the linguistic genealogies of their families and the richness of the 
linguistic landscape in Austria-Hungary. Statistics on multilingualism in Austria-Hungary 
are sparse and sometimes highly politicized,26 but migrant testimonials offer an 
abundance of evidence on their multilingualism, changing language use, and challenges 
in identifying themselves. Migrant George Zemanovic’s father had spoken Slovak at 
home, Hungarian at school, and German while serving in the Austro-Hungarian military; 
he always “reverted” to German to cuss. His mother spoke Slovak and Hungarian, which 
                                                                                                                                                                     
National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe, 2nd ed. (Exeter: University of 
Exeter Press, 2002), and Maxwell, Choosing Slovakia. 
24 Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial 
Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006) and Jeremy King, 
Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), esp. 59. 
25 Istvan Deák, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg 
Officer Corps, 1848-1918 and essays in Laurence Cole, Christa Hämmerle, Martin 
Scheutz, eds. Glanz-Gewalt-Gehorsam: Militär und Gesellschaft in der 
Habsburgermonarchie (1800 bis 1918) (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2011). 
26 See, for example, Tamara Scheer, “Habsburg Languages at War: ‘The Linguistic 
Confusion at the Tower of Babel Couldn’t Have Been Much Worse,” in Languages and 
the First World War: Communicating in a Transnational War, ed. Christophe Declercq 
and Julian Walker (London: Palgrave, 2016); László Marácz, “Multilingualism in the 
Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918): Policy and Practice,” 
Jezikoslovlje 13.2 (2012); and Susan Gal, Polyglot Nationalism. Alternative Perspectives 
on Language in 19th century Hungary,” Langage et société 136, no. 2 (2011). 
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she learned while living with her sister in Budapest.27 As Yolan Szency Batta, from 
present-day Santovka, Slovakia, remembered, “when I came out I spoke Bohemian good. 
Bohemian and German . . . and Hungarian.”28 Adolph Norman, from present-day 
Bratislava, was schooled in Hungarian, German, and Hebrew, and perhaps also spoke 
Yiddish.29 John Chomos, describing his home village of Vășad in Transylvania, 
explained, “This is at the juncture of the Hungarian and Roumanian border. . . . [B]order 
town people talked both languages.”30 “[In] the part of Europe we came from, the 
Balkans,” Mimi Pintorich explained, in addition to “Slavish,” “we understood German, 
we understood Hungarian.”31  Knowledge of a variety of languages was widespread and 
utilitarian in a multi-ethnic empire.  
Migrant Louis Zauneker’s multilingualism defined his encounter with America. 
On the one hand it eased his passage, as he could communicate widely with other 
migrants. On the other hand, it prompted difficult questions about his personal identity 
once he left the Hungarian-Yugoslav borderland and arrived in Cleveland. “I made some 
friends on the ship,” he explained to an interviewer. “They spoke every language that you 
could think of, and I could speak German, I could speak Hungarian, and Slovanian [sic]. 
So I could speak to those people. So I wasn't completely lost.” Rather than seeing himself 
as voyaging alongside a bunch of “others,” Zauneker shared a common lot and common 
                                                       
27 Interview of George Zemanovic by Paul E. Sigrist, Jr., August 4, 1993, in Ellis Island 
Oral History Interview, Series EI, no. 365. 
28 Interview of Yolan Batta by Paul E. Sigrist, Jr., December 6, 1990, in Ellis Island Oral 
History Project, Series EI, no. 013. 
29 Interview of Norman Adolph by Nancy Dallett, May 21, 1986, in Ellis Island Oral 
History Project, Series AKRF, no. 145. 
30 Interview of John Chomos by Brian Feeney, May 11, 1988, in Ellis Island Oral History 
Project, Series NPS, no. 159. 
31 Interview of Millie Cranford by Nancy Dallett, November 14, 1985, in Ellis Island 
Oral History Project, Series KECK, no. 081. 
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languages with his fellow travelers. Rather than disdaining speakers of other languages 
and being glad to abandon Europe to leave them behind, he seems unproblematically 
indifferent to languages and nationality. It was only upon his arrival in the United States 
that he had trouble explaining who or what he was. Trying to enroll in school, he 
recalled, “I remember the first thing [the teacher] asked me what my name was. … In 
German my name was Ludwig Vukan, in Hungarian it was Lajos Vukan, and in 
Slovanian it was Laici Vukan, and then when I came to America, they asked me what my 
name was” and he did not know how to answer. While Louis Zauneker’s facility across 
three languages and his identification with three different names might be more fluid and 
flexible than many other migrants, his multilingualism and his questioning of his identity 
as it related to language were widely shared.32   
Adding English was, of course, the most common next step for migrants, but 
some migrants learned new European languages in preparation for or as a result of their 
migration. As we learned in the introduction, Andrew Lichanec learned Slovak not in 
Europe but in America, as he was learning English. Migrant Irma Willishitzs Schmidt’s 
mother sent her to live with an aunt to learn German before bring Irma out to America, 
presumably to expand her job prospects.  Once over, she quickly got a job doing 
housework in a German-speaking home, and eventually married a German immigrant.33 
Emery Kanarik, whose Budapest family spoke Hungarian, used Slovak at the market, and 
learned German and Hebrew in school, benefitted from his multilingualism in American 
                                                       
32 Interview of Louis Zauneker by Willa Appel, February 6, 1986, in Ellis Island Oral 
History Project, Series AKRF, no. 157. For recent scholarship on the concept of national 
indifference, see Tara Zahra, “Imagined Non-Communities: National Indifference as a 
Category of Analysis,” Slavic Review 69 (Spring 2010), 93-119. See also the special issue 
on national indifference of the Austrian History Yearbook 43 (2012). 
33 Interview of Irma Willishitzs Schmidt by Janet Levine, February 17, 1994, in Ellis 
Island Oral History Project, Series EI, no. 426. 
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to earn his livelihood in German translation.34 One migrant settling in central New Jersey, 
added Hungarian to her linguistic repertoire of Slovak and English, communicating with 
neighbors around each others’ kitchen tables. The Bécsi Magyar Ujság, a Hungarian 
newspaper published in Vienna, reported in 1884 that Slovaks in America were 
“fervently learning Hungarian” to make them more desirable to employers, to 
communicate on the job with Hungarian-speakers or perhaps to take advantage of the 
better impressions among some employers of Hungarian workers over Slavic ones.35  
Ethnic neighborhoods coalesced in countless American cities, but rather than 
enclaves, they were cultural meeting grounds not entirely unlike the diverse areas than 
many Austro-Hungarian migrants came from. Cleveland featured churches from nearly 
half a dozen groups “all within a one-mile radius of that center point of the West Side 
Market at the corner of West 25th and Lorraine:” Hungarian Calvinist, Irish Catholic,  
German Lutheran, German Catholic, and Slovak churches all in close proximity.36 Mimi 
Pintorich, whose family settled in Bridgeport, Connecticut, observed that “in our area it 
was . . . Hungarian and, uh, Yugoslav community, ” with Italian-Americans also in the 
immediate area.37  
The linguistic pluralism of individuals and communities gave migrants more 
options, whether in marriage, business, recreation, or worship. Historical sociologist Ewa 
Morawska found intermarriage rates as high as 25-30% for Slovaks and Rusins in 
                                                       
34 Interview of Emery Kanarik by Andrew Phillips, May 24, 1989, in Ellis Island Oral 
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35 Bécsi Magyar Ujság, May 11, 1884. 
36 Interview of John Chomos by Brian Feeney, May 11, 1988, in Ellis Island Oral History 
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Johnstown, PA at the turn of the century.38 In New Brunswick, New Jersey in 1905, in-
group marriage between Hungarians was common (only Budapest and Cleveland had 
more Hungarian speakers), but women listed in the local census as Hungarian were 
married to men born in Austria, Bohemia, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the U.S. 
Hungarian men were married to women born in the same places, as well as England and 
Canada.39 Beyond marriage, other facets of community life made ethnic blocs porous. 
“Whomever did have an establishment better be able to talk two or three languages to be 
able to maintain a good [business],” John Chomos remembered.40 “I was singing in every 
club,” regardless of language, Philomena Skapik recounted, “with the Hungarians, with 
the . . . Bohemian[s].”41   
Austro-Hungarian migrants’ multilingualism eased the difficulty of learning 
English for many of them, as they were already used to learning and juggling multiple 
languages. “The language [English] was so easy to me compared to German,” Emery 
Kanarik recalled.” “It was marvelous. German had all these rules about feminine gender 
and neutral and masculine gender, . . .  Your nose has to have a gender. It's just 
ridiculous. . . .  English, compared to this, was a cinch.”42 
                                                       
38 Morawska, “The Internal Status Hierarchy in the East European Immigrant 
Communities of Johnstown, Pa., 1890-1930's,” Social History 16 (Fall 1982). 84. Mutual 
Intelligibility of Languages in the Slavic Family estimated the mutual intelligibility of 
Eastern Slovak and Rusyn at 82%. 
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Project, Series NPS, no. 159. 
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History Project, Series DP, no. 029. 
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When, with successive generations, knowledge of multiple European languages 
waned, served not simply to Americanize Europeans but as a language that facilitated 
continued communication between disparate Austro-Hungarian communities. In 
Cleveland’s Buckeye Road neighborhood, at one time the largest concentration of 
Hungarian-speakers outside of Hungary, English offered a neutral language of 
communication. “When we stepped out” in Buckeye, John Chomos recalled, “we spoke 
English to my Slovak friend, or to my Irish friend, or to my German friend.”43 The 
Cleveland Board of Education’s “Many Peoples, One Language” campaign promoted 
English in a multicultural city. The advertisement for adult English and citizenship 
courses featured the text in multiple languages, including English, Italian, Polish, 
Hungarian, and Hebrew, all in the same text size. The image featured an obviously 
immigrant couple, but without any specific markers of European national dress.44 While 
language policies favoring German and Hungarian in Austria and Hungary were favorite 
grievances among nationalists – American social scientist Emily Balch explained that 
nationalists in Europe “indignantly repudiate the use of languages which they understand 
perfectly well”45 --  nationalists seldom complained about the predominance of English in 
the United States.46 While some might lament the loss of the languages of the 
motherland, even to the most ardent nationalists, learning English had fewer overtones of 
national betrayal. 
                                                       
43 Interview of John Chomos by Brian Feeney, May 11, 1988, in Ellis Island Oral History 
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Ethnic Categorization in the Migration Bureaucracy and American Racial Science 
As migrants left Austria-Hungary and entered the United States, countless 
European and American officials, fellow passengers, new neighbors, and employers 
asked them to explain their national background. Austria-Hungary’s dualism and its mix 
of nationalities stymied American officials and social scientists. The American 
classification system of aliens in migrant records contributed to the ethnicization of 
migrants by often requiring that they articulate (or be assigned) a single race, nationality, 
mother tongue, or other marker of national identity. The categorization schemes of the 
U.S. Immigration Bureau, ethnographers, and racial theorists on both sides of the Atlantic 
indeed created the spectrum of ethnicities that outsiders would recognize. The U.S. 
government and social scientific community employed evolving classification systems 
that expanded and contracted and lumped migrants very differently in the decades 
between 1880 and 1930. Racial theories assigned essential characteristics to migrant 
groups and touted ethnic traits that made them appear to be better or worse employees. 
These types of theories and competition for jobs sometimes recast labor competition 
ethnically. Migrants’ rivalry in the United States for jobs and Americans’ goodwill were 
easily confused with homeland “hatreds,” but in reality these American situations were 
creating or heightening European antagonisms, rather than reflecting or continuing 
them.47   
                                                       
47 Governmental reports, settlement publications, employers, and unions had varying 
grasps of the relationship between ethnic tensions and labor tensions. While many 
observers were quick to ascribe ethnic dimensions to labor conflicts, these have likely 
been overstated. For every workplace scenario that divided workers by ethnicity, another 
brought them together, like the Kundtz factories in Cleveland. For past treatments of 
these matters, see Gordon, Edwards, and Reich, Segmented Work, Divided Workers, and 
John Bodnar, Workers’ World. 
 26 
 The U.S. Immigration Bureau’s categorization scheme was particularly 
influential, despite being wildly inconsistent and rather unorthodox. In 1902, the 
commissioner for the Royal Hungarian Commission of Agriculture, wrote to T.V. 
Powderly, the U.S. Commissioner-General of Immigration, to complain about the 
Immigration Office’s misunderstanding of Austria-Hungary’s dualism: Until 1899, 
migrants were categorized as coming from Bohemia, Hungary, or Austria. “Though this 
division was incorrect from the diplomatic standpoint,” he explained, nevertheless it was 
easy to show the exact number of the Emigration of Hungarian citizens and of Austrian 
citizens,” presumably by adding the figures for Bohemia and Austria together. “Austria-
Hungary consisted since 1867 of two separat [sic] monarchies . . . ; there is no Austro-
Hungarian Government, and no Austro-hungarian citizenship, there are only Hungarian 
citizens, and Austrian citizens.” ⁠48 From 1899 to 1910, the list of options included 
“Bohemian and Moravian,” “Bulgarian,” “Croatian and Slovenian,” “Dalmatian, 
Bosnian, and Herzegovian,” “German,” “Hebrew,” “North Italian,” “Magyar,” “Polish,” 
“Roumanian,” “Ruthenian” (other places written as “Russniak”), and “Slovak.” Needless 
to say, some of these descriptors had more staying power than others. After 1910,the list 
was revised to reshuffle some of the categories, eventually eliminating northern Italian 
and combining several Balkan groups. 
Geographic and nationality designations were further complicated by the breakup 
of the Empire after 1918 and the creation of new states, which will be discussed further in 
chapter 5. Post-war practices add another layer of complication and ambiguity to pre-war 
nationality designations. Migrants were assigned to quotas based on the state that their 
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place of origin now belonged, not by nationality,49 but US citizenship paperwork began 
to include additional information in the 1920s to clarify migrants’ pre- and post-war 
homelands and “race.” Gergely Dorkó of Mollenaur, PA, who received his naturalization 
in April 1920, was still listed with a previous naturalization as Austria-Hungary, which 
had ceased to exist as a political entity in 1918. A few years later, Louise Kroncsis of 
Canton, OH who became a citizen in 1929, was listed as “race Magyar; former 
nationality Rumanian,” adapting to the increased complexity of borders in the post-war 
era.50  
 American social scientists, some of whom were deeply interested in migrants, 
likewise contributed to enscribing as well as muddling the nationality categories of 
America’s East Europeans arrivers. In Margaret Frances Byington and Paul Kellogg 
Underwood’s Homestead, part of the Pittsburgh Survey, the used “Slav” as a “generic 
term to include Magyars and Lithuanians, as well as those of the Slavic race.”51  The 
Dillingham Commission’s “Dictionary of Races or Peoples” entry for “Slav” sought to 
analyze the “many-sided Slavic stock” by the “numerous ‘races’ which comprise it.” The 
“Classification of Slavic Tongues” included an Eastern & Southern Division of Russian, 
Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, and Slovenian, each with numerous sub-categories, and a 
Western Division of Bohemian (of which Tsekh [sic], Moravian, and Slovak were sub-
categories), Polish, and Lusatian (Wend). Dillingham commented that the list was “of 
Slavic languages, not of physical races,” noting that Bosnian and Herczegovian had been 
omitted, and raising questions over the exact placement of Macedonian, Bulgarian, and 
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others. The Dictionary’s entry on Slovaks raised the issue of whether Slovaks were 
actually Moravians or Czechs, and attempted to explain the diversity of Slovak dialects. 
As social scientists of all stripes – ethnographers, linguists, sociologists, anthropologists – 
and policy-makers published their findings, the options of nationality categories 
expanded and shrank, affixing some into the position of a “race” and others as only 
speakers of a “dialect.” This was dependent, in large part, on group size, the number of 
people in the United States to study, and the ability of some writers of a “nationality” or 
“race” to publish in English about it to gain an American social scientific audience. 
Social scientists scrambled to discover the truth, largely blind to their own role in 
creating the categories of East European nationalities.  
The US press used a jumble of governmental, social scientific, and local labels 
(sometimes migrant-generated, sometimes nativist slurs), expanding but further 
inscribing the dominance of ethnic categories. Outbreaks of labor unrest or localized 
violence among migrants were often ascribed to old ethnic hatreds in the American press, 
rather than disputes over real issues in migrants’ American lives. The Washington Post 
reported in1903, for example, that the city of Whiting’s “Slavs engage[d] in battle.” “On 
one side are Servians, Hungarians, and Croatians. On the other side,” it continued, “are 
those designated by the generic name.” All the police could deduce were that the 
“contest[,] begun in Europe,” was now being “fought out on the soil of Indiana,” a highly 
unlikely transatlantic continuation of a homeland brawl in the Midwest.52 In white 
American parlance, “Hunkie” and “Bohunk” did not strictly slur Hungarians and 
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Bohemians, respectively. The terms reflected Americans’ ignorance of the migrants in 
their communities, but also the reality of migrant communities’ national ambiguity.53 
  Bureaucratic and other categories of nationality were selectively embraced and 
challenged by migrants, depending on local conditions and the development of national 
movements in their vicinity. Historian Josef Barton found that Cleveland’s Serbs, Croats, 
Slovenes, Slovaks, Poles, and Hungarians developed some pride in a “hunky” identity.54 
The multilingualism and lack of a firm ethnic identity of migrants confounded migration 
bureaucrats and Americans, and the shifting official definitions of what “nationality” or 
“race” continually influenced the roster of peoples migrants might belong to. Immigrant 
nationalists could use governmental or social scientific evidence to lend legitimacy to 
their national projects and bring others in to the nationalist fold. But as even the social 
scientists noted, many of the debates about nationality and race were muddled by 
religion. It was in churches, most of all, that migrants would be ethnicized. 
 
Joint Institutions and the Parting of Ways: Migrant Churches Form and Split 
From 1890 to the outbreak and aftermath of the First World War, scores of 
previously multi-ethnic institutions in the United States split into more linguistically 
exclusive institutions and hundreds founded by and for single groups. Churches, clubs, 
and societies had begun more inclusively, only to splinter along developing ethno-
linguistic lines near and after the turn of the century. The parting of ways could take all 
forms, from an intentional separation to the slow building to dominance of a single 
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language group. The dramatic effects of turn-of-the-century nationalization demand that 
we answer why migrants from Austria-Hungary were initially willing and eager to found 
multi-lingual institutions in the United States and why, at points both before and after 
World War I, many parted ways. Furthermore, we must explain why this history of early 
multiethnic roots was successively written out of the historical record. Churches are the 
most effective venue of migrant life to tell this story. Anniversary yearbooks, along with 
other institutional records, shed light on organizations’ multiethnic or multilingual 
foundings, and also illustrate how these early collaborations were jettisoned from 
institutional histories with each passing anniversary.  Hungarian-Slovak Protestant 
churches founded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the most 
common but by no means the only category of collaborative ventures among Austro-
Hungarian migrants that later split into ethnically exclusive institutions. 
“The First Magyar and Slovak Evangelic Lutheran & Reformed St. Paul Church” 
in Pittsburgh was among the first churches, if not the first, founded by Austro-Hungarian 
migrants in North America. According to a church history from 1960, “This unnatural 
union, which the Hungarian and Slovak brethren founded, collapsed” within two years in 
a “split of nationalities.”55 The division of the church into the “Slovak Lutheran Church 
of Braddock” and the Calvinist-denomination “Pittsburgh and Vicinity First Hungarian 
Reformed Church” within two short years might suggest a simple split by nationality, but 
that notion ignores the reasons behind the church’s joint founding itself and the rapidly 
changing conception of what would have been considered “natural” in the 1890s. For 
migrants coming to the Pittsburgh area, interactions among Hungarian- and Slovak-
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speakers was by no means exceptional. The title page of the church’s original collection 
book celebrated “God’s help” in the church’s founding, in both Hungarian and Slovak;56 
the collaboration seems to have been completely genuine. The Lutheran and Reformed 
[Calvinist] union, however ethnically or linguistically coded, was the result of a 
compromise, as the two churches’ future denominational distinction also suggests; while 
Lutherans and Calvinists both preached the gift of God’s salvation through faith alone, 
Calvinists believed that faith itself was a gift that God gave only to a predestined few. 
Eight miles stood between the church in Pittsburgh and the new Slovak church in 
Braddock, indicating that distance and growing numbers in the city’s vicinity also 
prompted the planting of the new Braddock church. Pastor Francis Ferenczy is said to 
have brought together Hungarian and Slovak Reformed peopled from a number of 
surrounding towns that he visited, including Homestead, Duquesne, and Rankin, all of 
which subsequently developed stand-alone churches in the coming decade.57 
Furthermore, a number of Slovak-speaking parishioners in Pittsburgh continued to 
worship with the First Hungarian Reformed Church, which continued to hold six Slovak-
language services a year.58 Thus, to interpret the 1891 split of the Pittsburgh church as an 
ethnic fissure does not completely stand up in retrospect. 
While the Pittsburgh church split very early in its history, as many other hybrid 
undertakings did once they had the financial wherewithal to do so, a number of multi-
ethnic churches remained intact well into the twentieth century. The heightened 
nationalism of the First World War and the subsequent peace settlements became the 
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impetus for severing long-standing unions into separate entities. American migrant 
churches pursued disunion partly as a response to new European borders and geographies 
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. As the ecclesiastical centers of power shifted away from 
Europe to American-based denominations, multi-ethnic churches faced new challenges 
and overwhelmingly pursued the single-nationality option that we mistakenly assume 
they had chosen from the outset.  In many ways like the Pittsburg church, the Perth 
Amboy Hungarian Reformed Church, founded in 1903 by Felvidék – or upland area – 
migrants from Hungary, is a classic example of a collaborative ethnic institution. In the 
album for the church’s twenty-fifth anniversary, celebrated in 1928, the historical profile 
for the church noted that “the Slovak speaking Reformed element took an active part in 
the churchlife from the very beginning.”59 Slovak language services were offered one 
Sunday a month and even expanded as late as 1911. What, then, went wrong? “In 1924 
the Slovak members, who had been connected with the church from the very beginning, 
seceded from the church. This action was taken by them on account of the political 
troubles and antagonism in Europe. The Slovak Reformed people here,” it continues, 
“were influenced by Bohemian Presbyterian ministers and their secession was made in a 
peaceful manner. The great majority went into the Presbyterian Church and a few 
remained with us who were satisfied with Magyar services.” Doctrinally nearly identical, 
the split was much more clearly ethnically motivated. 
These few short lines are profoundly telling in the ways that they confirm post-
war nationalism but at the same time subtly challenge narratives about ethnic exclusivity. 
First, the cooperative venture lasted for over twenty years. Second, the source claims that 
the split was prompted by European, rather than local, circumstances. Third, the split is 
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said to haven been caused by outside agitators in the form of Czech clergy, rather than 
disputes originating from within the community. Existing documents make it hard to 
definitively confirm or deny these latter two causal factors, but the church’s early history 
nevertheless suggests decades of unremarkably peaceful shared history, followed by a 
seemingly velvet divorce. A bifurcating institution often yields a second set of documents 
from which to examine the institution’s history, in this case in the form of a 1951 Golden 
Jubilee Book of the Slovak Calvinist Presbyterian Union, which has a chapter on the 
church coming out of the Perth Amboy split. The history therein clarifies for us the 
breakdown of the administrative roles that Austro-Hungarian governing bodies had 
played in immigrant churches and how that brought about ethnic separatism. When the 
Perth Amboy pulpit became vacant in 1923 with the bilingual pastor, Reverend 
Nánassy’s, return to Europe, there was no longer a mother church mechanism to secure a 
bilingual minister and only Hungarian-speaking candidates applied for the position. It 
was then that Slovak speakers withdrew from the church and arranged for a Slovak 
Presbyterian minister from Jersey City to hold weekly services for them, founding the 
Slovak Presbyterian Church of Perth Amboy.60 The Slovak yearbook speaks rather 
amicably about the split, as though a bilingual successor to Rev. Nánassy would have 
continued a viable union. A sizable faction of the remaining Hungarian-speaking 
congregation splintered off to found the John Calvin Magyar Reformed Church just a 
mile away over disputes about American denominational affiliations; not all splits were 
national.   
The Perth Amboy case leaves us with as many questions as answers, but suggests 
a clear alternative to Pittsburgh’s rapid, though also rather amicable, division along 
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ethno-linguistic lines: a long-standing union with a post-war split. This alternative lends 
evidence to the interpretation that it required some ethnically divisive catalyst to drive 
multi-lingual congregations into difference national camps. As in Perth Amboy, it was a 
staffing problem that split the Slovak and Hungarian Calvinist Church in Mount Carmel, 
Pennsylvania. While the original minister had been bilingual, like many of the 
parishioners, and offered services in both Slovak and Hungarian, his successor could not 
preach in Slovak, angering many of the Slovak-speaking members who saw their native-
language services disappear. In that case it was the Hungarian-speaking minister and 
some members who left to found their own church, leaving the original church to the 
Slovak-speaking congregants.61 
In other cases churches’ multilingual foundings were rewritten to fit national 
tropes. These retellings of church histories can seem blind to the different priorities of 
early migrant communities and the constructedness of national projects.  At the start of 
the twentieth century, “the Slovak Calvins living in Greater Cleveland . . . were … 
worshipping God in three different Hungarian churches,” a history of the Slovak 
Calvinist United Presbyterian Church in Lakewood, Ohio explained. “Even their names 
were enrolled in the membership of those churches.” While the author recounts this as a 
cause for dismay, the integration of Slovak- and Hungarian-speakers in both work and 
social life was completely normal in the Cleveland vicinity (as it had been in northern 
Hungary). Why do these later yearbooks scoff at interethnic worship? The proposal to 
found an exclusively Slovak Protestant congregation arose in 1917, well into the war, 
followed the founding of an exclusively Slovak men’s fraternal lodge. The creation of an 
ethnically exclusive social space in the form of a fraternal club apparently prompted 
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dissatisfaction with the lack of a comparably exclusive religious space. The yearbook 
states in no uncertain terms that “when Men’s Lodge No. 33 was organized and the 
people had an occasion for frequent meetings which afforded them opportunity to 
exchange their views, the enthusiasm [‘to organize an independent Slovak Calvinistic 
Church’] was revived.” 62 By 1917 many Slovak-speaking Americans and Hungarian-
speaking Americans hoped for different outcomes for the war. 
It is easy to forget that amid growing national separatism and linguistic 
differentiation, ethnic churches also increasingly had to accommodate English. Many 
later-generation immigrants were multilingual in the sense of a single East European 
mother tongue and English, with parishioners no longer speaking other languages of the 
Empire. Holding a joint Hungarian-Slovak service would no longer be a mutually 
understood sharing of linguistic affinities as it had been at the outset, but instead a dated 
practice. The minister and presumably some older church members could continue to 
play a bridging role, but finding truly trilingual clergy — fluent in Hungarian, Slovak, 
and English — was an even taller order and increasingly difficult with U.S. immigration 
restrictions enacted in 1924. 
Clergy, we see, were highly influential in the national disposition of migrants. As 
educated and often middle-class professionals, clergymen were overwhelmingly 
multilingual and initially among the most significant go-betweens between migrant 
communities and homelands; at the same time, they were also more likely to be 
nationalists than their parishioners, and many occupied influential community leadership 
positions to spread nationalism. Some persisted successfully in their roles as cultural 
intermediaries and leaders of peaceful multilingual congregations; others committed 
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themselves whole heartedly to a national cause; others returned to Hungary. “Many 
shifted back and forth in identity,” historian Béla Vassady explains, “greatly frustrating 
and irritating both their Slovak and Magyar compatriots.”63 “Apparently,” Vassady 
continues, “Hungarian and Slovak observers alike had difficulty accepting the fact that . . 
. the shifting of ethnic identity more often reflected practical opportunism and community 
politics than ideologically motivated nationalism.”64 Indeed, Vassady’s observation of 
community politics is crucial: the language mix, nationalist sentiment, political tenor, and 
everyday concerns were widely different in a majority-Slovak congregation of Pittsburgh 
versus the mixed congregation of Bridgeport, Connecticut versus a primarily Hungarian 
parish in Indiana. Because of all of these factors, as well as their personal sentiments, 
clergy could be found all along the political spectrum from Habsburg loyalist to ethnic 
separatist.  
Two points on this spectrum that deserve special attention are so-called panslavs 
and magyarones. Clerics’ nationalism could be expressed in conflicting ways in their 
relationship to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy: loyalty to the Hungarian government 
and/or the Habsburg monarchy, indifference to politics, or support for ideologies that 
gave greater autonomy or a new state for the Empire’s Slavs or emerging ethno-linguistic 
groups. Slovak-speaking clergy were present, for example, among Czech-oriented 
“Panslav” groups, exclusive Slovak nationalist groups, as well as pro-Hungarian 
“Magyarones.” This plurality among the largely Catholic Slovak clergy (who, we should 
note, very often preached to non-Slovak-speaking parishioners) illustrates some of the 
many ways migrants themselves chose to align themselves nationally and politically, and 
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how clerics’ nationality views could be politically significant. “This great aggregate of 
humanity in a strange land” one Hungarian government official noted, “is for the most 
part in the hands of the priests, owing to the profoundly religious spirit of the Slovaks. . . 
.  This great moral factor, however,” he lamented, “is unfortunately wielded against us. . . 
. Only seven [of the Roman Catholic congregations are] presided over by patriotic priests 
[loyal to the Hungarian government], while the Slovak and Bohemian priests of Pan-
Slavic sympathies, hailing from the Western Highlands lead the other 35.”65   
Political Magyaronism was widespread among a segment of emigrant clergy in 
the United States, as were accusations of panslavism. Middle-class professionalization in 
Hungary’s growing school system, economic system, and urban cultural modernization 
were the sine qua non of pro-Hungarian Magyaronism and also anti-Hungarian Slavic 
nationalisms. Culturally chauvinist elements of Magyarization abounded and chaffed at 
many rising intelligentsia, while others experienced its benefits far more than its 
repressions. Among Rusin intelligentsia, according to John-Paul Himka, “the Magyarone 
orientation” was characterized as “natione Hungarus, gente Ruthuenus; that is, 
Hungarian as far as political consciousness and high culture was concerned, with some 
room for an oral Ruthenian vernacular, colorful ethnographic peculiarities, and 
Lokalpatriotismus.”66 This offered an elevation of status and an acceptable expression of 
Rusin national pride.  For clergy in northern Hungary, Magyaronism could share political 
underpinnings with Austro-Slavism, believing, at least for the time being, that the Slovak 
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nation’s interests were best served within Hungary. The Hungarian government promoted 
Magyaronism among emigrant clergy through kingdom-wide Magyarization in mid-late 
nineteenth century Hungary broadly,67 and specifically through the intentional selection 
of clergy loyal to the government to serve emigrant congregations, which will be 
discussed further in the subsequent chapter.   
Nationalists and governmental officials feuded endlessly over whether specific 
priests were too Magyarone or too panslav, loyal or traitorous Slovaks or Hungarians. 
Long before historians like Tara Zahra, Pieter Judson, Jeremy King, and others began 
analyzing the side-switching, hedging of bets, and seemingly contradictory behavior of 
the so-called “nationally indifferent,” in Europe, Monika Glettler and Bela Vassady 
identified the lives of Jozef Kossalko, Ignác Jaskovic Ferenc Dénes, Imre Haitinger, and 
other priests, mostly from the Kassa diocese, as archetypes of ambiguity. These men 
engaged in Slovak national life in the United States, serving multilingual congregations, 
working for Slovak-language newspapers. But they did not seek political quarrels with 
the home government; for example, their papers were politically neutral or pro-
Hungarian. Kossalko and Dénes were both active in the First Catholic Slovak Union, 
undermining their otherwise largely Magyarone credentials. But when Kossalko founded 
the First Catholic Slovak Union, he intended it primarily as a religious alternative to the 
secular National Slovak Society, emphasizing religious over national community. 
Particularly among clergy, but also their congregants, religion and nation could be 
intertwined; for most migrants, like priests, religion initially won out. A Magyarone 
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political orientation reflected a “complex, enigmatic nature” and featured “frustration and 
mental anguish” for priests68 when the development of East European nationalisms in the 
United States pressured many of them in increasingly nationalist communities to take a 
side. Some embraced Slavic nationalism confidently and their congregations followed, 
while others continued to emphasize their religious mission in the facing of rising 
competition from secular nationalist organizations. 
These cases raise the counterfactual but fascinating question of how the ethnic 
tagging of migrant institutions, already begun by the turn of the century, would have 
played out without the acceleration of national separatism spurred by World War I.   
 
Immigrant Institutions and the Ambiguities Beyond Ethnic and Religious Identities  
As East European migrant communities became more established in the United 
States, other forms of association and socialization joined churches in migrants’ lives of 
leisure. Migrant organizations flourished, most of which were religious or religiously 
affiliated, but some of which were secular. Many migrant organizations sought to nurture 
their members’ home culture(s), being a bridge into increasingly political nationalism 
and, for some, active nation-building. 
 The disjointed correlation between religion and ethnicity across Austria-Hungary 
was a defining factor in the Empire’s diversity, cohesion, and division and this disjointed 
correlation has an equally important history among migrants in the United States. In 
Austria-Hungary, Catholicism unified under one Church many imperial subjects who 
spoke an abundance of languages in geographically disparate parts of the Empire. Some 
Protestant denominational affiliations in Hungary had marked linguistic affiliations, such 
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at the association between Reformed Calvinism with Hungarianism and Greek 
Catholicism’s strength in Rusin-speaking areas, but these correlations were not without 
exceptions or complications. For example, most Slovak-speaking Protestants were 
Lutheran but some could be found in Reformed worship communities, particularly in 
borderland regions. Hungary promoted “Jewish” as a religious affiliation, not an ethnic or 
racial one, in contrast to most other areas of Europe, encouraging Jews to also identify 
themselves with an ethnic nation.69  
Whereas migrants’ primary group affiliation in Austria-Hungary came from 
confession, the development of national projects abroad transferred the locus of identity 
to ethno-linguistic group. This transition was never complete and unfolded in different 
ways in different places, but this greater emphasis on national affiliation vis-a-vis 
religious affiliation in describing oneself to others was widely shared among migrants 
and also reflected in the organization of migrant institutions.  Although the American 
immigrant congregations discussed above prioritized geography, denomination, and 
shared languages in founding churches, in the years leading up to World War I ethnicity 
around a single shared language became the dominant form of migrant organization. 
 Religious affiliation was central to the identity of many Europeans and, as we 
have seen, an imperfect fit with national affiliations. In interviewing older migrants, 
Morawska found that “an old immigrant, asked about his nationality (ethnic background) 
would hesitate, ponder and then alternate between the two” – in this case Rusin and 
Slovak --  “correcting himself back and forth and adding to his own confusion by 
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declaring religious adherence (Roman Catholic or Greek Catholic).”70  Migrant John 
Chomos, while identifying as a Hungarian, went to a German Lutheran church, becoming 
Lutheran although he had been raised a Greek Catholic.71  Mark Stolarik found in 
Bethlehem, PA that Slovak-speaking Greek Catholics took on a Rusin identity when they 
affiliated with the Rusin-majority Greek Catholic church, instead of the Slovak-speaking 
Roman Catholic church72, valuing their Greek Catholicism over their Slovakness. This 
adoption of a Rusin identity was not necessarily purposeful, but a community-based 
evolution or forging of identity tied to local circumstances and expression of worship. An 
excellent local priest or the geographic proximity to a church building could draw 
congregrants. 
Religious affiliation far outweighed language of instruction for many parents 
when approving of marriage partners or choosing schools for their children. In 
Homestead, “the only Catholic school was St. Michael's, and it was a Slovak school,” 
Elizabeth Martin (nee Feczko) remembered. “So we had to learn the Slovak language, the 
English language, because we only knew Hungarian.” A teacher at the school, Sister 
Alberta, used her own multilingualism to help the students who did not speak Slovak. “At 
lunchtime she would take all these Hungarian children into her office and she would 
translate or have us repeat or read.” Despite the additional difficulty of learning a new 
European language that the family did not identify with, Elizabeth’s mother, Mary 
Feczko, considered it worth it for her daughters to have a Catholic education. While Mary 
Feczko prioritized confession over language, her experiences in Europe might have 
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indicated that an additional language of instruction did not have to mean any negation of 
her family’s first language, and objected to the coupling of a national judgment with her 
religious choice for her daughter’s schooling: when registering Elizabeth for the school, 
the “Catholic Slovak . . . pastor had written down F-E-C-K-O and that sort of angered my 
mother because she wanted a Z in it,” a more Hungarian spelling.73 With the priest’s 
intervention, Mary Feczko’s school choice became about ethnic politics at the same time 
as religious education. 
Organizations founded around either shared confession, perceived nation, and 
language struggled with issues of inclusion and exclusion, national activism and national 
indifference, their secular purpose and their religious purpose, even as they gained 
enormously in membership and popularity. We can track migrants’ enthusiasm for ethnic 
cultural life and nationalist projects through membership, events, and also monetary 
contributions. A range of organizations and causes – family, local churches and 
associations, and homeland projects – competed for working migrants’ meager leisure 
time and donations. As we know, immigrants were most likely to invest their time in 
labor to send money back across the Atlantic specifically to family, but investing in 
ethnic-American institutions would strengthen the community there and do good work 
through churches, parochial schools, and cultural organizations. Leaders attempted to 
simultaneously build up institutions for the benefit of migrants personally but also for 
“the nation.” One Slovak-American estimated that “welfare societies” had paid out a 
“grand total of . . . over $250,000,000” by 1944, and that the publishing of Slovak-
American newspapers cost half a million dollars annually. Alongside the commonly 
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recognized organizations of mutual benefit societies and churches, clubs like the Czech 
and Slovak Sokols were important in building national life abroad. In addition to 
strengthening “physical culture,” the “Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol of the United 
States’s aim was “to educate and instruct its members in the Slovak language and 
history,”74 subjects that were routinely deemphasized if not excluded from education in 
Hungary and, of course, American public schools.   
Many secular organizations, like churches, started out serving a wider subset of 
the multilingual Austro-Hungarian community, though these too were sometimes quickly 
made ethnically exclusive. Newark’s First Hungarian Sick Benefit Society, a very early 
Austro-Hungarian immigration organization, was founded by a mixed membership of 
Hungarian-, German-, and Slovak-speakers. A Budapest newspaper reported in 1884, as 
reported by the newspaper Amerikai Nemzetőr, that “The society’s name is Hungarian, 
conversational language Slovak — and it’s [sic] books are administered in German; but 
whatever they do or say — their feelings are Hungarian and [they] are proud that they are 
Hungarian, as the colors on their badge also indicate.” One of the long-term goals of 
Hungarian members of the group, the article continued, was its “operative 
Magyarization.”75 (What “operative Magyarization” means is unclear, but it raises many 
questions.) By the late 1890s, one of the Bohemian sokols (gymnastics clubs) in Chicago 
had broadened to become the “Bohemian-Slovak Falcons.”76  
Impulses varied among communities as to whether service to the nation was part 
of their service to God, or if God was best served through institutions that served a 
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broader swath of the migrant community with national questions put aside. Often times 
very local circumstances in the make-up of the migrant community or the activity of 
particularly ardent nation-builders dictated how this would be balanced. The Johnstown, 
PA newspaper Cerkovnaja Nauka, published by the Greek Catholic church, addressed 
both the Slovaks and Rusins77 who made up the membership, serving one Catholic 
community in two languages. To immigrant nation-builders, migrants should not have to 
compromise their nation. If there were no congregation in their mother tongue, rather 
than use an “other’s,” they should found one. Thus, in New York City, conversely, the 
existence of an older Slavic (primarily Czech-speaking) community and the 
comparatively lesser importance of specific Protestant denominational differences 
prompted instead the founding of ethnic churches. It helped, of course, that the city had 
large enough of a population to host a number of Eastern European churches. The first 
Hungarian church in New York opened membership to all Hungarian immigrants 
regardless of religious affiliation78, including Protestants, Catholics, and a self-professed 
Jew among their initial members. Chicago’s Bohemian community, on the other hand, 
struggled to forge a pan-Bohemian community unobstructed by religious quarrels. “In all 
important national undertakings, and especially at festivities, the Bohemians should act in 
harmony,” the newspaper Svornost declared in 1884.  
In this way we will create a good name among other nationalities. On these 
occasions to classify ourselves as good Catholics or Liberals would be an 
absurdity. Having these ideas in their minds, the Bohemian Sokols [gymmastic 
clubs] have invited the Bohemians belonging to the Catholic church to their 
festivity thus emphasizing that the Sokols are not sectarian in matters of religion. 
Every good and honest undertaking and this one too, will always find a 
destructive individual, whose desire is to keep the local Bohemian community 
divided into two hostile groups and who endeavors to fire again the hatred of one 
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Bohemian for another. … Every lawful citizen is welcomed by the Sokols, 
whether he be a Catholic, Protestant, or an unbeliever; as long as he conducts 
himself properly he will be treated with honor and respect.79  
 
Nevertheless, many nation-based organizations were divided by religious or 
political affiliation, even as nation-builders hailed the unity of the nation as the most 
worthy goal. Despite the founding of a secular National Slovak Society in Pittsburgh in 
1890, the First Slovak Catholic Union was founded later that year as well as its women’s 
auxiliary in 1892, followed by the Slovak Evangelical Union in 1893 and the Slovak 
Calvinist Union in 1901. For the founders of these organizations, a religious affiliation 
set them apart from the secular National Slovak Society. Politics, of course, played a 
prominent role in all of this. According to June Alexander, Father Kossalko founded a 
Catholic alternative to the National Slovak Society because he was a Magyarone and 
“opposed Slovak nationalism”80, but also because he feared that part of the process of 
Americanization was Protestantization. By 1902, according to Alexander, the National 
Slovak Society had just over 41,000 members, while the First Slovak Catholic and Ladies 
Union had roughly the same number and the Protestant Slovak Unions had 10,000. 
Religious societies thus edged out a secular society in migrants’ choices, though other 
factors like the quality of insurance, publications, advocacy, local access, and social 
factors certainly played a role alongside religious priorities.  
Nationalists also had to fight an uphill battle against continued national 
indifference. The immigrant press was full of entreaties for migrants to support projects 
for their communities, churches first and foremost but also newspapers themselves, 
benefit societies, clubs, and discreet events like lectures. In turn-of-the-century Chicago, 
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for example, local Bohemians were asked through the paper to contribute to a home for 
the elderly and an orphanage and to attend T.G. Masaryk’s lecture series. Articles calling 
for support of these institutions and events did not hide their disappointment when 
donations and interest were limited. “Already there has been much complaint about the 
indifference of our citizens toward the ‘Home.’ . . . . Everywhere, in everything, we see 
an almost staggering indifference to the undertaking,”81 the editors of Denní Hlasatel 
complained in 1901. When T.G. Masaryk came to offer lectures at the University of 
Chicago the following year, the paper once again complained about Chicago Bohemians’ 
tepid commitment to hear an emerging leader. “Hardly anyone attends his lectures at the 
university and when he lectures among us, we burden him with useless questions . . . . 
Unionists, socialists, catholics, liberal and protestants can have profit and pleasure from 
the professor's lectures, but they must not expect Mr. Masaryk to be a referee in our 
quarrels and arguments.”82 That newspapers engaged in continual entreaties and 
admonitions suggests that migrants’ commitments to national projects was rarely as great 
as nation-builders would have liked, especially until promoting national life found the 
proper way to piggy-back on activities or institutions that offered migrants other benefits 
in their daily lives. 
East European Jews warrant special consideration in the place of religion and 
ethnicity in migrant life. While Judaism and Yiddish helped forge a Jewish-American 
community among Jews coming from all over Europe, the often German- and Hungarian-
speaking Jews of Austria-Hungary sometimes did not speak Yiddish, and were therefore 
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set apart from Jews who did.83 One migrant from Poland observed, “The Hungarian, and 
maybe Roumanians . . .  spoke only Roumanian or Hungarian. . . . . They don't speak 
Jewish or they don't, I never hear them.”84 The economic and social benefits of 
Hungarianness in Hungary created a substantial Jewish-Hungarian population that 
defined itself as Jewish religiously but Hungarian culturally, an identification that 
migrants carried to America with themselves.  Historical sociologist Ewa Morawska 
noted that Johnstown’s Hungarian-speakers “counted as ‘theirs’ the Jewish Hungarian 
professionals,” who “not only served the Christian Hungarian community in Johnstown, 
but took active part in the Hungarian national and cultural celebrations and even in the 
church events. In no other East European group in the city — although they all dealt 
regularly with Jews in business and sought their professional services — did social and 
cultural relations reach such a degree of closeness.”85 Many other Hungarian Jewish 
immigrants confirm this. “We landed in Yorkville because that's where the Germans and 
Hungarians lived,” Lazarus Salamon explained. “Most of the Jews landed on the East 
Side but we were closer culturally to the Germans and Hungarians. We would rather mix 
with them than with Russian Jews. We were too far apart. . . . A lot of Jews from the East 
Side went to the Bronx, but the Hungarian Jews, . . . they came to Astoria.”86 “I cook 
Hungarian way. I bake Hungarian way. That's my custom,” Julia Blau, who arrived 
                                                       
83 For literature on this topic, see Tibor Frank, Double Exile: Migrations of Jewish-
Hungarian Professionals through Germany to the United States, 1919-1945 (Oxford: 
Peter Lang, 2009). 
84 Interview of Milton and Max Shatsky by Andrew Phillips, June 25, 1989, in Ellis 
Island Oral History Project, Series NPS, no. 034: Interview of Milton and Max Shatsky 
by Andrew Phillips, June 25, 1989. 
85 Morawska, “Internal Status Hierarchy,” 84. 
86 Interview of Lazarus Salamon by Debra Allee, May 29, 1986, in Ellis Island Oral 
History Project, Series AKRF, no. 175: Interview of Lazarus Salamon By Debra Allee, 
May 29, 1986. 
 48 
Yoland Jacobowitz, stated simply.87 This phenomenon of considering oneself religiously 
Jewish but culturally Hungarian was ubiquitous and spoke to Jews’ greater integration 
into Hungarian society compared to many other areas of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Other Jewish American migrants could not always understand this duality. “A 
Russian/Jew and an Hungarian/Jew are in my opinion two different worlds and one does 
not and can not understand the other,” one mother explained.  “My own daughter, who 
was born in Russia, married an Hungarian/Jewish young man. She adopted all the 
Hungarian customs and not a trace of a Russian/Jewish woman remained with her.”88 The 
plight of the Russian Jewish mother speaks powerfully to the primacy of religion over 
ethnicity in migrants’ affiliations; she presumably made no objections to the marriage 
since her daughter had succeeded in finding a Jewish man, but found cultural/ethnic 
reasons to lament the union after the fact. Jews remained integrated in the Hungarian-
American community much longer than others, though the abundance of Jewish-
American organizations, with their own brand of Jewish nationalism, drew them away 
from Hungarian circles.  
In time, nation-builders and immigrant communities found ways for national life 
for the social purpose of the migrant community and political activism on American and 
homeland issues to synergistically support each other. With a firm national community 
with a rich social life and political clout, some consolidated national groups could seek 
alliance with either other consolidated national groups on projects of shared interest or 
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feel that they could safely expand their aspirations without threatening the identity of the 
core.  
Slavic migrant contributions to Slavic American churches, societies, schools, and 
sokols could be interpreted by Hungarian governmental officials from a nationality 
politics standpoint anywhere on a spectrum from nationally tagged or proud but 
innocuous, to dangerously pan-Slavic. Migrant donations to Slavic organizations back in 
the Habsburg Lands, for example to the Matica Slovenska, were even more directly 
worrisome and seemingly confirmed Austrian and Hungarian governmental officials’ 
fears about the threat that migration and the development of Slavic nationalism abroad 
posed to the Empire’s stability. When American Slovaks donated modest sums to the 
Russian Red Cross in relief aid in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War, Hungarian 
officials looked into this as seemingly obvious evidence of panslavism.89  When 
Croatians protested against Hungarian rule in the city of Agram, today Zagreb, Chicago 
Bohemians expressed Slavic solidarity against Austro-Hungarian power. “It is our duty as 
Bohemians, to make collections for the benefit of our Croatian brothers and help them in 
their battle with the savage Hungarian hordes. Croatians live among us, associate with us, 
and participate in all our national undertakings,” Czech-language paper Denní Hlasatel 
reported in 1903. Reminding readers that Croat Chicagoans had supported Bohemian Day 
in 1893, the paper declared “it is now time that we showed, that we sympathize with the 
unfortunate Slovak nation, which is being set upon, destroyed and murdered, and that as 
true Slavs we stand with them.”90 With the Austro-Hungarian government’s concerted 
effort at the ‘containment’ abroad of all things Pan-Slavic, voluntary donations of any 
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size funding potential threats to the social order and any type of coordinated Slavic 
activity immediately raised alarm.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen that much East European “ethnicization” and nation-
building took place in the United States, phenomenally accelerated by transatlantic 
migration. Governmental and social scientific bureaucracies, immigrant churches, and 
secular immigrant institutions all contributed to the rise of “nationality” or “ethnicity” 
becoming the primary way that many migrants (though by no means all) described 
themselves. By 1903, the Austro-Hungarian government and Hungarian officials in 
particularly decided to act more purposefully. In the subsequent chapters, we will see, 
first, how the homeland Hungarian (and to some extent Austrian) government responded 
to these developments, and subsequently how some of these East European national 
developments were spread back to the Habsburg Empire.   
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Chapter 2 
The Long Arm of Austria-Hungary: Managing Migrant Loyalty in the United States 
Austria-Hungary’s leaders perceived mass migration as a population crisis and 
were thus highly interventionist in its response to trans-Atlantic migration to try to 
maintain the loyalty to the Empire of migrants in America. The Austro-Hungarian 
government initially opposed emigration but subsequently decided instead to insert itself 
into the migration process, to both restrict and facilitate migration in ways that would 
theoretically protect citizens but still serve the countries’ needs. Historian Tara Zahra has 
argued that “As policymakers recognized that they could not completely seal their states’ 
borders, they increasingly sought to control and redirect emigration for the good of both 
migrants and the state. Two strategies,” she continues, “served these goals: transforming 
mass emigration into purposeful forms of ‘colonization,’” – planting and nurturing 
settlements of citizens elsewhere– “and expanding social protections for citizens abroad, 
creating what amounted to new transnational welfare states.”91 But Austria-Hungary’s 
intervention was more aggressive than that, particularly in regard to nationality politics: 
governmental intervention sought to keep migrants loyal to their home governments and 
to quash the threat of competing nationalisms. This chapter will explore the very active 
role that the Austro-Hungarian government — especially the joint Foreign Ministry and 
the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office — played in overseeing migrant loyalty in the 
United States beginning in 1902 until the outbreak of world war, to examine both its 
successes and the protests it inspired.  
The Foreign Ministry and branches of the Hungarian government used a number 
of methods to address the challenges that accompanied migration (like the depopulation 
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of some villages and changes in the labor supply) and integrate themselves into migrants’ 
lives abroad. Their tactics began at home and subsequently travelled across the Atlantic. 
The first method was legislative, to control the terms of legal exit and attempt to channel 
emigration through certain sanctioned routes. Intervention then followed migrants 
overseas: the government integrated itself into the migration bureaucracy at multiple 
levels, putting people on the ground in the United States to watch and work on the 
government’s behalf, and finally attempting to integrate the home government into 
migrants’ American lives through the press, church, and cultural events and institutions. 
Austria-Hungary operated way-houses for migrants in New York City, utilized a large 
and growing consular network in the United States itself, subsidized a number of 
immigrant newspapers and social organizations, sent religious figures to serve migrants’ 
spiritual needs, engaged in cultural education and propaganda, advocated on behalf of its 
subjects in serious labor problems, and, most controversially, spied on migrants, 
particularly those whose ideas were perceived as a threat to the Empire. The Austro-
Hungarian government would be involved in migrants’ journeys in all phases – from 
departure through the duration of their time in the U.S. to, for some, their return.  
Austria-Hungary’s responses to emigration and its actions in the United States 
reveal some of the challenges of the Empire’s dualist structure in responding to an issue 
with both foreign (and therefore joint) and domestic (and therefore separate) implications. 
While the dual monarchy shared a military and set joint foreign and economic policy, 
domestic affairs were handled through separate parliaments in Austria and in Hungary. 
Emigration was not simple to categorize as an exclusively foreign or domestic affair, as it 
inherently blended the two. The Empire operated unified consulates in various locations 
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in the United States, serving migrants from both Austria and Hungary, but emigration 
was just as much a domestic affair in relation to the depopulation of counties, different 
official Austrian and Hungarian ports of embarkation (Trieste and Fiume, respectively), 
and different internal needs for labor. Thus, an examination of the long arm of Austria-
Hungary inevitably includes Austrian initiatives, Hungarian initiatives, and also 
concerted efforts.  
Hungary concerned itself with emigration and migrants’ lives abroad much more 
actively at the outset of twentieth century than Austria. Governmental approaches 
differed in the two halves of the Empire on how to manage loyalty and diversity; while 
Austria experimented with constitutional equality and the distribution of representation 
for constituent peoples (for example, the Moravian Compromise of 1905, which 
apportioned seats between German- and Czech-speakers in the Moravian Diet), Hungary 
pushed for cultural identification as Hungarian (regardless of “blood”) to build a more 
unified and homogenous nation-state. As the emigration of Hungarian-speakers from 
Hungary picked up in the last years of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth, after early years of migration dominated by Slovak- and Rusin-speakers, 
Hungarian officials became increasingly concerned with maintaining the modest 
statistical majority that Hungarian-speakers recently held within the Kingdom. Thus, 
Hungary participated with Austria in the functions of the joint Foreign Ministry’s 
initiatives, but also pursued more intervention in the lives of its migrants abroad under 
the purview of the Prime Minister’s Office and other Hungarian ministries outside the 
Foreign Ministry that did not require consensus with Austrian officials.   
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The Austro-Hungarian government sought to address the emigration crisis 
through several measures, some of which seemed to or really did contradict each other. 
To limit and control legal migration, Austria-Hungary would define the laws surrounding 
emigration and support it by providing designated domestic ports and a series of migrant 
services to facilitate to the process. The Empire essentially traveled across the Atlantic 
with migrants to support them in their lives abroad bureaucratically, religiously, and 
culturally. The home governments nurtured ties between the homeland and America, to 
keep migrants loyal in their time abroad and welcome them home when they were ready 
to return. But Austria-Hungary’s long reach across the Atlantic could just as easily be 
manipulative as supportive, especially to Slavic nationalists. Austria-Hungary’s efforts to 
maintain the loyalty of the Empire’s citizens consistently backfired.  
The controversy surrounding Hungary’s transatlantic campaign for migrants’ 
loyalty is encapsulated in a scathing 1906 remark from U.S. Immigration Bureau 
inspector Marcus Braun, who had himself immigrated to the United States from Hungary. 
He described the position of the Hungarian government as follows: “Let them gather in 
the American dollars, but let us continue our paternal (?) supervision. Let us prevent them 
from assimilating with the American people; . . .  let us insist that they, instead of 
becoming Hungarian-Americans, remain American-Hungarians, let us edit for them their 
newspapers; let us teach them by our own teachers and preachers; let us continue our 
control over them.” “The Government of Hungary,” he concluded, “went about the 
accomplishment of these purposes with a vengeance.”92  
 
                                                       
92 Marucs Braun, Immigration Abuses: Glimpses of Hungary and Hungarians: A 
Narrative of the Experiences of an American Immigrant Inspector while on Duty in 
Hungary. . . . (New York: Pearson Advertising Co., 1906.), 77-78. 
 55 
Emigration as Perceived Crisis  
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian government 
spoke of transatlantic emigration as a growing crisis. Europeans had migrated seasonally 
for centuries, but transatlantic labor migration, while sharing some similarities with intra-
European labor migration, posed new challenges. Transatlantic migrants went further and 
stayed longer; ultimately, their movements transformed many migrants’ home villages 
and their relationship to it.93 Authorities treated emigration as a “crisis” (rather than as an 
opportunity, as many migrants did) because of uncertainties it introduced to central issues 
in Austro-Hungarian politics, including population (particularly in regard to the tax and 
labor base), nationality, and military questions. “That a nation like that of the Magyars 
loses yearly a percentage of its inhabitants by emigration is a very deplorable affair,” 
U.S. Immigration Bureau inspector Marcus Braun observed. “The Magyar patriot has 
indeed reason to weep over the fate of his country,” he continued. Mass migration on 
such a great scale “threatened the very life of the nation.”94  
Population was a concern to Austro-Hungarian governmental officials in both an 
absolute and relative sense. Emigration, one official explained, threatened “not only 
Hungary’s population with catastrophe, but also its great power standing.” As Zahra has 
explained,  “In an era in which demographers saw population as a measure of political, 
economic, and military strength, these numbers induced panic in the halls of government 
and beyond. . . . To many, the loss of millions of workers represented a disgraceful 
symptom of underdevelopment, poverty, and imperial decline.”95 Emigration was 
perceived to effect the Empire in so many ways that it prompted leaders from all walks of 
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life to object to the changes it would bring. Conservative military officials and 
landowners, who in Hungary were often also members of the tax-exempt aristocratic 
parliament, were particularly concerned. “The most harmful” effect, one official 
explained, was the threat to Hungary’s ability to defend itself with the loss of men 
eligible for military conscription, particularly in areas around Kosice, Zagrab, and 
Pozsony/Pressburg where the army was trying to strengthen recruitment. Emigration also 
caused the “total disintegration” of families and “threaten[ed] the state’s economic 
strength with serious danger,” the official continued. The most robust workers emigrated; 
as they were usually young men, this further impeded the establishment of new families. 
Hungary thus stood on the brink of depopulation, many feared, not only from the loss of 
emigrating individuals but due to its perceived long-term disruption to natural population 
growth. If mass migration were to continue unchecked, “Hungary, like the monarchy, 
would be unable to keep pace in peopling with the other great powers.” In its effect on 
defense and economic strength, emigration, officials feared, would “induce the decay of 
the monarchy’s world standing.”96  
The issue was not just how many people were leaving; it also mattered who was 
leaving. Emigration in general, officials argued, had to be curtailed or controlled, but 
with special attention to maintaining the numerical supremacy of Hungarian speakers, 
estimated at roughly 51-54 percent of the population in the 1900 and 1910 censuses. 
Authorities became alarmed when emigration, initially higher among Slovak speakers 
from Hungary’s northern counties, began to catch on among Hungarian-speakers as well. 
Some lawmakers, in fact, saw emigration as a means to Hungary’s linguistic 
consolidation; Undersecretary of State Count Kuno Klebelsberg explained to Prime 
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Minister Kálmán Széll that “Providence . . . has granted another population factor which 
has significantly raised the proportion of the Hungarian element at the expense of the 
nationalities. . . . This important new factor is the mass emigration of the non-Hungarian 
population.”97 Thus, he concluded, it was “not opportune” to hinder their emigration.98 
Hungary’s governmental programs to entice return migration, discussed more fully in the 
next chapter, focused heavily on Hungarian speakers. Governmental attempts to manage 
migration were by no means limited to the titular nation, but maintenance of a 
Hungarian-speaking majority was imperative.  
High governmental officials feared the grave implications for the economy of 
migrants’ lost labor potential, while local officials, in many cases, were quicker to see the 
economic benefits of emigration despite its political and societal costs. Baron Louis de 
Levay, Royal Hungarian Commissioner of Education, explained that emigration drained 
the base of taxpayers and laborers who could “very profitably be employed at home.”99 
Many Hungarian officials would have agreed, of course, that the tax base would be 
weakened but disagreed about employment prospects. Village mayors frequently cited 
lack of remunerative employment, at least seasonally, as migration’s primary cause. 
Villagers sought work abroad primarily because their seasonal jobs did not earn enough 
to pay their expenses and high property taxes, which overwhelming burdened the 
peasantry because of aristocratic exemptions.100 The government claimed it had already 
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begun to take measures at home for industrial development, land settlement, and 
parceling projects, but insisted that curtailing emigration was the “responsibility” of the 
royal Hungarian government, to serve as a “counterweight” to this “destructive 
migration.” Since emigration fever was still so great, the operations would have to be 
carried out in America as well, so that “we can hold on to emigrants not yet saturated by 
ideas dangerous to the state, and, when possible, have return migration.”101 
After several years of rhetorical opposition to emigration, the Hungarian 
government concluded in 1902 that migration to the United States could not be stopped 
and was actually in the country’s economic interest, bringing in about “100 million 
crowns yearly.” “But it must be prevented from expatriating the people emigrating,” 
officials insisted. Thus, while the government continued to restrict emigration and control 
its “manner and route” to best benefit Hungarian businesses and governmental coffers, it 
endeavored “to keep Hungarian patriotism alive in the emigrants and to bring back all 
who have finished making their living.” Prime Minister Kálmán Széll promised the 
establishment of a “bureau or institution in American itself for the protection of 
emigrants, to keep the Hungarians in America good Hungarian citizens.”102 While these 
measures might quell fears at home about permanent depopulation, and did try to 
eliminate corruption by steamship ticketing companies sending agents to the countryside, 
they raised new concerns about government paternalism and ran counter to Americans’ 
desire to see migrants Americanized. Historian Julianna Puskás astutely observed that the 
outcry in Hungary over emigration was not exclusively about emigration itself, but the 
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“catalogue” of social and political tensions it brought into clearer focus,103 including 
divergent national projects.  
 
Crisis Management through Legislation 
In 1902, Austria-Hungary began to take more decisive action to curb and control 
emigration, first through legislation and subsequently through more on-the-ground 
means. The Hungarian Parliament passed the Emigration Act in 1903, which outlined 
measures to curb emigration, channeled migrants who chose to leave Hungary to the 
Hungarian port of Fiume on the Adriatic, temporarily banned the usual routes via German 
ports, and laid out the government’s initiatives to maintain migrant loyalty in America. 
Austria promoted travel through its domestic port of Trieste, served by the Austrian 
Lloyd, Austro-Americana, and Canadian Pacific Railway steamship lines. As former 
Hungarian Parliament member Louis de Levay explained to North American Review 
readers three years after the law’s passage, the purpose was to “restrict emigration (as far 
as possible), and to lead the inevitable current of emigration into a channel that would . . . 
remove entirely the abuses from which the country and people have sorely suffered,”104 
by which Levay meant “the daring activity of foreign agents and their native 
accomplices” in swindling poor Hungarians to emigrate for the sake of commissions. The 
law and subsequent reactions to it reveals Hungary’s desire to become a protector in the 
emigration process, but also the power of money to trump ideology among politicians 
legislating migration. The law proved highly controversial and highlighted divisions in 
Hungarian political camps. Mass emigration persisted, and in fact grew exponentially. 
                                                       
103 Puskás, Ties that Bind, 93 
104 Levay, “Hungarian Emigration Law,” NAR. 
 60 
The law spurred new abuses even as it attempted to resolve others and became a model 
for emigration restriction in neighboring countries. 
Legislation and other governmental attempts at control of migration put the 
Hungarian government in the compromised position of profiting from the migration of its 
own citizens or, worse, outright corruption. In an open letter to the parliamentary 
committee on emigration from 1905, author G.Z. scathingly characterized the Hungarian 
government’s involvement in the emigration business through the 1903 law as “legalized 
barter in human beings.” It was one thing to protect emigrants from Hungary from known 
North German Lloyd agents and promote its own port to offer migrants a domestic, 
economical alternative; it was quite another, G.Z. claimed, for the government to claim 
an interest in migrants’ welfare but operate under the philosophy “Emigration from our 
country is heavy, let us make it profitable.” “As a consequence of these orders,” he 
charged, “… the hyenas of emigration ply their nefarious business under official 
protection.”105 Prime Minster Széll “was guided by noble intentions” in preparing the 
emigration bill, but his successor, István Tisza, exhibited “unseemly haste” in granting a 
monopoly on passenger shipping to the English Cunard Line out of the Hungarian port of 
Fiume and to the Central Ticket Office in sales, all of which enriched investors in these 
government sponsored monopolies at the expense of the exodus of the country’s own 
population, all in the name of the good of the country.106 To start, Fiume was not well 
positioned or sufficiently developed to become Hungary’s only legal embarkation point. 
“I yield to none in my ardent desire to see our Hungarian port prosper materially,” G.Z. 
explained, “but it is impossible not to notice the unfortunate geographical location of that 
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port for the transportation of our emigrants”; while the ocean trip from Bremen to New 
York took ten days, from Fiume it took eighteen or more. Furthermore, rather than 
limiting migration, the law and the accompanying monopolies for Adria Shipping 
Company, Cunard Line, and Central Ticket Office, employing “commission-hungry 
officials,” were responsible for the record-breaking numbers of emigrants from Hungary 
in the years immediately following its passage. G.Z. sarcastically explained that the 
outcome of Tisza’s “patriotic and beneficent exertions” was that Central Ticket Office 
stocks were “now quoted considerably higher!” 107 The law was a mess, and migrants 
continued defy it and flock to German ports when they could. 
Baron Levay’s defense of the 1903 law in the North American Review was 
intended to rectify “misrepresentation” of it in the American press, but many of his 
arguments confirm why the law was so controversial. Levay explained that the law 
attempted to staunch the emigration crisis by “restraining . . . individuals who attempt to 
propagate the emigration idea among the people” – namely German shipping company 
agents. This included an “interdict upon speeches in public meetings recommending 
emigration, and upon advertisements, placards and notices in newspapers,” resulting in 
“two months’ imprisonment and heavy fines.” Levay admitted that the Hungarian 
Government, in doing so, “has gone to the extreme limits of a free state against its free 
citizens,” but justified it to protect the country from “irreparable economic and moral 
injury” and “to respect the laws of foreign Powers, especially those of the United 
States.”108  
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The United States Bureau of Immigration paid special attention to European 
migration and the effects of foreign legislation by sending agents to explore the situation 
on the ground. The Hungarian government did not take well to the arrival of Special 
Immigrant Inspector Marcus Braun, sent to find out more about the 1903 Emigration Law 
and migrant conditions in Europe more broadly. Working for the Immigration Bureau, 
Braun, who had been born in Hungary, traveled throughout Europe — from London in 
the west to Odessa in the east, from Hamburg in the north to Fiume in the south — 
looking into European countries’ and shipping companies’ compliance with U.S. 
immigration laws, particularly the exclusion of unfit migrants. Hungarian paranoia about 
Braun’s mission and findings created an international incident: while in Budapest, Braun 
accused Hungarian police of tampering with his mail. He was detained for the outburst, 
setting off diplomatic drama over his treatment as an agent of a foreign government.109  
 Braun offered only mild critiques of Austro-Hungarian management of 
emigration, just a small part of a continent-wide report. But he levied a much stronger 
critique in his subsequently published pamphlet, which also reprinted a scathing 
assessment of the Hungarian government’s legislative solution by a member of the 
Hungarian Parliament. Braun’s initial findings on Hungarian emigration exposed the 
work of migrant traffickers luring peasants to emigrate from the countryside, and also 
other smaller-scale problems like the premature issuing of American passports to women 
claiming to be the wives of male migrants who had already become US citizens, without 
the proper proof of their marriage and the husband’s American citizenship.110 Braun’s 
report praised Austria-Hungary’s opposition to contract labor migration and local 
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officials’ clear public records of paupers, who were ineligible for a passport. Braun’s 
report — far more concerned with the wrongdoings of steamship company agents and 
subagents — could hardly be considered a smear campaign against Hungary.  Far more 
damning was his 1906 pamphlet, Immigration Abuses: Glimpses of Hungary. Braun 
openly critiqued the Hungarian government, which had wronged him and jeopardized his 
standing in the U.S. Immigration Bureau. “Instead of making Magyarland a land worth 
while to live for, one also worth to die for,” he explained, the government had instead 
pursued repressive policies in the 1903 law and other misguided attempts to addressing 
the emigration crisis.111 
Hungary’s attempt at a legislative solution to the emigration crisis thus failed 
practically, politically, and diplomatically. Various aspects of the law proved both 
ineffective and controversial with the public, western steamship companies, and the 
American government, and furthermore was nearly impossible to enforce. Hungarian 
citizens continued to emigrate via the closer German ports that offered shorter 
transatlantic journeys and cheaper fares. Criminalizing emigration routes did little to 
create goodwill among migrants and a desire to return, one of the central goals of 
addressing the emigration crisis in the first place. The government would have to 
consider other means to maintain migrant loyalty. 
 
Managing the Crisis through Migrant Services 
 The migration of hundreds of thousands of migrants back and forth across the 
Atlantic was accompanied by a considerably smaller but significant migration of imperial 
bureaucrats to European ports and across the Atlantic. Foreign governments spent the 
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equivalent of hundreds of thousands of dollars and governmental man-hours on 
emigration management, aiming to check in with migrants in every phase of their journey 
from their home village to their new American community, and hopefully back again. 
The Austro-Hungarian government successfully integrated itself into many aspects of the 
migration bureaucracy at official and also unofficial levels to channel and oversee 
migration; block, assist, and keep an eye on migrants; and keep migrants in an imperial 
orbit.  
 Whereas late 19th-century migrants’ interactions with homeland officials might 
have ended with the state railway conductor as they crossed the border into Germany, the 
intent of routing migration through Trieste and Fiume was to keep migrants in Austria 
and Hungary as long as possible for the government’s and purportedly their own benefit. 
As we saw above, Hungary’s attempt to consolidate ticketing and ship contracting in 
governmental hands was one of the greatest failures of the governmental response to 
emigration. Nevertheless, the services that Austrian and Hungarian officials tried to offer 
at their national ports of Trieste and Fiume are significant. The greatest innovation at the 
Fiume port was the Hungarian government’s facilitation of strict medical examination of 
migrants before they embarked on ships, screening for trachoma, skin diseases, 
tuberculosis, physical disabilities, and other conditions that were grounds for exclusion 
under U.S. law, sparing migrants from making the long journey only to be rejected at 
Ellis Island and forced to immediately travel back home.112 Thus, Austro-Hungarian 
officials tried to lead migrants by the hand from the Trieste and Fiume docks to their 
ships, and be the first to welcome them in New York.  
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The Austro-Hungarian government joined other European governments in 
establishing quasi-governmental immigrant homes in the United States. The homes each 
had an official agent at Ellis Island to advise new arrivals and offered subsidized food 
and lodging to migrants staying overnight in New York before continuing on to their final 
destinations or for a longer period of time as they sought permanent lodging and 
employment in the city. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry supported at least three 
homes, with the state purpose of preventing imperial citizens from being swindled. The 
curious division of these houses – one for German-speakers from the Empire, a 
Hungarian Home for migrants of all nationalities from the Kingdom, and a “Polish” 
(Austrian Pole) house for Catholic Slavic-language-speakers broadly – shows the ways in 
which the relationship between loyalty, ethnicity, and religion were very much in flux 
and inconsistent between Austria and Hungary. The inconsistencies between linguistic, 
territorial, and religious divisions among the homes show Austro-Hungarian 
government’s attempt to bureaucratically manage the contested nature of identity among 
Austro-Hungarians. Clearly the nationality politics that were being actively debated in the 
Empire about language, race, and citizenship were also being played out across the 
Atlantic.  
As quasi-governmental but officially American-based institutions, the Emigrant 
Houses also illustrate the power dynamics and profound disagreements between Austro-
Hungarian officials and various American parties. The Foreign Ministry had to work 
through American boards to operate the homes, and it sometimes disagreed with the 
Americans about who was to be served and at whose expense. U.S. Immigration and 
Health Department officials also influenced the homes’ histories, forcing their temporary 
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closure and stranding migrants in the short term, but ultimately bettering conditions by 
demanding renovations for reauthorization. Operated by ethnic Americans, subsidized by 
Austria-Hungary, and overseen by U.S. Immigration Service officials, the Emigrant 
Houses operated at the confluence of transnational interests and power.  
The Leo House was charged in 1904 with overseeing “immigrants of German 
tongue, without difference of race or religion, coming hither from the Austrian Empire.” 
The home received a quarterly stipend of 1250 Austrian crowns to subsidize operating 
costs.113  Contracting with the pre-existing immigrant house, the Leo House, placed 
certain restrictions on who the home was willing to house in exchange for the 
governmental subsidy; it had previously operated as a German Catholic institution. The 
agreement with the Austrian Foreign Ministry dropped the religious affiliation, but when 
the Rector of the House, Urbam C. Nageleisen, was asked by the Austro-Hungarian 
consul general whether the home would also accept “Italians and Rumanians, hailing 
from Austria,” he replied that “the House is not sufficiently large and spacious enough to 
accommodate more than those of the German tongue.” Nageleisen’s letter explicitly 
excluding those of the “Latin race” exhibits the slippage between “race” and “tongue.”114 
But even a stipulation that migrants be German speakers would not make for a mono-
ethnic clientele. As we saw in chapter one, imperial subjects, especially from urban areas 
and major market towns, often used German as the language of business and secondary 
education; Leo House’s successor listed, among its guests for March 1913, Croats, Poles, 
Bohemians, and Rusins, ostensibly all also German speakers. 
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The different parameters at the Hungarian House reflect both the different 
priorities of the Hungarian government and different conditions dealing with American-
based operators of the home. Inaugurating a new institution rather than contracting with 
an existing one, the Hungarian Relief Society had much more liberty in deciding who the 
home would serve. Dominated by ethnic Hungarians, the home nevertheless would house 
all migrants hailing from the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary within the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, “without distinction of nationality.”115 The new Hungarian House 
opened in 1909 to much fanfare from the immigrant press in New York, among both 
Hungarian-language and German-language papers.116 Advertisements were printed in 
Budapest for distribution to potential migrants in Hungarian, German, Slovenian, 
Romanian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak, and Ruthenian, anticipating and actively soliciting 
among all the peoples of the Kingdom.117 This by no means suggests that Hungarian 
officials or the Hungarian Relief Society were embracing ethnic equality. Rather, the 
Hungarian government’s aims were to simultaneously provide migrant services to 
Hungarian subjects and to limit minority subjects’ potential ethnic separatism by offering 
services in a Hungarian orbit.  
And yet the Hungarian House still became a subject of ethnic tensions. Slavic 
nationalists tried to have the Hungarian House investigated by U.S. officials on at least 
two occasions in 1910, likely affiliates of the “Slavonic Home,” an immigrant aid house 
not affiliated and in competition with those subsidized by the Imperial and Royal Foreign 
Ministry. According to Hungarian Home president Morris Cukor, false allegations were 
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made against the home directly to U.S. officials by a “pronounced Pan-Slav” with ties to 
the president of the Slavonic Home.118  In the scramble to offer influential migrant 
services, the nationality politics of the Hungarian Kingdom were being played out in New 
York.119  
 The Polish St. Joseph’s Home provide for the final segment of the Empire’s 
migrant population. As with the Leo House, the Foreign Ministry contracted with an 
established institution to house Slavic-language-speaking migrants, presumably just those 
from outside Hungary. The majority of migrants served there were likely Polish-speakers 
from Austrian Galicia, but also migrants from the handful of other Slavic-language-
speaking groups in Austria who did not also speak German. Thus, Austria’s approach to 
dealing with the linguistic diversity of migrants differed drastically from the Hungarian 
tactic of keeping all citizens under the same roof. Still, a Polish-led home was an 
arguably safe choice from a nationality politics standpoint. Although it is unclear why the 
St. Joseph’s home was selected for the contract, Polish-speakers were less frequently 
involved with the panslavic separatist movements that the Empire so feared.120  
Austro-Hungarian sponsored houses did not have exclusive rights to migrants’ 
business; a number of private houses competed with the government-supported ones, 
even without the benefit of subsides, to further nationalist aims. “Self-identified Polish, 
Slovak, Czech, or Hungarian associations, homes, and cooperative societies increasingly . 
. .  encouraged migrants to think of themselves as Polish Americans, Czech Americans, 
or Hungarian Americans, rather than as loyal subjects of the Austrian Kaiser,” Zahra 
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explains. These national homes were “founded precisely on the rejection of Austrian 
patriotism,” Austrian Consul von Ploennies lamented.121 The failings of the Leo House to 
accept all Austrian migrants further undermined Austria’s ability to compete with 
ethnically-oriented houses. The Leo House’s inability or unwillingness to accept Italian-
speakers from the Austrian half of the Empire would inadvertently have routed them to 
Italian houses operated by the Society for Protection of Italian Immigrants or the Italian 
Benevolent Institute. With the Italian government, like the Austro-Hungarian 
government, actively pursuing a close relationship with its migrants abroad, the 
possibility that Italian-speaking Austrian subjects, primarily from the region surrounding 
Trieste, would associate with an Italian institution and seek unification with the new 
Italian state was a reasonable threat.  
 The Emigrant Houses were thus places of both ethnic coexistence and 
contestation. Of the thousands of pages of archival material on the homes, the only 
mention of ethnic conflict is bureaucratic – the Slavonic Home’s alleged sabotage attempt 
– not ethnic violence between migrants themselves. Subjects of the same crown arriving 
across the Atlantic, the peoples of the Emigrant Houses had more in common than their 
divergent paths in America and the new states formed after the First World War suggest. 
Rather than a multiethnic anomaly, the transnational spaces of the Emigrant Houses in 
New York City reflect the realities of diverse empires and the increasingly globalized 
world accompanying mass transatlantic migration.  
 Through sponsorship of the Emigrant Houses the Austro-Hungarian could, if 
indirectly and imperfectly, continue to protect and channel migrants in their formative 
first days in the United States; after that, the task fell primarily to political and religious 
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agents of the Austro-Hungarian government, specifically consuls and clergy. Consuls and 
consulates in foreign countries had initially fulfilled economic functions, but transformed 
to fulfill more political roles as migrants joined trade as the main concerns between 
states. Austria-Hungary’s first consuls in the U.S., for example, were not Austro-
Hungarian diplomats, but rather American businessmen who would coordinate and 
promote Austro-Hungarian goods on the U.S. market.  Their duties rapidly transformed 
to issuing visas and proof of citizenship and managing migration affairs. As historian 
Nicole Phelps has argued, in the age of mass migration states “began to claim jurisdiction 
over their citizens anywhere in the world, and they expected their claims to sovereignty 
over the bodies of their citizens to trump territorially based claims to jurisdiction.”122 
With a series of consulates abroad, Austria-Hungary and the United States could 
coordinate complicated affairs of citizens in that country.123  
The number of Austro-Hungarian consulates in the United States to assist and 
oversee migrants mushroomed dramatically in the 20th century, performing a number of 
duties with both practical and ideological purposes. Alongside Washington D.C., New 
York, and Philadelphia, by the outbreak of World War I the Empire had operated 
consulates in Chicago, Cleveland, Buffalo, St. Paul, Charleston and Clarksburg in West 
Virginia, along with Pittsburgh, Hazelton, Uniontown, and Wilkes-Barre in 
Pennsylvania.124  For migrant workers who intended to return to the Empire, these 
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consular services were important resources. Practically, consuls could advocate on behalf 
of Austro-Hungarian citizens in problems with citizenship, labor, and international 
exchange. Their areas of assistance varied from helping migrants connect with family 
members in the United States to helping deceased clergymen’s families return home. 
Consular offices also facilitated the payment to family members back home of migrants’ 
insurance benefits when they died in mining accidents. The consuls did not take a 
particularly pro-active role in ameliorating labor conditions, resolving strikes, or 
addressing widespread employer abuse, but they did help migrants hold companies 
responsible for paying benefits. Consular offices also promoted imperial loyalty among 
migrants and surveilled anti-Habsburg or anti-Hungarian activity at the Foreign 
Ministry’s instruction. Many aspects of the American Action program were coordinated 
through consular employees, who collected reports from loyal ministers and sent articles 
from the American immigrant press hostile to the Empire back to the Foreign Ministry. 
Even if migrants were largely unaware of consular offices’ role in surveillance of 
nationality problems, they found other reasons to complain about the consular officials. 
In 1911, the Czech-American National Council asked Bohemian deputies serving in the 
imperial diet in Vienna to lobby for more Czech speakers among the Austro-Hungarian 
consular agents in the United States.125  
Back home, the Austrian and Hungarian governments and the Foreign Ministry 
attempted to influence migration and migrants’ experiences in the United States by 
nurturing relationships with American consuls (and later ambassadors) in Austria and 
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Hungary. In some cases, U.S. consuls in the Empire actively negotiated the citizenship 
status of Austria-Hungarian migrants with the Austrian and Hungarian governments, 
especially in regard to migrants who had already begun the process of applying for 
American citizenship – a testy situation that was usually negotiated on a case-by-case 
basis. The number of U.S. Consulates in Austria-Hungary expanded rather modestly in 
number but greatly in the breadth of their activities and the volume of work with the 
onset of mass migration. The United States initially had its consulate-general in Vienna 
with only a consulate in Budapest, a fact that rankled Hungarian politicians. Vienna was 
elevated to the status of an embassy in 1902 while Budapest was elevated to consulate-
general in 1904. The two-year delay had offended some Hungarian politicians, who 
resented the United States’ fundamental misunderstanding of Hungary’s sovereignty in 
the dual monarchy. The U.S.’s commercially oriented consulates in Trieste, Prague, 
Reichenberg, Carlsbad, and Fiume now turned more and more of their attention to 
migration, particularly in Trieste, Fiume, and Budapest.126 Successive consul-generals in 
Budapest proposed the addition of a consular office in Kassa, the largest city in upper 
Hungary where the largest number of migrants came from, but a Kassa office never 
materialized, largely because of U.S. budgetary constraints. Hungarian migrants had to 
continue to travel to Budapest to call on the American government, an outcome that 
likely pleased the Hungarian government since American visa services and foreign 
advocates would not be as accessible to upland migrants.  
As we have seen, Austria-Hungary’s bureaucratic presence in emigration is 
difficult to overstate; agents or members of the Austro-Hungarian government could be 
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involved in every phase of migrants’ transatlantic journeys, became increasingly 
accessible on the ground in the United States, and were there when migrants returned 
home. The imperial military, in particular, kept close track of the return of male migrants 
of age for military service; migrants were able to gain the assistance from the United 
States government only if their American citizenship was confirmed. While the 
Hungarian emigration law had been largely a failure, Austria-Hungary’s bureaucratic 
presence in migration was organized, decently funded, and pervasive. 
 
Managing Political Loyalty on US Soil: Political Intervention and the American 
Action 
Austria-Hungary’s intervention in migrants’ American lives grew over the early 
years of the 20th century, sometimes in concert with the Foreign Ministry and consular 
service and, in other cases, somewhat outside it. Through this mix of interventions, 
Austria-Hungary subsidized arguably necessary migrant services for all subjects of the 
Empire, while simultaneously suppressing Slavic nationalisms, at home and abroad. The 
“American Action” was one of at least three organized programs the Hungarian 
government was pursuing to deal with a growing crisis of loyalty to the Kingdom. Other 
initiatives addressed the situation of Hungarians living in Croatia-Slavonia (which the 
kingdom administered) and Romania (which it did not).127 These actions, taken as a 
whole, indicate a broad effort to promote political loyalty at the periphery. The 
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Hungarian government’s sincere interest in the welfare of its migrants can be viewed as 
tainted by assimilationist nationality aims, just as in Hungary itself. The American Action 
program, operated through the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of 
Religion and Public Instruction, was the most active at attempting to maintain migrant 
loyalty abroad through the political press, churches, and cultural events and institutions. 
The following section will explore the long arm of the Austro-Hungarian government in 
attempting to maintain the political loyalty of migrants from Austria-Hungary, primarily 
through the American Action but also other initiatives.  
The main goals of the American Action were to bolster Hungarian identity abroad 
to encourage return-migration of Hungarians and to assure that Slavic return migrants 
were not openly antagonistic to Hungarian political leadership and did not bring openly 
oppositional ideas back to Europe; the Action’s goals, as we will see below, would 
quickly come into conflict.128 Attempts to strengthen the Hungarianness of Hungarians 
living in the United States antagonized leaders of Slavic national movements and 
simultaneously gave Slavic nationalists opportunities to publicize their grievances before 
the American press and public. This only further confirmed Austria-Hungary’s 
perception of the need to combat panslavism and Slavic national projects in America. The 
American Action addressed migrant Hungarian-, Slovak-, and Rusin-speakers in 
somewhat distinct campaigns, subdivided further by religious denomination.129 Since 
many migrant communities, as we saw in the previous chapter, were linguistically mixed, 
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the subdivision of the Action’s program sometimes aided rather than retarded the division 
of the Austro-Hungarian emigrant community into distinct camps. 
Although much of the work of the Action could be conducted through the Prime 
Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction, foreign financial 
transactions could not, bringing the joint Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry into the 
program’s administration and into migrant services more expansively. The actual 
expenditures for the Action had to be paid out of Foreign Ministry accounts. The Foreign 
Ministry was on the same page in many of the issues relating to the press in particular; 
subsidizing organs of the immigrant press was among the most effective investments of 
the Foreign Ministry in managing migrant loyalty abroad.  
By offering financial support to newspapers, awarded first and foremost for  
“patriotism” and fidelity to the Empire, the Austro-Hungarian government could assure a 
patriotic message and that the right kind of information would be passed on to its 
subjects. One Slovak-language newspaper, the Slobodni Orel, justified the continuation 
of its government subsidy by explaining that it sent free copies of the paper to heavily 
panslav areas, to try to sway the readership back to imperial loyalty. In another case, from 
1914 when the First World War was in full swing and the stakes for the Empire high, the 
Foreign Ministry offered 20,000 crowns in start-up costs and a 4,000 crown annual 
subsidy for a pro-monarchy newspaper to circulate among South Slavs in the United 
States.130 Austria-Hungary’s support of the immigrant press emphasized the centrality of 
information, influence, and patriotism in the Empire’s intervention in the United States.  
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The American Action’s Religious Work 
Since churches were often the most significant ethnic organizations in migrants’ 
lives, they were the best venue for the state to promote homeland loyalty. Austro-
Hungarian governmental concern about imperial loyalty and the threat of panslavic 
nationalism in the United States was widespread, but among no groups more than 
minority newspapermen and the clergy. Very early on, Hungarian nationalists pinpointed 
churches as crucial sites of nation-building in the United States; through otherwise holy 
religious observance, Hungary’s migrants would be politically compromised. The 
Budespesti Hirlap (Budapest News) reported from the Amerikai Nemzetőr (American 
Guardian) as early as 1884 of the political danger associated with Hungary’s Slavic-
language speakers associating with other Slavs in the United States and called on the 
government to intervene. “Hungarian Slavs . . . are forced to listen to the homilies of 
other denominations and Czech panslav missionaries. . . . The problem also grows in that 
the Slovak brothers in America fall entirely into the hands of Polish and Czech panslav 
priests and stuffed with these ideas they return to the homeland. To help with this 
problem is such an important national interest that we call it to attention not only of the 
clergy but the government also.”131  
The architects of the American Action recognized the centrality of migrant 
religious institutions and used churches and the clergy as their primary conduits of 
intervention. The files of the Prime Minister’s Office contain an elaborate table of 
Catholic priests serving churches of Hungarian migrants, featuring their name, 
nationality, their national conduct or attitude, congregation, where they went to seminary, 
what diocese they had served in in (Austria-) Hungary, whether they had ever been fired 
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from a post, whether they had taken any action in regard to the formation of an Eastern 
European diocese in the United States, and various other notes. The column on 
nationality and national conduct illustrates the full range of government diagnoses of 
panslavism, from “Slovak Angry panslav” to “very suspicious” to “Hungarian-Slovak 
loyal,” with additional notes to denote the level of threat over whether or not they 
“scribble” in the press and evidence of alcoholism; others were merely labeled “American 
Pole.” A subsequent report from Nuber, the consul in Pittsburgh, categorized Slovak 
priests serving in the U.S. into three groups: those under Father Januschek of Scranton, 
who had appointed a large number of young panslav clergy in America; and those under 
Jankola and Stass, who founded a Catholic newspaper in which Hungary and Hungarians 
were attacked in articles.132  
Austria-Hungary had limited influence over how new American congregations 
chose their ministers – indeed, the process was rather ad-hoc in the late nineteenth 
century – but the Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction and homeland religious 
authorities tried to influence the process in whatever way possible, often by using allies 
among the loyal clergy. Braddock, PA parish priest Béla Kazinczy came in person to the 
Austro-Hungarian consulate in Pittsburgh on 11 April 1902 asking that three patriotic 
Slovak-speaking priests who could also speak Hungarian be sent to Charleroi and 
Dusquesne, PA, which had started their own congregations. His account is clearly 
refracted through the lens of the consul’s own nationalism. “From a Hungarian cultural 
perspective, and the state’s interest,” Nuber passed on to his superiors, “it would be 
important that a good Hungarian-feeling Slovak-speaking roman catholic priest would 
end up in these two communities. . . . the leadership of these new communities fall into 
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the hands of a Czech, Moravian, or Slovak panSlav priest.”133 Thus, the Hungarian 
government worked through the Reformed Church of Hungary and through the Catholic 
Archbishop of Esztergom to place ministers and priests loyalty to the monarchy in new 
and vacated clerical posts in the United States. This created an international contest over 
clerical vacancies that brought Austria-Hungary into greater contact and sometimes 
conflict with the Vatican, American Catholic officials, and American Protestant 
denominations that saw these immigrant churches as a fruitful mission field for 
themselves. 
The most tangible outcome of the American Action was Hungary’s subsidizing of 
Hungarian churches, particularly Reformed churches. The localized funding of Calvinist 
congregations could make their finances uncertain. The Hungarian government made the 
salaries of clergy serving in their congregations livable by supplementing their church 
paycheck with a government stipend, and by subsidizing an education back in Hungary 
for clergymen’s sons. So vital were these supplemental salaries from the Reformed 
Church of Hungary that the clergy fell into dire financial straits when the First World 
War prevented them from receiving these stipends.134 
By far the greatest ecclesiastical expense was the Hungarian government’s 
refinancing of Hungarian-American church loans through the General Credit Bank in 
Budapest.135 Churches founded before 1905 often had mortgages with American banks, 
facilitated by American Reformed or Presbyterian mission projects, but many 
congregations later formally joined the Reformed Church of Hungary and took advantage 
of mortgage refinancing. The Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction was aware that 
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financial support was the only real way to entice churches away from American 
denominations to pursue union with the mother church, and therefore frequently offered a 
few hundred dollars in outright grants for building and improvements, alongside the 
thousands in loans.136 Bringing emigrant churches under the umbrella of the Reformed 
Church in Hungary enabled homeland religious leaders to more effectively assure 
patriotic candidates served as ministers. The Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction 
and the Prime Minister’s Office considered the massive costs of taking on these loans 
well worth the national and spiritual benefits of ecclesiastical union, and the potential 
benefit of thwarting Slavic separatism.  
The Hungarian government’s meddling efforts did not go unnoticed and 
unprotested by Slavic nationalists. In 1902, a group of Slovak and other Slavic priests 
serving in America published a secret message from an officer at the Hungarian Ministry 
of Religion and Instruction, Ferenc Komlóssy, to the Archbishop of Esztergom, the head 
of the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church. It detailed steps the Church might take to 
assure the loyalty to the Hungarian state of minority priests serving in the U.S. How 
Slovak- and Ruthenian-American priests came to possess a copy of Komlóssy’s letter is 
unclear, but it quickly became the central document in a Slovak-American propaganda 
war and Hungarian attempts at damage control. The priests published it in two pamphlets, 
the aforementioned Hungary Exposed and a similar volume, titled Memorial Presented 
by the Roman Catholic Priests of Slovak Nationality,137 specifically to the Cardinal 
Archbishop and Bishops of the United States. The volumes, one Hungarian official noted, 
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were printed with “mournful” black covers.138 On the same cover of Hungary Exposed, 
the Slovak and Ruthenian priests identified themselves as the “Irish of Hungary.”  
Hungary Exposed illustrates the backlash against the “American Action” and how the 
United States had become a new front in the nationality politics of the Hungarian 
kingdom. A host of questions abound in these documents that are pertinent to Austria-
Hungary’s interventions abroad more generally: Was there an effective and unobtrusive 
way to maintain the loyalty of former imperial subjects on American soil? Whose 
responsibility was it to oversee the best interests of migrants coming from Hungary: 
priests themselves, the Vatican, American Catholic officials, or Austro-Hungarian 
officials? What role, if any, would American public opinion play in identity politics 
among immigrants from the Empire?  
 Speaking from the government’s perspective, Komlóssy justified keeping Slovak- 
and Rusin-speakers from the Kingdom now in America “under surveillance in the interest 
of their spiritual guidance,”139 a statement that reveals the inherent tension between 
benevolence and chauvinism in Hungary’s migrant welfare. The Vatican seemed to agree 
to the necessity of serving migrants abroad; the Hungarian government had already made 
arrangements with the Congregation of Propaganda Fide to appoint an Apostolic 
Delegate from Hungary to Washington D.C. to oversee emigrants.140 “This great 
aggregate of humanity in a strange land,” Komlóssy explained,  “. . . is for the most part 
in the hands of the priests, owing to the profoundly religious spirit of the Slovaks.” “This 
great moral factor, however,” he lamented, “is unfortunately wielded against us.” Only 
seven Roman Catholic parishes were presided over by patriotic priests, he complained, 
                                                       
138 MNL OL, K26, 605 cs., 20 tét. 
139 Hungary Exposed (n.d.). 
140 MNL OL, K26, 605 cs., 20 tét. 
 81 
“while the Slovak and Bohemian priests of Pan-Slavic sympathies, hailing from the 
Western Highlands lead the other 35.”141 Simply put, the predominance of Western 
Slovak priests in American congregations was pushing Slovaks closer to Czechs and 
other Slavs and away from Hungary. Komlóssy complained of “schismatic bishops” 
based in San Francisco and Alaska who lured Ruthenian-American congregations to join 
the Orthodox Greek Catholic denomination in the U.S. “Inasmuch as part of the 
immigrants intend returning to Hungary,” Komlóssy reasoned, “there is imminent danger 
that those whom the Russian propaganda has moved to secede, may on their return spread 
erroneous views among their co-religionists at home.” Komlóssy offered two solutions: 
the government should “prohibit the emigration of . . . hostile spirited priests,” and the 
bishop should send only “well-meaning priests speaking the eastern Slovak dialect” 
[emphasis added] to fill vacancies and new posts. He included a list of parishes where 
patriotic priests might be sent in the future. Priests who were loyal to Hungary could be 
used to report on panslavic activity and the conduct of their less trustworthy and even 
traitorous colleagues.142 
The priests’ most scathing charges against the Hungarian government called the 
document “highly pernicious,” featuring accusations of “espionage,” “coercion,” 
“intimidation,” and, most damningly, “discouraging [immigrants] from American 
citizenship.”143 The intended secrecy of the document was quickly recast as evidence of 
“plotting” and “scheming.” In their Memorial, the Slovak priests highlighted the threat 
that Hungarian surveillance and intervention posed to the Americanization of immigrants 
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and to American sovereignty. Komlóssy’s suggestions, they explained, “would seriously 
interfere with the rights and privileges of eccleasiastical [sic] authorities in the United 
States.” “From the time they land at our sea ports,” the priests assured American 
audiences, “our Slovak people recognize one country only –that country is the Republic 
of the United States.” Komlóssy’s order, they charged, “retards the natural process of 
Americanization among our Slovak and Ruthenian fellow countrymen.”144 The preface to 
Hungary Exposed and the priests’ Memorial also reveal the tension between their appeal 
to American sensibilities about immigrant assimilation and their obvious discontent at 
Hungarian governmental attempts to thwart the Slovak nationalist project. The priests 
charged that Komlóssy’s interest in the spiritual welfare of Eastern Slovaks was 
insincere. “Under the guise of the spiritual necessities of the faithful,” they charged, “it 
really aims at the political tutelage of the Slovaks and Ruthenians of the Greek rite in the 
United States. ‘Well meaning priests’ does not mean pious, good and efficient priests” to 
Hungarian officials, they complained. “A priest of the Slovak nationality may be ever so 
painstaking in the discharge of his function,” but “if he preaches to his people in Slovak 
and instructs them by means of their native language, in which after all they can best 
commune with their God, he is doomed to fail.”145   
The pamphlet authors claimed that officials in Budapest were attempting to limit 
the use of the Slovak language. But the Hungarian government’s grievance was 
articulated not against the use of Slovak itself. Indeed, Komlóssy’s letter called for more 
Slovak-speaking priests for Slovak-American congregations, and even suggested sending 
Slovak-speaking nuns as part of their American mission work. The problem of language 
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for the Hungarian officials was framed, intentionally, as a matter of “dialect.” 
Congregations of Eastern Slovaks in America needed priests who spoke the Eastern 
dialect, an arrangement that would conveniently shelter those congregations from priests 
who spoke the Western Slovak dialect or Czech and were more likely to hold panslavic 
or Slovak nationalist views.146  
In the wake of the publication of Hungary Exposed, the issue of language and the 
geography of panslavism concerned Austro-Hungarian officials assigned to American 
affairs. One government communiqué lamented that, before emigration began to the 
United States, panslavism had been unknown in the northeastern counties of Hungary, 
where the eastern dialect of Slovak was spoken. The allegedly panslav, western Slovak 
priests serving in America now comprised an expansive network of aid organizations 
seeking to “ply” the people with wide-circulating Slavic-American newspapers, and even, 
he suggested, pálinka [distilled brandy] dispensers, all leading the Eastern Slovaks astray. 
In this way, he stated, “the returning Eastern Slovaks take the dangerous seedling [of 
panslavism] to heretofore immune soil.” The “Roman Catholic Priests of Slovak 
Nationality” who wrote the open letter to the American bishops, were, according to 
Hungarian officials, not really all “Slovak.” Among the twenty-nine signatories, seven 
were identified as Czech, one as Moravian, one Polish, and one German. Of the 
remaining eighteen signers, sixteen were western Slovaks and only two were eastern 
Slovaks.147 The relatively high number of those listed as “Czech” and the variety of 
“Slavs” made it easy to label dissident priests panslavic. But what Czech, western Slovak, 
                                                       
146 Hungary Exposed. Easterns Slovaks were always perceived as more pro-Hungary than 
western ones. Again, see Maxwell, Choosing Slovakia, chaps. 5-6 for extensive 
discussion of the politics behind these linguistic distinctions. 
147 Memorial Presented by the Roman Catholic Priests of Slovak Nationality. 
 84 
eastern Slovak, panslav, Magyar, Hungarian, and American all meant as labels in 1903, 
as we know from Chapter 1, is not as clear-cut as labeling priests by nationality makes it 
seem. Indeed, the Hungarian government itself was relying on this multiplicity of 
meaning, intent on convincing Slovak-speakers at home and abroad that Slovak language 
use or identification and Hungarian loyalty were not mutually exclusive.   
 The two American newspapers that covered the conflict – the Washington Post 
and the Boston Evening Transcript – reported very differently about the dispute. The 
Washington Post largely took the Slovak- and Ruthenian-American accusations against 
the Hungarian government at face value, quoting heavily from the pamphlet and offering 
little additional information. The headline for the article, “Priest Exposes Plot,” echoed 
the priests’ language in calling Hungarian actions a “scheme.” The most severe charge, 
according to the Post, was the Budapest government’s efforts to “Prevent the 
Americanization of Slovaks and Ruthenians.”148 The headlines, however, were more 
critical than anything in the article itself. The headlines in the Boston Evening Transcript 
struck a much more mixed note. The mildly condemnatory title of “Hungary Active Here 
. . . Tries to Retain Hold on Slavonians and Ruthenians,” was quickly followed by much 
more amenable subheadings “No Objection to Their Becoming Citizens, Seeks Loyalty 
Only of Those Likely to Return.” The Boston Transcript relied on Joseph Horvath, then 
editor of the Hungarian-American newspaper Szabadság, for additional insights on the 
situation. For him, the defection of Hungarian Greek Catholic churches in America to 
branches of the Russian Orthodox church in the U.S. was not as much a matter of 
political panslavism, as the Hungarian government feared, but expedient practice in 
linguistically mixed immigrant congregations and the practical lure of Russian financial 
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support for churches. Horvath’s reframing of the issue put the emphasis not on the 
invasive actions of the Hungarian government in Slavic churches in the U.S. but 
specifically on emigrants likely to return to the Empire.  “The purpose of this edict was 
not to make of Hungarians in this country less loyal citizens of America,” he assured 
American readers. “The purpose was only to avoid sowing the seed of disloyalty among 
those liable to go back to Hungary.”149 But Szabadság was by no means free of 
propaganda; the paper received subsidies from the Hungarian government and regularly 
denounced panslavic activity. While there is no evidence that Horvath had consulted 
Austro-Hungarian consular and other officials on how to respond, a man in his position 
would be skilled in the art of making Hungary’s intervention seem innocuous. In a 
recurring theme of the American Action, it is questionable whether the intensive backlash 
by Slavic nationalists made Hungary’s interventions in American worthwhile. 
 
“Be Ever Loyal to Your Country”150: Cultural Propaganda and Backlash 
 The American Action and Austria-Hungary’s long arm in the United States 
featured consistent use of cultural propaganda. Communities of migrants from Austria-
Hungary hosted visiting dignitaries and some groups received banners and statues from 
organizations in the mother country. Events surrounding these items and people featured 
prominent cultural symbolism, from the traditional Hungarian goulash and Dobos cake 
served at visiting journalist Géza Kende’s farewell supper to the concerts of Austrian 
music held in conjunction with the Chicago World’s Fair. And yet these cultural 
celebrations also became flashpoints for national protest. The celebrations for a visiting 
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Hungarian official knit the Hungarian-speaking community in the United States together, 
at the same time that it became an ideal opportunity for Slovak-speakers to protest his 
policies back home and his presence in the United States. Alternating jubilation and 
backlash met much of Austria-Hungary’s cultural propaganda, best seen in the arrival of 
a ceremonial banner in 1902 and visits by Count Albert Apponyi, Hungarian Minister of 
Education, in 1904 and 1911.  
In 1902 the Hungarian Nationality League, an organization in Hungary, decided 
to send a decorative flag to the United States “For the Hungarian Americans”151; it was 
the first major event to bring large numbers of Hungarian-Americans together from 
different sub-regions of the United States as a coherent immigrant community and with 
an explicit symbol of the mother country.  The celebrations planned for the arrival of the 
flag and its tour between various Hungarian-American societies was highly successful in 
nurturing public expressions of Hungarianness abroad, in the spirit (if not the 
jurisdiction) of the American Action program. The gift of the flag also illustrates the 
ways that migration heightened the national consciousness not only of emigrants but also 
of those who stayed behind: a branch of the nation living elsewhere prompted a greater 
perceived need to consolidate the Hungarian nation as a whole.  
The dual meaning of “Hungarian” – one of ethnicity and one of citizenship – was 
enormously significant in the reception of this gift. According to Tihamér Kohányi, editor 
of the leading Hungarian-American newspaper, Szabadság [Freedom],  
The flag that they are sending refers to the “American Hungarians,” all of 
us, who were born in Hungary. The Slovak, the Croat, the Romanian, who 
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believes in the sanctity of this flag, should not believe that those who are 
planning this event or those who only speak Hungarian want to, with this 
flag, distance those who do not speak Hungarian so, but are the Hungarian 
homeland’s citizens.152  
 
Kohányi was perhaps naive, perhaps disingenuous in calling for the participation of all 
with “true patriotic feeling.”153 The imagery and culture of the event were decidedly 
Hungarian in the narrow sense: one hundred young women dressed in red, white, and 
green; a Ráckoczi march for the procession music; and speeches in Hungarian and 
English, not in any of the kingdom’s other languages. The delivery of a flag, so often a 
symbol of sovereignty, became a flashpoint for anti-Hungarian protest. The series of 
receptions held for the flag succeeded in uniting American Magyars, but provoked 
American Slavic nationalists. While Slavic opposition accomplished little in terms of 
prompting American governmental opposition to the flag or the Hungarian government, 
the sudden appearance of Hungarian symbolism in the United States, as we shall see, 
galvanized more American Slavs into becoming immigrant nation-builders. Increasingly 
segregated geographically and linguistically, the Empire’s former subjects were 
increasingly diverging politically in North America.  
The opponents – primarily Slovak-speakers and, according to one source, 
Hungarian-speaking socialists – were quick to get their own perspective into major New 
York City newspapers and to President Roosevelt, but to little avail. Anthony S. 
Ambrose, President of the National Slavonic Society of the United States of America, 
informed the U.S. State Department of the flag tour and alleged that it was a gift from the 
Hungarian government, paid for “by official representatives of that Government” and 
aimed at “prevent[ing] their [immigrants’] absorption into the great body of the American 
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people.”154 Ambrose’s letter to State Department notified authorities and ensured that a 
duty would be levied on the shipment, but otherwise failed to elicit objections from the 
American government. The Springfield Republican, after reporting on both sides, 
concluded that “the most jealous patriotic scrutiny fails to detect a menace to American 
institutions in this banner of the Hungarian people.” Referring to it as a “banner” rather 
than a “flag,” a verbal distinction that does not really exist in Hungarian, lessened its 
association with sovereignty.155 The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office insisted to the 
State Department that “the Hungarian National League which first started and carried out 
this idea has been actuated in doing so by patriotic, and not political, motives.” “No 
blame can be attached to anyone,” the Foreign Ministry official reasoned, “who exhorts 
his countrymen, even when living in a foreign land, to be faithful to their native 
home.”156 The State Department briefly looked into the details of the case, noting that the 
German Emperor had bestowed a similar gift on German singing groups in Chicago, and 
turned to other matters.157 But Slovak-Americans had cooperated in protesting Hungarian 
incursions in the United States, a practice they would find reason to repeat again. 
 Hungarian Count Albert Apponyi’s American tours in 1904 and 1912 prompted a 
similar set of reactions: jubilant Hungarian celebrations, Slavic protest, and no opposition 
from the American government. The mixed reactions to Apponyi’s visit again illustrate 
the contradictory outcomes of Austria-Hungary’s intervention abroad. An extremely 
prominent member of the Hungarian aristocracy and government was coming to US soil 
to personally nurture connections between the home state and the Hungarian 
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communities abroad, strengthening the cohesion of the community and ties to the mother 
country. But at the same time, Apponyi’s tour became a flashpoint for Slavic nationalists 
to protest the government’s nationality policies at home and Apponyi’s chauvinism in 
particular. Apponyi, for whom Hungary’s education laws colloquially known as the Lex 
Apponyi were named, was also the aristocrat who had personally insulted Stefan Osusky, 
prompting his emigration, discussed in the introduction to this dissertation. The lack of 
response to Apponyi’s 1904 visit contrasted with his 1912 tour shows how rapidly 
migrants were dividing into strict national camps in the United States. The backlash is 
instructive in the ways that the American Action failed to stem Slavic nationalism and 
even contributed to the sharpening of ethnic tensions between Slavic nation-builders and 
the Hungarian state.  
The primary purposes of Apponyi’s visits to the United States in 1904 and 1912 
were to lecture at Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference and at various universities, and 
to nurture Hungary’s ties with the United States government, but both featured numerous 
occasions to engage in the cultural politics of Hungarian emigration and promote 
Hungarian unity with the mother country. Apponyi met with Theodore Roosevelt during 
both of his visits and spoke to both Houses of Congress in 1904. Western politicians 
credited him with keeping the peace in Austria-Hungary’s fragile dualist compromise, 
overlooking his chauvinism on minority policy. Apponyi’s tours fit neatly with the 
American Action’s goal of promoting Hungarian identity abroad, not only because of 
American respect for him but, like the traveling banner, cultural events that the 
Hungarian-speaking community across the northeast and Midwest could participate in. A 
particularly significant moment was Apponyi’s visit to the statue of 1848 revolutionary 
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Lajos Kossuth in University Circle in Cleveland, which had been erected in 1902 by the 
United Hungarian Societies, an umbrella organization for many of the Hungarian-
oriented clubs in the city. The statue’s unveiling in 1902 and accompanying parade 
featured the participation of a number of the city’s nationalities, given Kossuth’s high 
status among ’48-ers more broadly.158  
Slavic protests during Apponyi’s visit in 1912 were particularly notable (as well 
as troubling to Hungarian officials) because American Slovaks were joined by Czechs 
and Poles, groups that would not have been affected by Apponyi’s educational laws in 
Hungary. The Czech paper Denní Hlasatel reported that “the harassing of Count 
Apponyi, the archenemy of the Slovak people” was the Cesko-Americka Tiskova 
Kancelar’s (Czech-American Press Office) “outstanding achievement” of the year, noting 
that the press effort “succeeded in minimizing the ill effects of the Count's visit to this 
country.”159 Indeed, the Washington Festival Committee rescinded Apponyi’s invitation 
to lecture after threats that protesters would “ruin” the event.160 Apponyi charged that “a 
systematic Czech campaign . . . [to] make our Slovak emigrants, at least politically, into 
Czechs” was responsible. While organizers feared massive Slavic protest at Apponyi’s 
lectures in Chicago, they were uneventful. “The terrorism then practiced by the Czecho-
Slovak group,” as Apponyi phrased it, came later, in the newspaper coverage of the 
event: “malevolent lies” of “uproar and wild disorder” at the lecture in the Chicago press, 
even though the only altercation at the lecture itself, Apponyi claimed, had been one 
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hostile question from Hungarian-speaking socialists who blasted Apponyi’s lack of 
support for expanding the franchise in Hungary.161 Furthering the propaganda effort, the 
Slovak National Committee compiled Count Albert Apponyi: The so-called Angel of 
Peace and what he stands for in Hungary, “on behalf of the non-magyar immigrants.”162 
The committee reprinted critiques of Apponyi by western intellectuals like R.W. Seton-
Watson, purposefully using “non-Slavs” as the “witnesses to truth” to convince 
international audiences of Apponyi’s unwarranted reputation as an “Angel of Peace.”    
 
Conclusion 
 Austria-Hungary’s transatlantic reach to maintain migrant loyalty in America 
featured many successes in promoting migrants’ community and church life, particulary 
for the Hungarian government in regard to Hungarian speakers. It may have bolstered the 
imperial loyalty of some migrants at the individual level, but failed to keep the Empire’s 
national projects from developing rapidly overseas. The Empire’s migrant Slavs 
increasingly embraced conceptions of the nation that operated outside the bounds of 
imperial loyalty, and forthrightly opposed it. Migrants increasingly viewed Hungary as an 
oppressor, including those migrants for whom national oppression played no part in their 
migration. Austria-Hungary’s long arm across the Atlantic provided vital services to early 
twentieth-century migrants and to new arrivals, but many of those who had been in the 
United States for a number of years and who increasingly supported Slavic national 
projects chafed at the Empire’s cultural propaganda. When Marcus Braun himself 
interviewed Prime Minister Tisza about Hungary’s emigration situation and suggested 
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that that the American Action’s distribution of patriotic literature, flag tour, and church 
work created “friction among the various nationalities” coming to the United States from 
Hungary, Tisza emphatically replied, “Why, we have to do something to protect 
ourselves against Pan-Slavistic disturbances constantly going on and tolerated in the 
United States.”163 At every turn, the competing goals of Austria-Hungary’s intervention – 
to keep migrants loyal to the homeland and to mitigate the effects of separatist 
nationalism overseas – worked against each other. And it was not America’s problem: 
imperial officials worried about the consequences of heightened nationalism returning to 
the Empire with return migrants, as we will see in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 
Bringing Migrants back Home: Americanization, National Activism,  
and the Threat to Imperial Order 
Migration to North America was a temporary affair for many Central and Eastern 
European migrants at the turn of the 20th century, including those from Austria-Hungary. 
Estimates suggest that in the early decades of mass transatlantic migration, before 1909, 
17 to 27 percent of the Empire’s migrants returned to the Empire.164 U.S. Labor 
Department counts of migrants who returned between 1908 and 1923, (broken down by 
“race or nationality,”) suggest 66% of Hungarian migrants returned, 57% of Slovaks, 
19% of Czechs, and 17% of Rusins. Despite the wide variety in statistics, the overall fact 
remains clear: return migration was widespread.165 While Austro-Hungarian officials 
initially opposed emigration and considered it disloyal to leave the homeland, their 
attitudes changed. The economic benefits to the sending country, their inability to stop it, 
and its potentially temporary duration inspired this change. Even as the Hungarian 
government continued to discourage and police the exit of emigrants, Hungarian officials 
began to actively promote return migration, particularly of desirable “patriotic” subjects.   
As Hungarian officials reconciled themselves to the thought of emigrants who 
might return, they began to try to mitigate emigration’s economic consequences, and to 
influence nationality politics by encouraging particular categories of return migrants. The 
rationale behind the American Action, we saw, had been in the words of the Prime 
Minister, “to keep alive among emigrants national feeling and on that path the intention 
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to return.”166 Furthermore, Hungarian governmental tactics to encourage return migration 
emphasized maintaining migrants’ loyalty to their home country, a path which appeared 
to justify, at least to themselves, governmental surveillance and intervention abroad, 
particularly of Slavic national activity in the United States. “Patriotism” became the 
primary criterion in assessing which migrants were most desirable to draw back.  
The Austro-Hungarian government entertained a number of plans in the two 
decades before the First World War to bring migrants home, many of which fell under the 
auspices of Hungary’s established “American Action.” “Unlike its Austrian counterpart,” 
diplomat and scholar Rudolf Agstner has written, “the Hungarian government actually 
bore the cost of repatriating its co-nationals. One Hungarian official justified the expense, 
arguing that it was necessary to "prevent the depopulation of the Holy Crown of St. 
Stephen."167 The simplest proposal was to subsidize return journeys for migrants. The 
Emigrant houses that the Foreign Ministry supported in New York City, discussed 
previously in Chapter 2, could also be used for shuttling migrants back to the empire, 
housing not only new arrivals but also those about to board ships home.168⁠ Several small 
cohorts of travelers made use of these direct subsidies, most notably “families left 
destitute by the incapacitation or death of their principal breadwinner” in industrial or 
mining accidents.169 These were only the most modest of much more extensive return 
migration campaigns, which attempted to address a much wider array of governmental 
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priorities and migrant actions.  
Although return migrants could help mitigate some of the losses of transatlantic 
emigration, they also posed threats to the imperial order. Some return migrants were 
inevitably at odds politically with the government. This was especially the case for 
Slavic-language-speaking migrants who had further developed a sense of nationalism that 
opposed the empire’s privileging of German- and Hungarian-language institutions, and 
migrants who developed more democratic beliefs in their personal theories of 
government. The proliferation of separatist nationalism, democratism, and socialism were 
all threats that the Austro-Hungarian government considered carefully in crafting return 
migration campaigns. 
Return migrants could help or hurt the empire both economically and politically: 
emigration could drain labor and population, but could also be a source of remittances; a 
return migrant might be one who failed and had spent her savings pointlessly on foreign 
steamship tickets, or be someone who brought back skills and capital to invest in the 
homeland economy. This spectrum of economic outcomes made it sometimes difficult for 
governmental officials to decide how to act in regard to emigration and how to spin the 
economic arguments for return migration. One ambassadorial report in the late summer 
of 1908 observed that return migrants were “handsomely equipped with money,” while 
other reports indicated that among migrants returning to Fiume the average carried far 
less money back than what they left with and that the return of a few well off individuals 
heavily inflated the average. Migrants who had been in the United States for 3 or 4 or 
even 12 years were returning with just 6,000 crowns. In one batch of return migrants, 298 
brought money back with themselves while 129 did not, raising the real concern that they 
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could require public assistance. Lean financial times in the U.S. after the Panic of 1907 
prompted fears of large wave of return migrants, as one official put it, a “panicky return 
migration.”170 
Hungarian governmental officials were eager to circulate tales of migrants’ poor 
fortunes in the United States to discourage further emigration. The Kivándorlási Ellenőr 
(Emigration Monitor) and Kivándorlási Értesitő (Emigration Bulletin) newspapers were 
brimming with stories of migrants’ failures, from the penury of return migrants to 
unfortunate cases of those who suffered or even perished on the ship en route across the 
Atlantic. An article titled “Things to Know” warned, “everyone is mistaken, who hopes 
that as soon as they arrive in America, they will immediately find work and that 
employers will be grasping for them.” It further cautioned that steam and electricity had 
already replaced many manual jobs and that the employers were responding to bad 
economic conditions in 1903 by “strongly reducing their business and releasing workers.” 
The ranks of the “desperate” and “unemployed” were expanding at a “frightening 
rate.”171 Other issues of the bulletin shared statistics of mass unemployment in American 
cities.172 Reports of migrants’ successes, like Ambassador Hengermüller’s 1908 report 
emphasizing their accumulated wealth, threatened to arouse “suspicion” about the 
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governments’ reporting on migrants’ misfortunes. In much the same way that the 
government subsidized migrant papers friendly to the monarchy in the United States, so 
too could they subsidize papers devoted to migration news to publish articles aligned 
with their interests. 
The politics of emigration and return migration intersected powerfully with 
nationality politics. Hungarian governmental efforts to encourage return migration 
explicitly strove to maintain Hungarian-speakers’ margin of population majority in the 
kingdom. 54 percent were primarily Hungarian-speakers according to the 1910 census, 
but as low 48 percent by some other estimates, worrying officials in Budapest.173⁠ In 
serving Hungarian-speaking communities, promoting patriotism and promoting 
Hungarianness largely overlapped and were easily intertwined (at least to a point). 
However, Hungary’s efforts at managing migrant patriotism and return migration were 
not limited to those they considered ethnically Hungarian. Some officials sometimes 
promoted the return of Hungary’s Slavic, German, and other migrants to the countryside 
so long as those migrants were “patriotic.” But other officials argued that simply 
excluding national minorities from return migration campaigns was more expedient. In 
the end, Hungarian governmental programs that prioritized the return migration of 
Hungarian speakers prevailed because they both addressed the goals of repatriation and 
gave the monarchy a stronger position in homeland population engineering. Debates 
inside the government show the slippage between theory and practice, as transnational 
contests for identity lost out to the simpler task of attaining national goals through 
exclusion. 
                                                       
173 A magyar szent korona országainak 1910. évi népszámlálása. Első rész. A népesség 
főbb adatai (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1912). 
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 Interested parties in the United States recognized that migration for many 
immigrants was temporary and that a sizeable minority would return home. As in 
Austria-Hungary, officials, employers, and shapers of public opinion in the United States 
disagreed on whether to accept the status quo of cyclical migration, prevent more 
immigrants from arriving in the first place, or endeavor more strongly to make arrivals 
into new Americans.  
 
Labor, Land, and Money in Cycles of Migration  
Issues of loyalty and nationality mattered in discussions of return migration, but 
issues of livelihood, labor, and land were also crucial, and involved a host of Austro-
Hungarian governmental agencies in the return migration campaign. As we saw in 
previous chapters, Austria-Hungary’s joint Foreign Ministry coordinated affairs at Ellis 
Island and worked with local institutions in New York City to house migrants traveling in 
both directions. Hungary’s Ministry of Religion and Public Instruction worked actively in 
the United States to maintain migrants’ loyalty in America. The governmental monopoly 
awarded to the Central Ticket Office tried to keep the profits earned in the business of 
emigration domestic, simultaneously enriching Hungarian noble members of parliament 
who invested in it. When it came to return migration, other agencies, too, became part of 
the effort, especially where there was money to be made. Hungary’s Ministry of 
Agriculture looked to return migrants as prospective buyers for declining aristocrats’ 
surplus land, and the national postal service sought to get a share of the profits of migrant 
remittances. 
Many Eastern European individuals’ earning potential was limited by the 
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unavailability of land, paucity of local jobs outside of agriculture, and high taxes on small 
landholdings, pushing them abroad for work and wages to pay their taxes on their land at 
home. These interrelated issues of work, land, and taxes in the monarchy reemerged 
whenever governmental officials actually examined individual migrants’ choices. 
Migrants complained to Dr. János Baross of the National Hungarian Economic 
Association that the taxes on their small farms, just 3 to 10 holds of land, were higher 
than their estates’ value! “Those among us who do not have land are much happier than 
those who do,” explained migrant András Vojtoka from the town of Csicser. “The day 
laborer earns what he needs to live, unburdened by taxes or debt, but we,” Vojtoka 
continued, “could no longer bear the expenses.” Baross confirmed to his colleagues that 
day laborers probably had it easier than smallholders with “dwarf” estates; the 
“overfragmentation and pulverization of peasant estates” was among the main causes of 
migration visible not just in Vojtoka’s home county but across the whole uplands region 
and the whole country.174 When the Prime Minister’s Office surveyed sheriffs in counties 
with high rates of emigration about what could be done to curtail it, many responded, not 
surprisingly, that villagers frequently returned of their own accord once they could afford 
to purchase land.175⁠  
Hungarian governmental and non-governmental agencies devoted extensive 
resources and brainpower to examining questions surrounding emigration and return 
migration. The National Hungarian Economic Society sponsored the Uplands Emigration 
                                                       
174 A Felvidéki kivándorlási kongresszus tárgyalásai, megtartatott Miskolczon...  
(Budapest: Pátria, 1902),156, 153. Baross’s recommendation was hardly progressive – a 
modified primogeniture under which there would be a minimum size to landholdings for 
offspring to inherit; other siblings could either pay annual rent to the inheriting offspring 
(157). A list of expenses by social rung/property holding is provided on 196. 
175 Various county reports can be found in MNL OL K26, 630 cs., 1905-XVI. 
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Congress in the city of Miskolc in 1902, with participation by representatives from 
county economic societies (essentially chambers of commerce), county officials, and 
industry bureaus. The panels explored wide-ranging topics on emigration’s effects, from 
economic affairs pertaining to the agriculture, forestry, mining, and viticulture industries 
to the strengthening of the middle class, the partition of estates, taxes, and credit 
systems.176 Congresses like this recognized the economic realities that pushed individuals 
to emigrate and would have to be rectified to prevent further losses and draw substantial 
numbers home.  
The government’s plans and migrants own decisions both had to take into account 
the changing availability of work on both sides of the Atlantic; changes in the American 
labor market contributed considerably to pull factors drawing migrants to the United 
States, but also pushing them home. Big strikes and industrial panics produced an uptick 
in return migrants as the American labor market became either inhospitable or saturated. 
The Panic of 1907 stands out as evidence to this: as tens of thousands of migrant workers 
were laid off in industrial areas from Pittsburgh to St. Louis, Europeans flooded home by 
the thousands.177 In response, the Interior Ministry requested that various Budapest public 
works offices, included the water, landscaping, and cleaning departments, hire return 
migrants whenever possible as day labor to deal with the emergency influx of 
unemployed returnees. Newspapers regularly circulated this and other kinds of 
intelligence about migration conditions. The Kivándorlási Ellenőr reported in February 
of 1908 that the Cunard ship “Carmania” brought home 1,700 return migrants to Fiume, 
departing back to New York with only 239, showing the extent of consequences of the 
                                                       
176 A Felvidéki kivándorlási kongresszus tárgyalásai, megtartatott Miskolczon, chaps. 1 
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177 See Wyman, Round-Trip to America, 81.  
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1907 panic. It further reported that migrant families were lined up at the Austro-
Hungarian consulate in New York, “begging” for travel fare home.178 Other papers 
reported not only on job opportunities for industrial workers, but also advice on places 
where work had become hard to come by. They encouraged workers to stay home, go 
elsewhere, or go home for a time until prospects changed. Mining and other industrial 
accidents prompted bursts of return migrants, whether fellow workers lucky to escape 
death and inspired to head home, or families returning to Europe into the arms of family 
after the loss of their breadwinner.179 
As much as government officials bemoaned the emigration of industrial workers, 
many workers were leaving precisely because there were too many of them for available 
positions and that very fact made them difficult to draw home. Questions about return 
migration featured a complicated interplay between agricultural and industrial work. The 
Trade Minster reported to Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza in 1905 that vocational 
workers had left Hungary mainly from the steel and machine sectors because of a surplus 
of workers; drawing them home, as the Prime Minister wanted, would be impossible 
because those industries remained saturated with labor.180 It was pointless for the 
government to target industrial workers for return migration unless it wanted to invest 
first in expanding the steel and machine industries to employ them. A subsequent note in 
                                                       
178 Kivándorlási Ellenőr, Feb. 15, 1908.  
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the Prime Minister’s office files referred to the reality of the Trade Minister’s conclusions 
as “unpleasant,” and archived his report.181 Seemingly intent on having a reason to entice 
industrial workers home anyway, the government instructed the Hungarian Industrialists’ 
National Association to survey factories and identify those in need of “trustworthy and 
hard-working” return migrant employees so they could concretely place returning 
individuals in available jobs.182 The political will to encourage return migration, in this 
case, was clearly far more important than any real economic need.  
Until 1906, the government’s efforts had “endeavored only to keep the desire to 
return migrate alive,” but had not yet engaged in actually implementing any return 
initiatives. ⁠183 As the government’s efforts shifted from the realm of emotion to 
facilitating return movement, its priorities shifted from migrants’ national feeling to their 
pocketbooks. In laying out the return migration operation to the Foreign Minister, one 
official consistently emphasized spending return migration funds on migrants who had 
accumulated wealth in the United States. Hungary’s return migration campaigns featured 
efforts to rescue unfortunate migrants from penury abroad, even as it sought to entice 
economically successful migrants to return home and enrich the country. 
The return migration proposal of the Ministry of Agriculture is particularly 
worthy of attention as an example of the government’s concrete effort to promote return 
migration. The central question was this: “How could we most practicably, avoiding state 
intervention, sell land to Hungarians in America . . .  and thus, through resettlement, 
                                                       
181 Report of Mar. 3, 1905, IHRC 979, Reel 25. 
182 Magyar Nemzet, Mar. 24, 1908.  
183 Letter to Aehrenthal, stamped July 22, 1907, HHStA, PA XXXIII, 100, 3269. 
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somewhat offset emigration?” ⁠184 The greatest enticement, to make this “come true” rather 
than be an “empty desire”, according to the Ministry, was to “plant opportunities for 
return.” This meant concerted programs to provide not simply land but estates.⁠185 One 
Ministry of Agriculture official proposed having the state “unofficially” buy available 
properties and sell them to Hungarian Americans, factoring in some management costs 
that the state incurred. The favored alternative plan, which eliminated some of the 
difficulties and potential for corruption of governmental land ownership, was for the 
Ministry to create a compendium of parcels for sale, with information on how much was 
required in down payment or how much could be taken out in loans.186 In the end they 
landed on contracting out the Ministry of Agriculture’s program to a non-governmental 
entity ⁠187, either the Magyar Gazdaszövetség (Hungarian Farmers’ Association), an 
organization of medium-sized gentry and peasant landholders, or the Julian Society, 
which had done resettlement work among Hungarian-speakers to Hungary from Slavonia 
and Bosnia.  
The Hungarian Farmers’ Association did indeed take up the task of “easing the 
acquisition of estates” for return migrants from the United States.188 Familiarity with their 
“patriotic activities” helped them secure the right to operate the program.189 The program 
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degree. See Phelps, U.S.-Habsburg Relations,186-189.  
189 Letter to Bernát from Ambrózy, May 7, 1909, IHRC 979, Reel 25. 
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was initially contracted for a few years, with a 30,000 crown yearly allowance.190 The 
Kivándorlási Ellenőr reported in 1908 that 200 Hungarian Americans had applied to buy 
land under the Hungarian Farmers’ Association’s program, and that they planned to 
extend it to more Hungarian Americans and also Hungarians living in Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Bukovina.191 Also eligible were would-be migrants who the Farmers’ Association 
could prevent from emigrating by selling them program land.192  The paper further 
reported that sixty-two properties/estates were currently for sale.193 Government-assisted 
return migration had become a reality, however limited. The benefits of formulating a 
return migration program in this way served nationalist, social, and economic goals alike. 
Selling estates or even somewhat parceled estates to return migrants with cash, rather 
than to local peasants, would be significantly less disruptive to local class hierarchies, 
avoiding the unpleasantness of estate-holders having to sell their lands piecemeal to 
locals who might have worked on that very estate.194 It also furthered Hungary’s intended 
trajectory of increasingly mechanizing agriculture. 
Governmental officials paid attention to community-building, knowing that 
repatriation would be more successful if returnees were able to feel a sense of community 
and pine for the often close-knit migrant communities they had left behind. Emigrants’ 
family members still residing in Hungary could be tapped to both lean on their relatives 
in America to return and to spread word of the resettlement program. Rather than 
engaging in boosterism, relatives in Hungary could accurately depict the land for sale, 
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and lure back their families. Potential return migrants would be assessed for their 
suitability to the Ministry of Agriculture’s resettlement program in their “financial 
situation” (ability to put down a 50 percent down payment) and also their “psychological 
morale/mood,” essentially their re-assimilability and patriotism. ⁠195  
Implementing the government’s return migration program would require sending 
trustworthy agents to larger Hungarian settlements in the United States to find individuals 
open to relocating back to Hungary and wealthy enough to purchase land. Utmost care 
would have to be taken to find agents capable of practicing great discretion so that they 
wouldn’t spark a controversy over return migration propaganda. ⁠196 They planned to use 
U.S.-resident ministers and priests already receiving stipends from the Austro-Hungarian 
government to preach return migration from the pulpit. Governmental officials 
recognized that this would not actually be in ministers’ best interest, since the size of 
their congregations directly affected the financial health of the church and their personal 
salary. Thus, they proposed either a commission system based on the value of land they 
pushed (later rejected), raises for ministers for each of their congregants who repatriated, 
or some other form of financial incentive. ⁠197 Indeed, M.P. Silvestri reported from 
Cleveland, Ohio that summer that the ministers in the area, even those receiving a 
government stipend, “would not gladly recruit” candidates for return migration, since 
doing so would, “in the long run, undermine the very position of their parishes.”198  
Instead the Magyar Gazdaszövetség used its own agent North America, a János 
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Skotty, to operate the program, but with only modest success. Skotty spent a month 
traveling around the United States trying to recruit migrants to buy land and return home 
to disappointing results. While many applied for the program, few were willing to 
actually commit to return migration. Magyar Gazdaszövetség director and M.P. István 
Bernát pessimistically reported that “few drove to proceed past the application stage,” 
either because the applicants did not actually desire to go home and buy land, or were 
holding out for “the state to truly, caressingly, bait them home,” essentially with better 
economic terms.199  
The lack of immediate success with Skotty’s first round of recruitment 
encouraged the Ministry of Agriculture and the Gazdaszövetség to ponder difficult 
questions about the relationship between migration, love of country, land, and security. 
What was the relationship between encouraging return migration and the land hunger 
among peasants back in Hungary? Why was it that some migrants were willing to buy 
farms on the other side of the world in the United States, but if and when they returned to 
Hungary they only wanted to live in the place where they were born? Did American 
farms produce better income and more stable living than estates at home?200  
The relative lack of interest in governmental return migration programs among 
migrants in the United States encouraged the Hungarian government to explore 
expanding the program to Canada. There, one official concluded that success seemed 
much more promising on account of Hungarians’ reported inability to get used to the 
“inclement” weather and the much greater gender imbalance favoring men than among 
Hungarian-speaking migrants to the United States. Encouraging return migration from 
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Canada had the added benefit, for the Ministry of Agriculture’s program, that many more 
migrants there were working in agriculture rather than industry, and were “weathered in 
body and soul to hard field labor.” They were now skilled specifically in “machine-driven 
intensive husbandry” and could become “master” models for the surrounding area’s 
population at home.201 Implied, but unstated, in the report is that migrant farmers in 
Canada could more readily imagine a future as farmers in Hungary than industrial 
workers in the United States who had much more varied goals beyond a future of 
husbandry.  
It seems that most migrants, in the end, based their decisions to return on family, 
economic, and work-related factors, not because of governmental enticement. Rather than 
being discouraged by their time in the United States, the majority of those returned, even 
if they would have ideally stayed, were of “pretty good morale.” In a governmental study 
on the “psychological mood” of return migrants, many blamed the poor work 
opportunities specifically on the presidential election in the United States in 1908 and 
were of the opinion that in a short time jobs would be plentiful again.202 A minority of 
migrants were, however, according to the study, quite disappointed by their migration 
experiences or continuing poor fortune, and were nicknamed “Die Amerikamüden,” the 
“weary Americans.” The report indicated that “work aversion” and “sloth” likely 
contributed to their lack of success in the United States and continued troubles upon 
arriving home, contributing to their psychological inability to “enhappy” themselves. The 
most important finding from the study was that return migrants would migrate again once 
they believed that conditions in the United States to find work improved. Thus, even as 
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the government worked to encourage migrants to return back to the homeland, the cycle 
of movement would simply begin again. Psychological factors had little salience 
compared to opportunities for work.  
 
Bringing Home the “Patriotic” Migrant: Return Migrants and Homeland Politics  
 The primary characteristic of a desirable return migrant, like a good citizen, was 
being hazafias, a good son of the homeland. Hungarian officials sending correspondence 
across the Atlantic in both directions frequently signed their missives, “with patriotic 
affection.” Every priest or minister that that Hungarian government sent to shepherd 
flocks of the religious faithful in the United States was inspected, first and foremost, for 
their patriotism, their faithfulness not only to church doctrines but to the government. It is 
no surprise, then, that this concept of patriotism, so ubiquitous in other realms of 
governmental rhetoric, would be prominent in return migration campaigns as well. 
Officials sought to restore the country in population and in spirit. It is no surprise, also, 
that migrants who did not fit governmental definitions of patriotism would be excluded to 
whatever degree possible from return migration campaigns.  
Expectations for migrant patriotism were not completely consistent between the 
Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Habsburg Empire. Officials in Austria formulated 
their assessment of migrant loyalty primarily through friendliness to the monarchy, 
Monarchie freundlich, as opposed to Hungary’s hazafias, an adjective to describe one as 
a son of the homeland. Both concepts avoided ethnic criteria as their foundation, befitting 
a multinational state, but the Hungarian concept of patriotism suggested a more active 
love of and identification with the country. Austria’s articulation of friendliness toward 
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the monarchy allowed for a greater perception of ethnic difference and rested instead on 
an acceptance of the status quo in imperial power. (Though seeing eye-to-eye with the 
government became of crucial importance in the Hungarian definition of patriotism, 
also.) 
Among return migrants, the most studied and most vulnerable to harassment by 
homeland officials were men who emigrated without completing their compulsory 
military service in the Austrian or Hungarian army.203 In terms of governmental efforts at 
expanding return migration, however, the government’s enemies were not wayward 
would-be soldiers, but migrants who held nationalist views that challenged Austrian and 
Hungarian control in the Empire. Rising Slavic nationalisms in the United States and 
easier implementation of governmental programs among Hungarian-speakers made 
Hungarian-speakers the overwhelmingly prioritized targets of the major return migration 
initiatives. On the practical side, Hungarian governmental agencies had the most ties in 
place already with Hungarian-speaking Reformed and Greek Catholic institutions in the 
United States, initially involving Roman Catholics only incidentally in some plans ⁠204; in 
1908 officials sought to include Hungarian Roman Catholic priests as well in the 
effort.205⁠ Using existing channels for a somewhat controversial program made the 
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expenses palatable.  
But the targeting of Hungarian-speakers for return migration was about more than 
just practicality; it featured an overt element of anti-Slavic prejudice and a goal of 
population engineering. By advertising governmental return migration initiatives to 
certain segments of the Empire’s migrants and not others, the government could recoup 
some of the losses of emigration in ways that protected or heightened the plurality or 
majority of Hungarian-speakers. This was true especially on the national level, as well as 
in particular localities. The Interior Ministry identified Transylvania as an important 
region to encourage return migration, as a way to bolster the ratio of Hungarian to 
Romanian speakers.206 
Even in the Ministry of Agriculture’s plans, where strengthening the country’s 
agricultural sector would supposedly be the paramount goal, concerns about Slavic 
nationalism were front and center. Minister of Agriculture Ignácz Darányi explained to 
István Bernát of the Magyar Gazdaszövetség that migrants from the linguistic minorities 
from northern Hungary should be excluded from purchasing land through the return 
migration programs explicitly because of alleged panslavic views. “Since the return of 
emigrated Slovaks is estimated at 19%, these people with panslav ideas slowly infest 
Felvidék [counties now in southern Slovakia] in this territory already exposed from a 
nationality standpoint —  with the return of Ruthenians with Great Russian ambitions,” 
he explained.207 The “strict keeping” of this stipulation was critically important, he 
explained, because “our emigrants’ repatriation could easily produce the sad outcome, 
that with the Hungarian state’s help, elements that stand in opposition to the Hungarian 
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state idea would return, and these elements would close out from land acquisition those  . 
. . who represent the most acceptable material for settlement.”208 It was essential for “the 
protection of our moral world” to exclude Slavic-language emigrants who had been 
touched by “panslav agitation” abroad.  
Writing Prime Minister Sándor Werkele in 1908, Darányi excluded Hungary’s 
Slavic-language- and German-speakers alike. “Among our slav-speaking emigrants . . . , 
such exceptionally strong panslav agitation is taking place, that these persons’ abetted 
return . . . is not bearable from the standpoint of the monarchy’s nationality situation or 
the Hungarian state’s nationality/minority domestic peace.” ⁠ While German-speaking 
Swabians in Hungary were, from a nationality standpoint, of “good feeling,” “the 
emigrated Svabs in the United States naturally melted into the. . . alldeutsch [all-German] 
operation” there, which was incompatible with Austrian sovereignty. Thus, German-
speakers would also be excluded from this first repatriation effort.209 While the Ministry 
of Agriculture’s return migration program was initially concerned with the land and the 
liquid capital of American return migrants, the program powerfully took on a nationalist 
purpose by 1908.  
 Minister of Agriculture Darányi was also careful to clarify that the resettlement 
program could only be executed “properly” if the “settlement’s moral foundation, 
homesickness, not business interests,” guided its implementation. Such an emphasis on 
homeland made for an uneasy fit when the program was outsourced to a private entity 
whose mission was to support the wellbeing of mid-sized landholders. Preserving the 
economic stability of the country’s agricultural sector in the face of mass emigration had 
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been the point of the Ministry of Agriculture’s involvement in the return migration 
campaign at the outset, making Darányi’s Hungarian chauvinism and this emphasis on 
abstract homesickness and patriotism rather puzzling. The Ministry of Agriculture was 
now peddling primarily in the business of patriotism rather than cultivatable land. 
 Hungarian officials were concerned not only about the return of physical 
individuals promoting panslavism or Slavic nationalism, but also of writings by Slavic 
nationalists being sent home. The Hungarian government had several tools at its disposal 
to try to mitigate the effects of the return of undesirable people and materials. Local 
officials were asked to report on the reappearance of specific individuals, as well as who 
received mailings of known Slavic-American publications that had been identified as 
agitative. Alongside the presses in Prague and in Martin, officials identified presses in the 
United States as the source of newspapers, journals, and pamphlets distributed by the 
“American panslav anti-national movement.” One policy adviser insisted to the Minister 
of Commerce that “preventative measures” should be taken, because by the time these 
material fell into readers’ hands it was too late to do anything about them. The postal 
service, he advised, should track the return addresses of Czech-language materials 
coming to Slovak-speaking areas of Hungary from America and Austria and, if possible, 
obtain the list of subscribers to censor them more surgically.210  
In addition to separatist nationalism, return migrants returned home with other 
political ideologies that officials considered undesirable or threatening, regardless of their 
professed nationality. Many of the changes that migrants generally underwent in the 
United States were shared by Hungarian-speakers and Slavic-language-speakers: changes 
in economic condition, heightened political consciousness and growing desire for a more 
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democratic Hungary, and heightened modern class consciousness from working in an 
industrial setting. Too radical a position in any of these areas was thought to make 
migrants less assimilable to life back home and potentially a threat, thus subject to 
surveillance and harassment by local authorities upon their return.211⁠ “Patriotism” thus 
signaled a non-threatening stance in nationality politics – a record clean of activism in 
anything that could be labeled panslav – as well as a non-threatening stance to the 
political and social status quo more broadly.  
Back home, a host of political orientations were deemed threatening to the status 
quo, from democracy to socialism. “You could see . . . that they returned with new social 
ideas rather tinged with socialism,” one Hungarian official reported to the prime minister 
in 1909. The examples he gave of this, however, were merely an entitlement to demand 
“humane treatment” and their elation at being referred to by honorific titles like “Mr.” 
even by authorities in the United States.212 The social leveling that officials feared from 
return migrants was less of an immediate threat but more of a long-term one. On the 
whole, before World War I, migrants did not actively seek to revolutionize Hungary’s 
class structure and political system on their visits home, but did support more 
democratically inclined candidates, as we will see in the next chapter, and start to 
envision a more democratic future for Austria-Hungary. Return migrants’ social 
revolutionary views did not find much fruition until 1918. The consequences of return 
migration on separatist nationalism were apparent much more quickly, especially with the 
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outbreak of World War I.   
 
Return Migration and Interstate Politics 
Drawing migrants home was a central priority in Hungarian foreign affairs, but it 
was not without diplomatic dangers. The Ministry of Agriculture’s proposals were 
extensively debated in governmental circles, taking “great care and forethought” to avoid 
anything that would create “conflict with the American government.” ⁠213 Nevertheless, the 
status of return migrants was among the greatest points of contention between the Austro-
Hungarian and U.S. governments, and occupied a significant portion of the activity of 
U.S. consuls based in Austria-Hungary. The mobility and tricky citizenship status of 
return migrants plagued diplomatic discussions between the two countries for decades. 
As Nicole Phelps, the preeminent scholar of U.S.-Habsburg foreign relations, has found, 
massive transatlantic migration prompted an international debate on ideas about territorial 
sovereignty versus sovereignty over one’s own citizens. Officials in both countries 
attempted to align migrants’ physical location with their land of citizenship, but migrants’ 
propensity to move and to claim or denounce citizenships as fit their needs, made 
standardization continually difficult.214 
Austria-Hungary’s compulsory military service was central to controversies about 
the return migration and citizenship of military-aged men.215 Austro-Hungarian and 
American agreements on naturalization were laid out in an 1870 treaty that exempted 
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migrants who acquired American citizenship from outstanding military commitments at 
home, but thousands of migrants who made return visits home were not yet full citizens 
and thus not covered by this treaty. And while migrants who had become American 
citizens were legally exempt from Austro-Hungarian military duty on their return to 
Europe, officials nevertheless hassled them, especially at the local level. Migrants 
returning to Austria-Hungary with a U.S. passport or other documentary proof of 
citizenship were fairly easy to spring if they were detained by European officials for 
evasion of military service. Those who had only filed “first papers” for citizenship, 
however, were not yet full citizens and therefore not entitled to assistance from American 
officials.216 Migrants who had spent time working in the United States and become 
citizens but returned for an extended period to Europe and had no proof of intention to 
travel back could rarely receive the American consular assistance they desired.  
As interstate relations between Austria-Hungary and her neighbors worsened with 
the 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herczegovina and the ensuing wars, the government 
tried to clamp down on the emigration of men of military age to keep the fighting force at 
home. In December of 1912, the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior issued a temporary 
ordinance banning the emigration of all eligible men who had not yet fulfilled their 
military obligations.217 Hungarian officials opposed to emigration had long wanted to 
address the liberality of the 1870 treaty. During the First World War, in desperate need of 
soldiers, Habsburg officials began to interpret the 1870 treaty to mean that Austria-
Hungary’s migrants, as dual citizens once they became Americans, were still eligible for 
mandatory military service at home. As the language of the treaty was vague on the 
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matter, U.S. officials did not protest this change in interpretation, especially as the 
diminishing opportunities for transatlantic travel made the issue moot.218 
If migration to the United States was only temporary for many migrants, so too 
could be the American citizenship they gained during their time in the United States. If a 
migrant’s return to Europe was permanent, according to two new acts of Congress in 
1906 and 1907, their American citizenship could be withdrawn. With no international 
standard on dual citizenship, citizenship’s expiration, or expatriation, American and 
European officials were often left to negotiate cases on an individual basis. “Many 
naturalized citizens of Polish, Croatian, Hungarian or other origin, return to their counties 
of their nationality for the purpose of taking up their permanent abode therein and when 
the question of their military service is involved endeavor to obtain protection under the 
cloak of forfeited American citizenship,” U.S. consul to Vienna Ulysses Grant-Smith 
complained in 1916. “Had it not been for the present war, there is no doubt that many 
such persons would have continued to reside in their former homes as American citizens 
without any wellfounded claims as such.”219   
Alongside evasion of military service, return migration sometimes dragged 
American officials into Austro-Hungarian attempts to quash the spread of nationalism by 
migrants returning to the Empire from the United States. Phelps analyzed the case of 
Zdenek Bodlak, born in St. Paul, Minnesota to Czech parents, who moved to Prague to 
study music and wound up in prison in 1914 for sedition against the Austrian 
government. Although the American consul in Prague, Charles Hoover, opined that some 
of the Austrian government’s methods at rooting out sedition would never be permitted in 
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the United States, he recognized that return migrants, even as American citizens, had a 
responsibility to abide by local laws. Furthermore, he had little sympathy for migrants’ 
interest in homeland national causes. Phelps summed up Hoover’s thinking as follows: 
“If naturalized American citizens were more interested in Austrian politics than 
American politics and went so far as to return to Bohemia to promote nationalist 
ideologies, then they should not be able to hide behind the barrier of American 
citizenship.”220  
In all, American and Austro-Hungarian officials had nearly identical goals in 
regard to migrants – making them loyal members of their country – which thus put them 
in competition for the bodies of return-migrants and their confounding back-and-forth 
travels. American consular officials were rather dismissive of return migrants who had 
failed to conform to the expectations of American citizenship and embroiled themselves 
in politics at home. American nativists and proponents of immigration restriction might 
be glad to see migrants return to Europe once injured or too old to labor in the United 
States so they would not become a public burden, but the preference was overwhelmingly 
that migrants, while they could retain cultural affection to their homeland, reassign their 
political allegiance to the United States. These ideas put Austro-Hungarian return 
migration campaigns directly at odds with Americanization efforts in the United States.  
American efforts to keep migrants ebbed and flowed with changes in industrial 
labor demands, and with the contest between nativists and their opponents, including 
Progressives and socialists. While American nativists applauded the return of every 
emigrant to their place of birth, the views of Americans sympathetic to migration was 
more varied. U.S. Special Immigration Inspector Marcus Braun, known to us from the 
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previous chapter, blasted the Hungarian government’s interventionism in the United 
States in his 1906 pamphlet Immigration Abuses: Glimpses of Hungary, specifically 
critiquing Hungary’s efforts to draw migrants home. He suggested what Hungarian 
officials told each other about the migrants: “Let us prevent them from remaining there 
for good and let us insist that their stay out there be but temporary; let us insist that they, 
instead of becoming Hungarian-Americans, remain American-Hungarians,” Braun 
mocked. “And when they have earned enough to pay off the mortgages on their farms [in 
Austria-Hungary] and their debts to the usurers, and have saved up enough to begin life 
anew,” he continued, “let us receive them with open arms and kill the biblical fatted calf 
in honor of their return.”221⁠ Braun’s pamphlet reflected the interests of American thinkers 
and officials who expected migrants, once the beneficiary of American jobs and social 
services, to become Americans and continue to contribute to the American nation and 
economy. 
A final form of return migration worth considering in Austro-Hungarian-U.S. 
relations is deportation. In 1903, the United States deported twenty-one Hungarian 
citizens between the ages of 18 and 51 (average age 35) who had crossed the Atlantic to 
Halifax and presumably attempted to enter the United States from Canada at an 
unauthorized location. Eight were from Kincses, near Ungvar, 4 from Domba [sic], and 
four from Déy/Decz [sic]. Twelve were being sent to Radnot (near Rimaszombat) and 
seven to Lipto Sz. Marton.222 The majority hailed from Hungary’s northern counties, 
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where agricultural output was low and economic investment was limited. While 
narratives of deportation at Ellis Island tend to focus on migrants who were found unfit 
for entry – for failing health exams or demonstrating their ability to not become a public 
expense – pre-WWI histories talk little about the deportation of able-bodied workers. 
Their arrival outside officially sanctioned channels reveals that, although the United 
States accepted the entry of hundreds of thousands of migrants annually, it, too, legislated 
the legal parameters for entry, well before the quotas of the post-World War I era. Not all 
return migrants returned to Austria-Hungary of their own volition. 
 
Conclusion 
While the Hungarian government’s interest in migrant loyalty and patriotism 
remained consistent, its direct influence on return migration was limited. Count Miklós 
Bánffy, a huge proponent of return migration, was so disappointed with the lack of 
success by 1910 that he dejectedly suggested either a final push to make it happen or 
abandoning the return migration program altogether, despite it having been one of his pet 
projects for several years.223 Bánffy wrote the Prime Minister, Count Károly Khuen-
Héderváry, that the administration had two choices: “Either to give up the action’s 
resettlement branch once and for all and, in this vein, gradually decrease and completely 
end the action,” or, “with a strong hand to compensate for the previous years’ 
shortcomings, initiate broad-ranging socio-political, population, and homeland action, 
into which the Americans’ resettlement could be inserted.”  Bánffy considered the latter 
the “only proper road open to the government.” Chastising the prime minister for failing 
to properly support the endeavor, Bánffy ended his letter expressing…  “with anxious 
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patriotic feeling I call … your attention to this affair’s importance” and “undelayable 
importance without further delinquent omission.”224  
The American Action program continued to promote loyalty to Hungary through 
the First World War and even beyond into the early 1920s, hoping to draw migrants 
home. In the case of still “patriotic” minorities (always greater in the Hungarian 
governmental imagination than in actual numbers), they could join in Hungary’s fight to 
recreate the dismantled kingdom. This effort largely failed. In the Hungarian Parliament 
at the outset of 1916, members of Parliament, already looking ahead to the end of the 
war, believed that there were “large numbers of Hungarians” who would “return to their 
mother country after the war.” MP and University of Budapest economics professor Béla 
Földes asserted that “Hungarians now in America did not feel at home there,” presumably 
due to discrimination against Hungarians as aggressors in the war, and that they should 
be “the first to be repatriated” and given opportunities to succeed upon their return.225  
While many migrants who had intended their stay in the United States to be 
temporary were essentially trapped in America for the duration of the war, such a 
movement for mass return migration was wishful thinking in 1916 and far from accurate 
by war’s end three long years later. The outbreak of war completely transformed the 
circumstances surrounding return migration. The extended period of time migrants spent 
in the United States during the war itself and the benefits of Americanization during the 
conflict ensured that thousands of Eastern European migrants who imagined their stay in 
America to be temporary would become permanent residents of the United States.  
The introduction to restrictive immigration legislation in the United States 
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likewise affected migrants’ decisions, as what had once been a revolving door 
transformed into a gate, however porous, in the interwar era. With restrictions in place, 
migrants, we will see in chapter five, migrated as “birds of passage” far less than they had 
earlier in the century, fearing the gates might close more tightly behind them. 
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Chapter 4 
Nationalism Turns Separatist: Migrant Nationalisms and the Collapsing and 
Coalescing of States in World War I 
 
Migrant nation-builders are essential to understanding the transnational story of 
Austria-Hungary’s destruction and the creation of specific nation-states out of its former 
territory after World War I. Migrants’ nation-building activity in the United States before 
the war allowed a select number of national projects that had been developing on both 
sides of the Atlantic over the previous decades to emerge as nation-states by wars’ end. 
Migrant nationalists’ creation of cohesive, distinct ethnic communities in the United 
States in the late nineteenth century recast the western imagination of Austria-Hungary 
from a jumbled mix of cultures arrayed under one emperor to a backward, unnatural 
multiethnic empire with distinct, distinguishable ethnic components that were being 
politically stifled. Nationalists both in Eastern Europe and the United States articulated 
alternatives to empire: discrete ethnic nations. A high-stakes war allowed some of those 
alternatives to become realities.  
Migrant nationalists of different self-proclaimed nations did not have a level 
playing field in gaining the ear of policy-makers. As wartime enemies, German- and 
Hungarian-speaking migrants to the United States had little say in determining their 
homeland’s fate, as the imperial government itself purportedly already represented 
German- and Hungarian-speakers’ interests. Migrants’ roles from these titular nations 
were limited to members of the U.S. wartime propaganda bureau, the Committee of 
Public Information, and whatever initiative individuals took to write in the press. 
Similarly, migrants whose national projects in the United States were not sizable, 
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cohesive, distinct, or strategically significant enough — for example, Rusyn-Americans 
— were likewise not granted the exceptional opportunities. Only migrant nation builders 
like self-identified American Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles succeeded at the task of nation 
building.  
Migrants received a prominent role in nation-building when they could effectively 
partner with homeland nationalists, rally their ethnic organizations in the United States 
around the cause of statehood, and contribute to American war aims. Czech- and Slovak-
American organizations had poised themselves well for these tasks, developing over 
several decades distinct, active, interconnected organizations with personal ties to 
homeland nationalists and politicians. Migrants had made Chicago a “hotbed of East 
European exile nationalism” for several decades. In Chicago and New York, migrants 
regularly protested the status quo in Habsburg politics. During wartime, they were also 
fueled in their protests by the American government. While German- and Hungarian-
speaking migrants felt pressure after the outbreak of war to defend their loyalty to the 
United States and disown their homeland allegiances, “American authorities fostered this 
nationalism,” historian Tara Zahra explains, “hoping to incite Austria-Hungary’s Slavic 
minorities to rebel against their rulers.”226 Regardless of whether migrant nationalists 
supported causes that succeeded or failed at war’s end, their activism in transatlantic 
debates about nationhood, statehood, and citizenship warrant our further attention. War-
time necessity put important discussions of Eastern Europe’s post-war options on U.S. 
soil. First Cleveland and then Pittsburgh became the self-titled cities of two foundational 
agreements in the establishment of a Czecho-Slovak state because American-based 
                                                       
226 Zahra, Great Departure, 82-83. 
 124 
nationalists had the luxury to act on state-building in ways that many of their European 
counterparts simply did not have in the midst of war.  
Migrant nationalists’ ethnic interpretations of Austro-Hungarian imperial 
oppression melded with the United States’ wartime enemy, suggesting an ethnic solution 
for the Empire’s post-war future in the form of supposedly more democratic nation-
states, but we need not follow suit. This chapter holds, as Nicole Phelps has argued, that 
the United States and other Allied powers saw East Europeans primarily in terms of 
race227; therefore, ethnicity and nationality took on oversized importance in the conflict. 
Providing a strong rebuttal to once commonplace arguments in Habsburg historiography, 
historian Pieter Judson explains that “the existence of nationalist movements and 
nationalist conflicts in Austro-Hungarian politics did not weaken that state fatally, and 
they certainly did not cause its downfall in 1918.”228 Instead, he argues, Austria-
Hungary’s greatest challenges were related to wartime leadership and the “struggle for 
democratization” in the face of privileged political classes. But migrant nationalists, even 
more than their European counterparts, insisted on casting the Empire’s social 
inequalities in ethnic terms – the oppression of Slavs by Germans and Hungarians, as 
opposed to the oppression of the landless and smallholders by German- and Hungarian-
speaking aristocrats – and the Allied powers ultimately followed suit. To the United 
States and Western European governments wary of any association with social 
revolution, achieving Austria-Hungary’s democratization through a nation-state solution 
to the “nationality problem” was far preferable to other ways of addressing the guilty 
Austro-Hungarian government’s aristocratic militarism and chokehold on politics. 
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Indeed, fanning the fires of nationalism became an explicit Allied goal to weaken 
Austria-Hungary in the very late stages of the war.229  
In this way the Allies chose to reinvent Eastern Europe as a collection of nation-
states. They did so by essentially empowering nationalists instead of, say, monarchists or 
socialists; they favored the creation of bourgeois states over aristocratic or proletarian 
ones. Considering the unfolding of Eastern Europe in this way expands interpretive 
possibilities and lets us reassess the centrality of “ethnic” conflict in the war, the peace 
process, and the diplomatic and nationalist histories written since. This vein of 
interpretation reminds us that nations are imagined and states established. They are not 
“awakened” and restored to a status they should have had all along. This interpretation 
allows us to see more clearly how transatlantic migration contributed to nation-states as 
the ideal of twentieth-century statehood and why some migrant nationalists, like Czech-
American Emaunel Voska, helped make their dreams of nation a reality during World 
War I. Since a movement for democracy had to come from the “people,” ethnic 
nationalists in the United States were an effective proxy for their “countrymen” and thus 
promoted in getting a say as to how the landscape would be redrawn. According to 
Voska, while “Bohemia-at-home was divided in its opinions on the character of our 
visioned State, no such difference troubled Bohemia-in-America. We agreed . . . in 
imagining a democracy.”230 
The significance of transatlantic migration, then, to the post-war outcome of 
Eastern Europe has two distinguishable phases:  the long-durée importance of 
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transatlantic migration to Austria-Hungary’s national politics through the building and 
promotion of cohesive, recognizable “ethnic” communities in the United States 
(discussed primarily in the preceding chapters), and certain migrants’ opportunities to use 
wartime military and diplomatic circumstances to influence the war effort, shape the 
peace settlements, and influence the nation-building process. Wartime nationalist 
propaganda and negotiation profoundly affected the peace settlement because of 
widespread changes to East European nationality politics already wrought over three 
decades of massive transatlantic migration.  
In the second decade of the twentieth century, Slavic national projects in the 
United States rather suddenly shifted in aims from broader rights and autonomy within 
Austria-Hungary to separatism. The difference between these two positions was dramatic, 
and yet the triumph of the nation-state model at war’s end has frequently led politicians 
and later historians to think that independence was what all “nations” deserved and 
desired from the outset. In reality, as we have seen, the movement of thousands of people 
had significantly shifted the scale and aims of many East European national projects in 
such a way that made a series of separate states out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire a 
possible outcome of an early twentieth-century war. The separatist turn in migrants’ 
views of European nationality politics was a monumental change in ideas that was 
necessary to make the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, rather than its maintenance as a 
state, the outcome of the war in the region.231  
East European nationalists’ had a cacophony of theoretical plans for Austria-
Hungary’s future that, could not, of course, co-exist. At war’s end some states found 
fruition in somewhat previously articulated forms, like a south Slav state, while others, 
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like an enlarged Romania, became far more extensive than ever dreamed; others still, 
namely Austria and Hungary, suffered territorially diminished “rump” states, and some 
never achieved independent states at all, like Ruthenia. But in several cases, most notably 
the creation of Czechoslovakia and the reunification of Poland, the national aims of 
American migrants significantly influenced the form and the likelihood of statehood.  
 What many wartime discussions and histories written since often fail to admit is 
that state-building is an inherently subjective process. Paris Settlement politicians 
conceded that lines were not drawn strictly on the “national principal” of state boundaries 
exactly following linguistic/national boundaries — to do so would be impossible, and the 
culprits of the war had to be punished with some truncation of their “rightful” territory, 
after all. But they seem to have largely accepted that the creation of states around 
nationalities, in national categories forged and known to them in part because of 
migration, was somehow natural and objective. This chapter, building on “constructivist” 
interpretations in nationalism theory, maintains that post-war nation-states, like Austria-
Hungary itself, were all constructions, based on a roster of nations influenced by the 
presence of migrants in the west and through the role, in part, of migrant nationalists.  
Many of the high-level diplomatic discussions about wartime foreign affairs and 
post-war treaty-making are absent from this dissertation, as they have been well 
documented elsewhere. Also outside the scope of this chapter are the array of debates 
among peoples in the Habsburg Monarchy and exile communities in Western Europe. 
The more modest focus of this chapter is the often overlooked significance of North 
American migrants and transatlantic migration itself to the war and peace process, and 
should be considered in conjunction with other scholarship on the Great War.  
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Of only secondary importance in the pages below, despite extensive attention to 
migrants’ imperial loyalty in previous chapters, is migrants’ loyalty to the Empire or to 
the United States. Several excellent works already document migrants’ willingness to 
display their American patriotism when called to do so,232 and exemption from armed 
U.S. military service sensibly circumvented painful decisions for migrants of fighting 
against their kin on the battlefield. The Fourteen Points called for “autonomous 
development” for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. Autonomy was anathema to war-time 
Austro-Hungarian politicians, especially Hungarian aristocrats; it was enthusiastically 
embraced by the Empire’s Slavic immigrants and seldom challenged by Hungarian-
American nationalists, who increasingly saw union with Austria as an undesirable 
liability that should have been addressed decades before. The overwhelming majority of 
migrants had little reason to defend the imperial status quo, whether Hungarian- or 
Slavic-language speakers, making migrants’ imperial loyalty rather irrelevant to the war. 
Major points of contention certainly materialized later over what form Wilson’s 
suggested self-determination and autonomy should take and many protested where the 
boundaries of new states were rather unexpectedly drawn, but only after questions of 
wartime loyalties were already moot.   
The war and the peace accomplished one thing above all else: making the nation-
state the standard of Western statehood. The conflict and post-war settlements also made 
citizenship and ethnic identity much more fixed and subject to government control. 
Despite continuing evidence that identity was mutable, hybrid, and constructed, 
international diplomacy and popular opinion now functioned under the predominant 
assumption that it was discernible and biologically fixed and reemphasized the moral 
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imperatives of nationalist beliefs.233 Working backwards from there, it is no wonder that 
histories of migrant nationalism suggested that migrants had been fighting Austro-
Hungarian oppression all along, and had even left Europe because of it. The chapter 
below will examine the transatlantic separatist turn in East European nationalism and 
look at successful, semi-successful, and unsuccessful migrant national activism that 
attempted to influence Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Ruthenia, respectively. 
 
The Separatist Turn from Empire and Confederation to Nation-States 
The expansion of various Slavic national organizations in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries sought greater recognition, rights, and self-government for Slavic 
peoples in the Empire, but rarely sought complete separation Austria-Hungary or deemed 
a nation-state their goal until late in the First World War. Histories that posit an 
independent state as the goal of Slavic nationalists throughout the latter half of nineteenth 
century miss the variety of proposals and the creative evolution of nationalists’ goals over 
the course of the sixty years following the 1848 revolutions. These decades featured 
various proposals for expanded national rights within a Habsburg state and a tremendous 
shuffling and reshuffling of affinities and alliances before advocating for a separate 
Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovak state, reunified Poland, enlarged Romania, and South 
Slav state became the goals at war’s end. German- and Hungarian-speakers in the United 
States also had to contend with their mixed and changing views about their Austro-
Hungarian home state. German-speaking migrants from Austria frequently joined 
communities of German-speaking migrants from Germany, making their views 
particularly difficult for historians to access. More accessible to us are Hungarian-
                                                       
233 See more in Phelps, U.S.-Habsburg Relations. 
 130 
speaking migrants’ misgivings about Hungary’s place in the Habsburg Empire. The 
Hungarian government’s American Action program, as we saw, did little to emphasize 
Hungary’s ties to Austria or the House of Habsburg. As we will see below, Eastern 
European national projects in the United States were contradictory and divergent and 
completely changed by the outbreak of war in Europe, and then changed again with the 
United States’ declaration of war on Austria-Hungary.  
 Most Slavic national projects before WWI sought a federative Habsburg Empire 
or new federative East European state(s), built on shared history and the belief that very 
small independent states were not viable. Nineteenth century nationalists believed that 
“linguistic nations” could thrive within the framework of multinational Austrian and 
Hungarian “political nations.” Even so-called panslavism had separatist and non-
separatist forms, a spectrum emphasizing all Slavs under Russian leadership, the East-
Central European region’s slavs broadly, or the unity of Austria-Hungary’s slavs alone. 
Among Slovak nationalists in Hungary, historian Alexander Maxwell firmly establishes 
“Hungaro-Slavism” as “the mainstream of pre-1918 Slovak thought,” as a corrective to 
“several histories of Slovakia [that] mistakenly equate opposition to Magyarization and 
opposition to the Hungarian state.”234 Many South Slavs sought independence from 
Austria-Hungary not to start independent states, but to join already autonomous countries 
in building a Slavic state or federation; others sought to remain in Austria-Hungary under 
a “trialist” (three-part) government that afforded them the same rights as Hungary had 
vis-a-vis Austria. In various parts of Imperial Austria in the early twentieth century, local 
legislative bodies forged a series of compromises that made many of the concessions that 
nationalists were seeking; the Moravian Compromise of 1905, Bukovina Compromise of 
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1910, and Galician Compromise of 1914235 sought to define representation for various 
linguistic groups within a geographic area, recognizing nations (through language) as 
political categories but still part of the whole.   
 The longstanding resistance to separatism in many of the Slavic national projects 
gave way to the novel goal of independent Slavic states. In the case of Czecho-Slovakia, 
linguistic overlap encouraged mutual efforts between Czech- and Slovak-speaking 
migrants to achieve greater linguistic rights in Austria and Hungary respectively, but 
cultural cooperation did not readily suggest political union. Hungaro-Slavism kept many 
Slovak nationalists in Austria-Hungary from endorsing separatism or Czecho-slovakism 
in Europe.236  As American CPI journalist Will Irwin wrote, “Most nationalists in 
Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia were still either monarchists, Russophiles or extreme 
radicals.”237 While Irwin intended those terms pejoratively, he nonetheless indicates a 
variety of political orientations among individuals and elected officials in the Empire, 
even among those who considered themselves nationalists. Among the growing group of 
nationalists who saw Slovaks’ best interests outside of a centralized and Magyarizing 
Hungarian kingdom, autonomy within Hungary, Austria-Hungary, or some federative 
Central European state were all options. A political union with Czechs was seldom 
endorsed even after the turn of the century. In 1906, Thomas Capek wondered, “wither 
do the Slovaks gravitate? Toward the Bohemians, who are their nearest and most natural 
allies? Certainly not.”238  Ivan Daxner expressed more openness to the idea but similar 
misgivings when he stated, "Away from the Magyars, but not into Czech subservience; 
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we want to join Czechs as equals."239 During and after the war several prominent Czech 
and Slovak nationalists would argue that Austria-Hungary had kept the Czechoslovak 
people cruelly divided from each other in different halves of the empire, but such protests 
were largely after the fact. Joint Czech and Slovak political aspirations were a new 
product of both migration and wartime opportunities. 
 Czech and Slovak nationalists achieved a joint state that few had previously 
envisioned, but nationalists dreamed of many states that never materialized. National 
projects that never achieved a state offer a powerful corrective to the teleology behind 
many of the states that the war did indeed establish. While World War I is often heralded 
as a story of victory in both United States history and various Slavic national histories — 
a failure only for Germany, Austria-Hungary, and their few allies —Maxwell proposes 
recognizing a wide range of national failures alongside national triumphs. In his view, 
World War I was not the apex of “national awakenings” — a term that he likewise 
critiques — but a mixed record of successful and failed nationalisms. Taking Slovakia as 
his case study, Maxwell argues that not only Hungaro-Slavism but also All-Slavism 
(panslavism) and even Czechoslovakism “failed,” all losing out to the ultimately 
triumphant exclusive Slovak national project. These failures, furthermore, are often far 
more illuminating than narratives of heroic success.240 Whereas nationalists and scholars 
of the immediate post-war era could point to any kind of nationally coded institution as 
evidence of their nation’s existence and state-readiness all along, national projects that 
never won states remind us that things could have gone very differently. After 1918, there 
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was no all-Slav state, no Bohemia or Czechia, no Slovakland or Slovakia, no Ruthenia, 
no Croatia, Bosnia, or Serbia, or Slovenia. The post-war struggle of nationalists whose 
perceived nations did not achieve states after World War I points to the centrality of 
emigré communities and wartime exigencies in garnering the political will and 
circumstances to define an independent state. Such analysis is full of counterfactuals: had 
Rusyn-speaking migrants been more insistent on separate institutions rather than widely 
joining Slovak-speaking communities, might they have been able to lobby for a separate 
state that they did not yet perceive they needed to lobby for? Questions of this sort have, 
of course, no answer, but serve as reminders — constantly necessary in an era when we 
take nation-states for granted as the best and only viable type of state — that they are 
constructions.  
 The American Action’s efforts at maintaining Hungarians’ loyalty to the 
homeland notwithstanding, many Hungarian nationalists in the United States also 
increasingly held more separatist views toward the Empire, questioning Hungary’s union 
with Austria. The legacy of the 1848 revolution and its leader Louis Kossuth provided a 
republican model of separatism for those who held little allegiance to the Dual Monarchy 
as such. In addition to suppressing Slavic national projects, historian Béla Vassady argues 
that the Hungarian government’s American Action’s subsidies to ethnic institutions in the 
United States also aimed “to defuse the Magyar immigrants’ anti-Habsburg Kossuthism.” 
In much the same way that the Action failed to contain Slavic nationalism abroad, 
however, it also proved largely “unable to cool” Hungarian-Americans’ “passionate 
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Kossuthism”241 The leading Hungarian-American newspaper, Amerikai Magyar 
Népszava [American Hungarian Peoples’ Voice], prominently featured a hand-penned 
letter from Kossuth’s son Ferenc of Hungary’s Independence/Independent/Opposition 
Party as the very first guest salutation in its twenty-year jubilee anniversary album, 
followed only afterward by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the U.S.242 The cover 
featured a single-headed eagle alongside the Hungarian coat of arms – an American 
eagle, not a double-headed Habsburg eagle. The Népszava had been central in erecting a 
statue of Lajos Kossuth in Cleveland and statues of George Washington and Nathan Hale 
in Bupadest, all clearly symbolic of anti-imperial independence.243  
This strong vein of Kossuthism in Hungarian-Americans’ national views was 
highly problematic for the Hungarian government during the war, particularly when the 
central leaders of the government under Prime Minister Tisza were ardent Dualists 
committed to the union with Austria. At the same time, migrants’ Kossuthism was 
promising to the Independence/Independent/Opposition Party in Hungary, which ran on a 
platform of universal suffrage, independence from Austria (though divided into factions 
supporting complete separation and merely greater separation than the current 
Compromise), and sometimes alliance with Social Democrats. The party’s leftist wing, in 
particular, sought to harness the support of Hungarians in the United States, who were 
more unified in favor of a greatly expanded franchise than other any other homeland 
political issue.   
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 Debates around migrants’ place in Hungary’s democratization can be clearly seen 
during Independence Party politician Count Mihály Károlyi’s tours of the United States 
in April and July of 1914. Károlyi’s visits were received with fanfare by Hungarian-
American audiences and the American press, some opposition by Slavic audiences, and 
indifference on the part of the American government. Károlyi largely succeeded in 
unifying the Hungarian-speakers in the United States through his “homeland cause” of 
expanded suffrage and democratization, visiting New York (where he drew a crowd of 
3,600), Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Bridgeport and smaller Hungarian-American 
communities. Band music on a harbor tugboat greeted Károlyi’s arrival in New York 
harbor in April.244 Károlyi sought supporters among emigrants from Hungary by 
collecting financial support, utilizing the American and migrant press, and working 
through existing institutions to back his movement.  
Károlyi’s platform aimed at the common ground between Hungarian-American 
nationalists, socialists, and the rather politically indifferent, for all of whom expanded 
suffrage and democratization and greater distance from Austria were appealing. 
Independent Party member Dr. Sigismund Farkasházy explained to the New York Times 
that Hungary was “being oppressed by an oligarchic absolutism.” Austria and Hungary 
were “bound by a kind of Siamese twin ligament,” he explained, under which Austria had 
“reduced Hungary to a condition of economic bondage.” Farkasházy played explicitly on 
the Independence Party’s ties to Kossuth’s legacy, stating, “the death of Francis Kossuth” 
-- previously the Hungarian Minister of Trade and Lajos Kossuth’s son, who passed away 
in late May of 1914 --  “will have no effect on the progress of the Opposition,” as Károlyi 
would carry forward “the great patriotic work of the Opposition Party” (again, 
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Farkasházy uses Opposition as the English translation of the Independent Party).245 
Prominent Hungarian-American New Yorker Alexander Konta reiterated Farkasházy’s 
connection between Kossuth’s revolution in 1848 and the Hungarian Independence 
Party’s “Battle Against Austrian Autocracy.” “As an American citizen, I sympathize, of 
course, with the party’s aspirations toward a true democracy,” Konta proclaimed.246 
Károlyi’s was an attempt to address democratization through governmental 
reform by social class instead of nation, based on people’s identities simply as voting 
citizens rather than members of ethnic constituencies. This was the opposite approach of 
most Slavic nationalists, who tried to gain expanded rights and representation in the 
Austro-Hungarian political system. Unlike the Moravian and Bukovina Compromises in 
Austria, which created expanded rosters of voters in explicitly ethnic blocks, Károlyi’s 
expanded franchise would grant suffrage to all males over the age of 21, to Hungarian-
speakers and national minorities simultaneously, without any designated representation 
by language or ethnicity.  
According to Béla Vassady, by embracing widespread democratization, Károlyi 
“hoped to minimize socialist and Slavic immigrant opposition in America” and build a 
broader coalition of emigrants from the Hungarian kingdom..247  Konta’s influential 
article in the Times argued that “in Hungary’s national life, as in her politics, the 
divisions are less and less those of race and increasingly those of party.” A better way for 
Konta to phrase the problem, by 1914, however, was that the country now faced greater 
divisions by race and party. Konta explained that the oppression that retarded Hungary’s 
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peace and prosperity was “not exerted by one race within the kingdom, the Magyars over 
all the others, but is exerted by Austria for Austria from Vienna.” For Slavic nationalists 
with grievances specifically against the Magyarizing policies of Budapest in the last 
several decades, Konta’s explanation of the Independence Party’s aims resonated in its 
democratization but likely stung Slavs in its disregard for Hungarian governmental 
culpability and scapegoating of Austria alone. “If the Magyars still oppressed the other 
races of Hungary for their own profit, the emigration from the country would be made up 
almost entirely of non-Magyar Hungarians, of Slovaks, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Croats, 
Serbs,” Konta reasoned, noting that the masses of Hungarian-speaking migrants were 
escaping that same class-based oppression as national minorities. In much the same way 
that democratically-motivated Hungarian nationalists like Konta were too dismissive of 
the racialized elements of the aristocracy’s rule in Hungary, Slavic nationalists did not 
particularly empathize with the class oppression faced by Hungarian-speaking peasants. 
For several decades, Slavic peasants’ poor fortune in Hungary has been continually 
explained by nationalists as national oppression. Regardless of how progressively 
democratic Károlyi’s program might have been compared to the aristocratic Hungarian 
government, by 1914 many Slavic nationalists by saw expressly ethnic representation or 
autonomy as the only suitable way to recognize Slavic-language-speakers’ rights and 
place in Austria-Hungary, not universal suffrage. The fight for Hungary’s 
democratization and escape from “Austrian autocratic rule” was broad enough to earn the 
backing of Hungarian-Americans across a broad spectrum of political persuasions, but 
not convincing enough to gain the support of Slavic nationalists in joining the 
Independence Party to create a “modern State . . . founded under the Hungarian flag.”248 
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Károlyi’s tour and political appeal created a  “nationalist dilemma” for 
Hungarian-speakers who had worked hand-in-hand with the Hungarian government to 
support Hungarian cultural life in the United States and also those on the left who 
opposed or eschewed homeland aristocratic politics. Unlike with national minorities, 
Károlyi’s program hit the right notes with Hungarian-Americans. Károlyi did have some 
opponents among Hungarian Americans, but they could not viably challenge his 
independence platform and its greater resonance with migrants’ American experiences as 
democratic citizens and sometimes voters. Hungarian nationalists who had worked 
through the American Action to promote loyalty to Hungary had been supported by the 
very Hungarian government that Károlyi was now opposing. Vassady points out the 
noteworthy opposition of Father Kálmán Kováts of Pittsburgh, who considered Károlyi’s 
attempt to gain support from Hungarian-Americans potentially financially exploitative 
and an easy target for Slavic opposition. But in the end, “most” of the Hungarian clergy 
supported Károlyi’s program. Károlyi’s success in winning over Hungarian-speaking 
socialists was a similarly “major reversal” in migrant allegiances in homeland politics.249 
The New York Times reported that “Because [Károlyi] is the most ardent advocate of 
universal suffrage in Hungary, the Socialists there have accepted him for a leader. Most 
of the Socialists at the meeting last night accepted him in the same spirit,” though “a few 
could not forgive him for being an aristocrat and for being wealthy.”250  
 Hungarian governmental and Slavic opposition did muddy Károlyi’s attempt to 
gain the backing of the American government. The National Working Party and the Tisza 
government attempted to erode Károlyi’s popularity in the United States using the 
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familiar channels of the American Action.251 On the Tisza government’s behalf, 
Hungarian nationalist Alexander Gondos penned anti-Károlyi articles to circulate in the 
American and Budapest newspapers, under the name A.S. Glenn.252 Gondos tried to bar 
Károlyi and his support staff’s entry to the United States by publishing information that 
certain party members had engaged in duels, and were therefore criminals. In the press 
Gondos openly posed the question of whether “it was right for the minority party of a 
country friendly to the United States to solicit money in this country for a political 
campaign in that country,” a question that raised complex issues about the United States’ 
growing agenda as a promoter of Western democracy. U.S. Vice President Thomas 
Marshall replied that migrants who had become American citizens “ought not to be 
interested in any foreign Government,” but specifically made an exception if it were “an 
effort upon the part of the people to change an oligarchy into a democracy.” Gondos’s 
attempts on behalf of the Hungarian government to undermine Károlyi’s popularity with 
Hungarian Americans failed to erode Károlyi’s popular program, but the Hungarian 
government’s opposition to Károlyi did perhaps succeed in blocking his recognition by 
the United States. A State Department official noted that Károlyi’s professed purpose in 
the United States in the spring of 1914 was to study migrants’ “conditions” in America, 
but that they were well aware his aims were “to take the necessary steps to institute a 
propaganda in favor of a more democratic regime in Hungary.”253   
Since Károlyi was coming to the United States without the formal recognition of 
the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry, U.S. officials did not receive him in any official 
capacity. Migrant nationalists used Károlyi’s visits to try to endorse him to American 
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government officials – State Department files are full of telegrams and written 
endorsements from Hungarian-American societies and individuals254 -- but his opponents 
sent messages, too. Nonetheless, Károlyi gained thousands of supporters and $30,000 in 
donations (many just $1.75 apiece) to run a democratic campaign at home, but over 
$16,000 of it was seized by the U.S. government under the Alien Property Act once the 
United States joined the war.255 Károlyi’s platform of democratization was meant to 
“assure a nervous Washington that his purpose was not violent revolution but victory in a 
democratic election in Hungary,” but if national minorities still considered Károlyi-style 
universal suffrage within a unified Hungarian kingdom as ethnic oppression, it was of 
little value to the United States as it formally entered the war. With the Austro-Hungarian 
Embassy’s conspicuous non-recognition of Károlyi’s travels as a state visit and Slavic 
migrants’ rejection of Károlyi, the United States government declined to support Károlyi 
and pursued Austria-Hungary’s democratization during and after the war through nation-
states instead. 
 
Migrant Lobbying in War-Time 
When the United States declared war on Austria-Hungary in December 1917, 
already three and a half years into the conflict in Europe, it was not yet a war that 
promised to dismantle Austria-Hungary. But the war did portend a renegotiation of the 
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balance of power among the Empire’s peoples. In Europe and among migrants in the 
United States alike, the war encouraged many individuals who were rather nationally 
indifferent or non-political in their national life to declare a national identity and embrace 
its political implications. “So many of our people,” one Czech nationalist observed, “had 
almost forgotten that Bohemia was once a nation, until the World War blew up the flame 
smoldering within.”256  
The war gave some nationalists – but not all – unprecedented influence in crafting 
new political entities, even if they had long ago migrated away from their Central and 
East European homelands. When looking at migrant lobbying, scholarship often 
emphasizes whom migrants were lobbying, rather than examining the lobbyists 
themselves. Thus, here it is not President Wilson or Secretary of State Lansing that take 
center stage: their contributions and oversights, triumphs and blunders in aiding, 
ignoring, and decimating various nations have been extensively explored, and their roles 
have been well documented, even overstated. The Wilson administration largely ignored 
the separatist politics of Austria-Hungary, Slavic and Hungarian alike, until 1918. 
Lobbying by East European or migrant nationalists at the presidential level before U.S. 
entry into the war was indeed largely “ignored,” or, more generously, not acted upon.257 
But migrant nationalists were at work, and in 1918 played a significant role in the major 
reversal of the American government from maintaining Austria-Hungary as a geopolitical 
entity to dismantling it. Wilson, Lansing, and West European diplomats at the Paris 
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Settlement made it happen, but the writings and war-time work of migrant nationalists 
like Emanuel Voska, Charles Pergler, G.H. Mika, Marcus Braun, and Eugene Szekeres 
Bagger, instead, are the focus below. They illustrate the different roles that Czech-, 
Slovak-, and Hungarian-speaking migrants played in East European state-building during 
World War I, from their positions as leaders in American ethnic circles.  
 In addition to individuals, the institutional circles they operated in are vital to 
understanding migrant nation-building. Many migrant nationalists were involved with 
George Creel’s United States Committee on Public Information, most notably Voska, 
making them agents of Americanization at the same time as nationalists. Institutionally, 
two of the most important organizations to consider are ones that we have already seen in 
raising the ethnic consciousness of the Empire’s migrants: the Bohemian National 
Alliance of America and the Slovak League of America. Immigrant nation-builders often 
had American partners who were not migrants but supported different migrants’ war 
aims, like Oberlin College sociologist Herbert A. Miller, who was a strong supporter of 
Masaryk and the Czech national movement, and Fiorello LaGuardia, who supported 
Hungarian Count Mihály Károlyi and a separate peace to found a democratic Hungary. 
Several national programs had American supporters, but with a variety of strengths, 
connections, and liabilities. Hungarian-American national leaders and communities had 
arguably less experiences with political protest and lobbying, as the government and the 
American Action took the lead in promoting Hungarian nationalism, a sharp contrast to 
Czech- and Slovak-speaking migrant nationalists.  
  Czech nationalist Emanuel Victor Voska was among the most influential of 
migrant nationalists and thought carefully about his dual role as a European nationalist 
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and American serviceman and citizen. Voska had come to the United States at the age of 
nineteen supposedly after a brief arrest by Austrian police; while some writers have 
attributed his “exile” to his national views, by most accounts he was not yet a nationalist 
and was arrested for seditious speech based on his socialist beliefs. Despite his radical 
views, Voska shifted his activism from class to nation in the United States, becoming a 
successful businessman and a leader in Czech-speaking circles.258 A master of 
propaganda, Voska must of course be read critically; for example, his commentary on a 
“clique of Hungarian nobles” hatching a “plot” sets his writing firmly in his nationalist 
camp.259 He nonetheless offers the most extensive and direct evidence of concerted ties 
between Czech nationalists living in Prague and the United States.  
 Voska went to Prague months before the war broke out in his role as a 
correspondent for the Czech-American newspaper Hlas Lidu, apparently perceiving an 
impending crisis and traveling all over Europe to collect information. Voska met the first 
night of his visit with T.G. Masaryk, leader of the Czech national movement in exile and 
later first prime minister of independent Czechoslovakia; Masaryk advised Voska not to 
come to his apartment again, lest he be targeted by Austrian police, but they began a 
longstanding collaboration. “Then we hatched an idea. The Fourth of July was coming. I 
would give a big dinner in honor of the day, inviting not only prominent men of the 
American community in Prague but citizens of Prague with American business 
connections—and, incidentally, the leaders of Masaryk’s movement.” Voska planned this 
to “avert suspicion,” and held “political conferences with Czech leaders under the 
disguise of newspaper interviews.” After the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz 
                                                       
258 Information about Voska’s early life is surprisingly sparse. See Dagmar Hájková, 
Emanuel Voska: Špionážní legenda první světové války (Paměť: 2014). 
259 Voska, Spy and Counterspy, 1-2. 
 144 
Ferdinand and Princess Sophie in Sarajevo, Voska was able, at Masaryk’s request and 
using his American press credentials, to travel and gather information. In Trieste he 
learned from “leaders of the South Slavs” that it was not a Hungarian plot against the 
royal family, as he had originally thought; they “frankly admitted that Serbians fired the 
shots which killed the imperial couple.” With a declaration of war unfolding, the 
American consul in Prague happened to be on vacation, and so Voska and his daughter 
helped out the assistant in charge for several weeks, furthering his ties with the State 
Department. Masaryk next sent Voska to meet with British members of Parliament and 
the Russian ambassador to London to indicate Masaryk’s desire to establish a Czech 
movement with the Allies. Voska claims to have concealed documents in the soles of his 
shoes and wrapped around his daughter’s corset ribs. As Masaryk suggested, he then 
returned to New York to “organize support for the revolution among our American 
Czechs.”260  
 Back in New York, Voska devoted himself to collecting intelligence and facilitating 
communication for Masaryk’s Czech national movement, building in part on his 
experience with social organization as a socialist and unionist in the Empire. A clerk at 
the Austrian consulate in New York warned Voska that Austrian spies would be present 
in the audience at a public meeting that Voska arranged at the New York’s Sokol Hall. 
The clerk, a Czech nationalist, promised to identify other Czech employees at the 
Austrian consulate who shared their views. Voska pulled widely from the Czech-
American community to recruit couriers to carry verbal messages from the Czech 
movement in the United States to two parties: Masaryk and his supporters in England, 
and Czech nationalists still in Austria. Voska relied heavily on migrants who had become 
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U.S. citizens and held American passports. As long as the US was neutral, these migrants 
could pass through territory controlled by both the Allied and Central Powers. Voska 
explained how his group also issued counterfeit passports, used official Austrian passport 
forms purloined from the New York consulate to provide false papers for their agents, 
and even arranged for fake arrests of his couriers en route to Europe so that they would 
not be suspected as spies by the Germans or Austrians. Voska then sent agents to beg the 
Austrian diplomats to issue his couriers visas to return home to see dying relatives.261 
Masaryk and Voska used Metropolitan Opera House soprano Emmy Destinn as an agent 
to convince “monarchists, Russophiles, clericals, and radicals” among the Czech 
politicians in Prague to join Masaryk’s republican movement. She sang Czech folk songs 
from the Prague opera house and when arrested, feigned innocence as an American 
Czech, claiming that that she had no idea that to do so was a political act.262  
 Voska was active on the home front as well. He assisted with foreign language 
materials and support for Liberty loans, did work for Creel’s Committee on Public 
Information, started the magazine The Periscope to inform Americans about Central 
European affairs, continued to promote the Czechoslovak national cause in immigrant 
industrial circles, and sent dozens of updates to the Wilson administration.263 Various 
aspects of the global conflict of World War forced working-class migrants to choose 
between their class interests as workers and national interests in addition to choosing 
between their duties as Austria-born citizens and new Americans. The socialist-or-
nationalist dilemma was one that Voska himself likely sympathized with, having 
reinvented himself in the United States from socialist to nationalist and businessman; the 
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Austrian-or-American dilemma was, for him, an obvious choice. Voska claims that 
“Many Czechs and Slovaks who thought they were good union men found in this crisis 
that they were better patriots.”264 The question for migrants was overwhelmingly 
complex: An Austrian propaganda film screened widely in East European communities in 
the United States while the US was still neutral, depicted a bomb made by a Slovak-
American in an American munitions factory being fired in Europe, killing his brother. 
Workers, regardless of nationality, were called to resist longer hours and higher output 
quotas without compensation, or otherwise strike. In contrast, Voska’s group printed 
hundreds of thousands of pamphlets in several Slavic languages explaining that “victory 
for the Allies meant independence for their old countries,” discouraging labor strikes. In 
1914 Germany and Austria called “their male nationals of military age to register at the 
consulates. Among our people—Czechs, Slovaks and South Slavs born under Austrian 
rule—,” Voska explains, “a good many had registered. Then they had joined our 
revolutionary societies and wanted henceforth no part of Austria. Now such men began 
coming to the secretaries of the Czech National Alliance or the Slovak Leagues to ask for 
advice. They had been summoned to the Austrian consulate and . . . ordered to Mexico 
‘for service.’”265 Voska’s espionage work exposed a broader array of German-Mexican 
connections to Allied intelligence agencies, undermining efforts by Germany and 
Austria-Hungary to pull on their migrant population for military purposes using Mexican 
ports.  
 Voska took his efforts back to Europe once the United States entered the war, 
officially in the employ of the U.S. Army but working for Czech interests alongside his 
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American orders — a dualism that featured at nearly every phase of his life. At the front 
lines in Italy, he engineered the distribution of propaganda to the soldiers of “subject 
races” serving in the Austrian army, airdropped leaflets in German and Hungarian 
encouraging soldiers to surrender and be treated to “sumptuous meals, including coffee 
and cigarettes” as POWs in Italy, and worked with the army to bring Czech and 
“Jugoslav” politicians to Italy from behind Austro-Hungarian lines.266 After the war, 
Voska immediately set out to work for the peace and Czechoslovak state-building. He 
claims to have carried loads of archival material from Vienna to Prague, proving Austro-
Hungarian responsibility for causing the war. His office in Prague flooded the city with 
pro-Wilson leaflets (“his picture in every cottage”). He bluffed to requisition food rations 
from Austro-Hungarian military storage in Bratislava to feed Bohemian coal miners and, 
by providing them food during famine, dissuade them from Bolshevik revolution.267 All 
of these contributions make Voska among the most influential figures in the transnational 
effort for Czechoslovak statehood, in which migrants played an active role. Beyond 
Voska’s own exploits, his story reveals a wide network of migrant nationalists who 
worked with and through him in the United States to help their “nation” achieve a state 
under unique wartime circumstances.  
 Voska’s work in espionage, propaganda, and the military was complemented by 
Czech-American nationalist Charles Pergler’s political work in Washington D.C. and 
G.H. Mika’s work in the Slav Press Bureau. Pergler “moved his headquarters to 
Washington, where for two years he worked virtually as a lobbyist—for a nation which 
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did not exist and a cause which was not demanding legislation!”268 Whereas Károlyi’s 
program had argued for the transformation of Hungary through democratic reform, the 
outbreak of war had shifted Masaryk, Voska, and a whole host of other Slavic 
nationalists’ programs to the dismantling of Austria-Hungary; it was Pergler and Mika’s 
jobs to convince American Slavs, the American public, and American diplomatic 
officials alike of this position. The Károlyi movement’s critique of Austria in the 
American press already did some of Slavic nationalist’s work for them; Slavic-Americans 
whose homelands were in territorial Hungary could add critiques of Hungary to Czechs’ 
critiques of Austria. Pergler and Mika’s writings and speeches emphasized terms like 
“oppressed,” “suppressed,” “subject,” and “captive” describing Austria-Hungary’s 
minorities, appealing regularly to the United States’ own anti-imperial revolution to 
found a republic.269 Pergler spoke before the House Foreign Relations Committee in 
February 1916, gaining the type of audience that Károlyi had hoped for but never 
achieved. Particularly influential was a February 1918 article in the Times, “Slavs in 
Austria Appeal to Allies … Don’t Want Autonomy,” arguing explicitly that “complete 
separation from Habsburg Empire Is Demand of the Oppressed Nationalities There.” 
Mika explained in no uncertain terms that “only . . . condition . . . under which the 
Czechoslovaks will be willing to accept autonomy and to continue within Austria-
Hungary” was “the transformation of the Dual Monarchy into a Federal Republic.” 
Pergler’s characterization of Austria-Hungary described it as “a survival of 
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mediaevalism, purely dynastic and artificial”; “its very existence,” he continued, “is a 
denial of the principles for which America stands.”270 
 The main strains of Hungarian-American lobbying, emphasizing a democratic but 
unified Hungary through a minority opposition party, were less compatible with 
American war aims by 1917 than Slavic-American calls for Austria-Hungary’s 
dissolution. This can be one explanation why Hungarian-American lobbying did not 
result in the same level of acceptance by the State Department and other Allied 
governments as Czech and Slovak efforts did, giving Hungarian-American nationalists 
like Konta few of the opportunities available to Voska, Pergler, Mika, and others. 
Hungary’s longstanding union with Austria, its wartime military alliance with Germany, 
and its intact government were indisputable facts; alternative democratic politicians were 
nearly impossible, diplomatically, for U.S. officials to embrace. As historian Tibor Glant 
explains, American diplomats with the Wilson administration declined to engage with the 
relatively little-known democratic Hungarian Count Mihály Károlyi on his 1914 and 
1917 visits to the United States.271 Although Károlyi was popular with Hungarian-
American audiences and could plausibly present himself as an heir to Lajos Kossuth’s 
ideals to both Hungarians and, at times, the American public, he lacked the personal 
friendship with Roosevelt and respect in international academic circles that had made 
Count Albert Apponyi so popular among American diplomats and politicians a few years 
before. Many Hungarian nationalists had high hopes for Károlyi’s role in achieving their 
vision for Hungary’s post-war future, but not all democratic nationalists and American-
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based East-European nation-builders got the same opportunity to influence post-war state 
creation.  
 Just as Masaryk had immigrant nationalist supporters in the United States and in 
American governmental political circles during the war through Voska, Pergler, and 
Miksa, Marcus Braun and Fiorello LaGuaradia promoted Károlyi’s movement in U.S. 
diplomatic circles during the war, despite the American government’s decision not to 
engage with him in 1914. Braun, we know, was a leader in New York City’s Hungarian 
community and in diplomatic circles, but less so in church- and fraternal-based 
Hungarian circles, while LaGuardia, as we saw above, had been a consular agent in 
Budapest, Fiume, and Trieste earlier in the twentieth century. Braun provided the clearest 
articulation that a Hungarian independence movement from Austria, supported by 
Hungarian Americans, would undermine the Empire’s war effort and best fulfill 
Hungarian dreams of self-determination. In a four-page memorandum that Braun 
discussed at length with LaGuardia, Braun argued to U.S. Secretary of State Lansing that 
Hungarian Americans were in the ideal position to give Hungarians back home the 
courage to back away from the Central Powers’ war effort, since the Russian threat to 
them, the one practical reason to defend themselves on the side of the Central Powers, 
was now gone. Braun envisioned a flood of correspondence from Hungarian-Americans 
to their relatives at home and in the trenches to give up the fight. He further envisioned an 
“Independent Hungary,” led by Károlyi and others who could lead the country in a post-
Habsburg democratic future. Following the same tactics that the Hungarian government 
had used in attempting to maintain the loyalty of its citizens abroad, the “Independent 
Hungary” movement that Károlyi had begun would enter a war-time phase using the 
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ethnic press, leaders in the ethnic community, and clergy to preach an independent 
Hungary from the newsstands, the fraternal hall, and the pulpit — all means that the 
Bohemian National Alliance and Slovak League of America had also employed. Braun 
drafted a “Manifesto to American Hungarians to their Brethren of Hungary,”272 but it 
seems that it never left the State Department.  
 The parallels to the Czecho-Slovak movement would be striking, if Braun’s vision 
had developed further. Despite LaGuardia’s enthusiastic support, Lansing and Wilson 
rejected the plan and LaGuardia’s multiple attempts at a separate peace.273 According to 
historian George Barany, Braun’s proposal and documentation of LaGuardia’s support of 
it were filed in September 1917 without any official comment. The LaGuardia-Károlyi 
partnership never became a Miller-Masaryk partnership; Braun did not get to play the 
roles that Voska or Pergler did for Masaryk. For one, the homeland politicians with 
whom Braun sought cooperation with were still back in Europe waging war, not traveling 
in the West gaining legitimacy and international support as Masaryk was.  Károlyi 
favored Hungary’s break from Germany and attempted to reach out to Entente diplomats, 
with a host of proposals compatible with the direction of Western democracy should he 
come to power, including expansion of the franchise, feminism, and recognitions of 
labor. George Barany concludes that Károlyi “could not be counted upon as the political 
leader of a Hungarian anti-Habsburg national revolution in 1917” from the perspective of 
American officials, as he and his party continued to believe in the integrity of Hungary as 
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a “geographical unit” irrespective of the nationality questions.274  The interplay between 
different national projects is significant in the rejection of Braun, LaGuardia, and 
Károlyi’s bid: a Czecho-Slovak national project that had set itself on a course for an 
independent nation-state could not coexist with a democratic Hungarian national project 
that maintained “Hungary” as a political unit with its current borders. Where one pursued 
democratization through national self-determination the other did through universal 
suffrage without national distinctions. Geography dictated that they could not both be 
achieved.  
 Károlyi worked for his vision for Hungary’s post-war future without the backing of 
the United States. He succeeded briefly in becoming prime minister and provisional 
president of Hungary in October 1918, before being deposed by Socialists the following 
March. In practice, independence politicians and migrant nation-builders were accorded 
recognition much more from “oppressed” nationalities whose goals could be fit more 
easily with American and Allied war aims, not opposition party leaders of “nations” that 
had an official government that the United States would have to diplomatically bypass.  
European “independence,” in the end, would therefore take the form of nation-states, 
however constructed, instead of the democratization of existing political entities.  
 As the war waged on battlefields, in State Department and Foreign Ministry offices, 
in migrant fraternal organizations, and on the home fronts, it simultaneously raged in the 
press. While the migrant press featured the most ethnic vitriol, the pages of the New 
Republic put the debates between articulate nationalists before a wider American 
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audience. Eugene S. Bagger boldly wrote in 1918, “I believe in the full victory of the 
Allies and in Czecho-Slovak and Jugoslav independence, not in spite of being a Magyar, 
but because I am a Magyar.”275 While Slavic nationalists had embraced separatism in 
large numbers several years before and Hungarian-American were increasingly inclined 
toward Austria, the vast majority of Hungarian migrant nationalists, like Károlyi, 
espoused social change within Hungary’s hallowed thousand-year-old borders. Bagger 
openly declared that Hungary’s backwardness stemmed from class inequality — 
specifically with the “corrupt junker oligarchy” in government — but by 1918 he 
believed that Hungary should embrace rather than resist Wilsonian self-determination. 
Vladislav R. Savic, writing for the “Jugosalv” perspective the next month in response to 
Bagger agreed, further arguing that “The Magyars here in America would do a great 
service to themselves and to the world if they should immediately organize and express 
themselves for complete independence and equality of all the races of Hungary. The 
attitude of the Magyars in this country may influence their people in Hungary and save 
the world may thousands of lives and billions of money.”276 In some circles Bagger was 
quickly branded a traitor for conceding that the division not only of Austria-Hungary but 
of Hungary itself would be an appropriate outcome of the war. His interpretation of 
Hungary’s faults, however nuanced or accurate, did not mean much when victory and 
punishment were to be doled out by nation, not classes within them, and Hungary’s 
borders shrank more than even he thought possible. 
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The Cleveland Agreement (1915) and the Pittsburgh Agreement277 (1918) 
 The Cleveland Agreement, forged between the Slovak League of America and the 
Bohemian National Alliance at the Bohemian National Hall in Cleveland on October 22, 
1915, was the beginning of the formal movement for an independent unified Czech and 
Slovak state. The concept of Czecho-slovakism had longstanding transatlantic roots, 
particularly in literary circles, but became politically salient in this American context. 
The agreement simply declared the intention of the two organizations to work in concert 
for a Czech-Slovak state. Over the past several decades, Czech- and Slovak-speakers had 
come to share certain work and living spaces in the United States and formed two highly 
organized, nationally conscious ethnic institutions. Just months after the war broke out in 
Europe, the Bohemian National Alliance of America and the Slovak League of America 
joined forces with the goal of Czecho-slovak statehood. The Cleveland Agreement stands 
out as a pivotal moment in which national identity was very transparently constructed, 
finally embodying a century of intellectual musings on linguistic relatedness of Czech 
and Slovaks and the naturalness for their affinity to one another.  
 Contrary to after-the-fact interpretations, such an arrangement was by no means 
inevitable. The terms Čecho-Slav, Czecho-Slovak, Czechoslovak, and other variations 
joining Czechs and Slovaks did not come into use until 1913.278 Thomas Capek wrote in 
1920 that “‘Published in the interest of the Čecho-Slavs in America’ is a legend that is 
printed under the headlines of pretty nearly every journal, irrespective of religious or 
political affiliation. Usually, if not always, that paper is being issued in the interest of one 
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Čecho-Slav — namely, the publisher.”279 Nationalists could ride waves of wartime 
support, but even a committed nationalist like Capek saw artifice in ethnic pandering. 
Capek retroactively applied the concept of Czecho-slovakism to earlier decades which it 
had not yet existed, a practice that would be replicated by scores of other Czech and 
Czecho-Slovak nationalists, though notably not Slovak nationalists who objected to this 
coopting of what had been a separate Slovak national project.  
 The United States and Slavic Americans were again central to the formation of 
Czechoslovakia with the signing of the Pittsburgh Agreement on May 31, 1918. The 
agreement envisioned a federative state with Czech and Slovak halves, with both 
similarities and notable differences to Austria-Hungary’s dualism. The federative, rather 
than unified, state structure had been of utmost importance in achieving a consensus 
between Czech-speaking and Slovak-speaking American communities.  
 Tomaš Masaryk lobbied extensively for the Agreement before the meeting in 
Pittsburgh, building on the groundwork of Voska’s efforts and the connections of his 
American connections like American businessman and diplomat Charles R. Crane. While 
Masaryk was not a conventional migrant himself, he maintained American connections 
through Czech-American communities, academic circles, and his American family 
through his marriage to Charlotte Garrigue, who he had wed in Brooklyn in 1878.280  
After fleeing Austria in 1914, Masaryk traveled to Europe and Russia before arriving in 
the United States in 1918. “The United States,” Voska realized, “was momentarily the 
center for diplomatic action”; the center would shift later back to England and to Paris, 
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but it was an opportune time for Masaryk to visit the United States. “The Czech National 
Alliance saw in his visit a new opportunity to make the United States Czechoslovak-
conscious.” Masaryk’s visit made the most of American interest and temporary centrality 
in supporting the Czech national cause. Masaryk’s American appearances – like those of 
Counts Apponyi and Károlyi – featured welcome ceremonies, political speeches, and 
“picturesque demonstrations in national costume.”281 An editorial in the Chicago Tribune 
welcomed Masaryk in glowing terms, and his May 7th arrival was greeted by an “by an 
indescribable hurricane of enthusiastic and stormy ovation,”282 while his welcome in New 
York featured an “impressive parade” of the city’s immigrant societies.283 Visiting 
Chicago in late May 1918, Masaryk explicitly knit together America and Bohemia’s fates 
in the war effort. “I am certain,” he declared, “that without a free Bohemia there will be 
no free America. This is not talking big. . . . What is Austria? Nine nations and one 
dynasty which, assisted by army, bureaucracy and nobility, exploits all, even the 
Germans and Hungarians. America has a choice; it can opt for nine free nations or for 
one degenerated dynasty.”284 Masaryk largely succeeded in winning over a critical mass 
of migrant nationalists and American diplomats to his views. 
 At the end of the month, on May 31, 1918, the Czecho-Slovak National Council 
met under the presidency of Thomas G. Masaryk in Pittsburgh. The participants were not 
elected representatives of self-identifying Czechs and Slovaks in Czech- and Slovak- 
speaking areas of Eastern Europe, but instead mostly representatives of fraternal 
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organizations like the Slovak League of America, the Czech National Federation, the 
First Slovak Evangelical League, and the Association of Czech Catholics, associations 
that were sometimes rivals for members in the American context but now unified behind 
a nationalist cause for their perceived people back in Europe. Among the Pittsburgh 
Agreement’s signatories were many of the leaders of the Czech- and Slovak-American 
communities. Among Czech-speakers, Vojta Beneš was an organizer of the Bohemian 
National Alliance of America, Hynek Dostál was the editor of the Hlas newspaper out of 
St. Louis, Clevelander Josef Martínek was editor of the Czech-language socialist 
newspaper Americke Delnicke Listy, Charles Pergler headed the war-time Slav Press 
Bureau and was a part of the Bohemian National Alliance and the Bohemian Chapter of 
the Socialist Party of America (and, much later, Czechoslovak ambassador to the United 
States), Rev. Oldřich Zlámal was an influential Cleveland priest, and Jaroslav Joseph 
Zmrhal was a principal and superintendent in the Chicago Public Schools. Among 
Slovak-speakers, Ivan Bielek director of the New York import company Czecho Slovak 
Commercial Corp, Ivan Daxner was the executive secretary of the Slovak League of 
America, Ján Adolf Ferienčík was the editor of the paper of Slavonic Evangelical Union 
of America, Ignác Gessay was a Cleveland journalist, Milan Getting was a publisher of 
the newspaper of the Slovak Sokol, Jozef Hušek worked for the Slovak League of 
America, Rev. Ján Kubašek was president of the Association of Slovak Catholics, Albert 
Mamatey was the president of the National Slovak Society and the Slovak League of 
America, Rev. Jozef Murgaš was a founding member of the Slovak League of America 
and a priest in Wilkes-Barre, Cleveland journalist Ján Pankúch worked for the Slovak 
League of America. Andrej Schustek was chairman of the first district of the Slovak 
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League of America, while Rev. Pavel Šiška was the League’s financial secretary. Two-
thirds of the signers of the Pittsburgh Agreement were migrant nationalists.  
 The Pittsburgh Agreement demonstrates migrant nation-building at its apex. 
Migrants assumed the prerogative as self-proclaimed members of the nation to act on 
European Czechs’ and Slovaks’ behalf. They scarcely admitted that building a European 
nation-state in Pittsburgh was not strictly democratic. In its four opening points, the 
agreement confidently declared a “Union of the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent 
state comprising the Czech Lands, and Slovakia” in a democratic republic, but specified 
that Czech Lands and Slovakia would have their own administrative bodies and courts 
and assured Slovak as the official language in Slovakia. The fifth and sixth points of the 
Agreement displayed more caution by migrant nationalists about acting on their 
European brethren’s behalf. “The organization of the collaboration of the Czechs and the 
Slovaks in the United States will be amplified and adjusted according to the needs and 
according to the changing situation, by mutual agreement,” it explained, while leaving 
the “detailed rules” of the new state “to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal 
representatives."  
The Pittsburgh Agreement and Masaryk gained further recognition through the 
establishment of the Mid-European Union, founding on September 16, 1918 as an 
“informal union of . . . newly liberated nations,” a sort of joint lobby and think tank to 
negotiate territorial disputes between the emerging nations and work for their mutual 
economic future. Meeting the next month in Philadelphia, their declaration “was signed 
in the same hall and that the same table as the American Declaration of Independence.” 
Delegates represented the “Czechoslovaks, Poles, Jugoslaves [sic], Ukrainians, Uhro-
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Russians [elsewhere in the document written as Uhro-Ruthenes], Rumanians, Italian 
Irredentists, Unredeemed Greeks, Albanians and Zionists, wholly or partly subject to 
alien domination”; other iterations included Lithuanians. Polish representation reportedly 
withdrew shortly thereafter over territorial conflict with Ukraine over territory in 
Galicia.285 Masaryk became the first president. Oberlin College sociologist Herbert A. 
Miller was the only American member of the organization and became its operating 
Director. Miller drafted the Union’s resolutions “to resolve mutual differences and to 
solve common problems” for aspiring nations, which were adopted by the assembly and 
then presented to President Wilson.286 Despite the success of many of these national 
projects included in the Mid-European Union in achieving a state in the wake of the war, 
not all national projects resulted in states. Gregory Zatkovitch’s attempt to gain a hearing 
for a Ruthene state at the Paris Settlement, despite inclusion in the Mid-European Union, 
failed,287 while Czecho-Slovakia’s founding was confirmed.   
 Delegates’ views varied widely on ethnic Czechoslovakism, with the 
overwhelming majority maintaining a view of two nations in one federative state, as both 
the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Agreements stated. Some appreciated the flexibility of a 
hyphenated Czecho-slovakism, and others still embraced Czechoslovaks as one people, 
cruelly divided by Austria-Hungary into different halves of the empire, to be properly 
reunited again. Although in the overwhelming minority at Cleveland and Pittsburgh, the 
language of a single “Czechoslovak nation" (národ československý) emerged in the 
state’s founding declaration later on in Europe. The Washington Declaration, officially 
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declaring the independence of the Czechoslovak state, was published on October 18, 
1918 in Paris and declared a unified rather than federative structure, sidestepping the non-
binding but unambiguous plans of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Many Slovak nationalists, 
particularly those in the United States, who were committed to a separate Slovak nation 
within the proposed Czecho-Slovak state under the Cleveland and Pittsburgh 
Agreements, were outraged and lobbied extensively against the structure of the new state. 
But with the backing of migrants, American diplomats, and western European diplomats, 
nationalists had succeeded in accomplishing a state for the Czechoslovak national project.  
 
Conclusion 
 Correspondence in 1918 between President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of 
State Lansing referred to Austria-Hungary as the “artificial Austrian Empire.” Moving 
ever closer to seeing the western world in terms of nation-states, Wilson wondered “if 
even Hungary is any more an integral part of it than Bohemia.” “Hungary should also be 
definitely considered to be an independent nationality, no longer united with Austria,”288 
he concluded. Wilson’s observation came too late for Károlyi. Even the most pro-Dual 
Monarchy Hungarian politicians would have vehemently insisted that Hungarians had 
been a separate “nationality” from Austria all along. Commentators the world over had 
printed thousands of pages and drawn millions of breaths debating which nations were 
“independent” nationalities and which were mere off-shoots. Comments like Wilson’s 
indicate that they failed to realize that their musings on ethnicity was itself a process of 
further construction, not some excavating of objective ethnic truth.  
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 The Paris Peace Settlement left some migrants elated at the success of their 
national projects, others unsure about the new order, and still others bitterly disappointed. 
In 1920, Thomas Capek confidently wrote, “a Pole to Pole, no matter whether in the old 
country your John Lubomirski owed allegiance to Austria, Prussia, or Russia; a Čech to 
Čech; the Magyar to his own; the Austro-German to the Germans from the Fatherland. 
That State idea to which Austro-Hungarian statesmen have clung as tenaciously as the 
dervish holds fast to his fetich, is that moment proved an illusion, or rather a delusion: 
political boundaries that had separated people of the same race are seen to disappear as a 
rainbow fades. Only two binding ties survive: race and language.”289 Capek’s assessment 
shows how far the world had come so quickly in recasting Europe as a land of nation-
states, however imperfect. The Allies maintained their privileges to Empire in non-
western parts of the world, but no German Empire or Austro-Hungarian Empire would 
further threaten their vision of Europe. Race and language certainly won in theory, but 
the linguistic intermixture made the reality far messier. More political boundaries now 
separated “people of the same race” than before the war, since now thousands more miles 
of political boundaries existed in Europe, with sizable minority populations. In several 
cases, migrants’ war-time lobbying shifted to post-war revisionism. This is not surprising 
for those whose nations were “losers” in the war, like Hungarian-speakers seeking 
“Justice for Hungary,” but Slovak nationalists in the United States also became bitterly 
divided between those accepting of a single Czechoslovak nations and those insistent that 
Slovaks had been promised autonomy in a Czecho-Slovak federation.290  
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 Studying war can be sad business, a tragedy alongside a drama. Embarking on 
this project, studying nationalists, I expected to find few loyal migrants truly committed 
to the Habsburgs or to Austria-Hungary in my research. The accounts are littered with 
German nationalists, so easy to vilify as the culprits and enemies, especially since 
Americans tend to conflate most things historically German with Nazism. But here and 
there were migrants who were indeed committed to Austria-Hungary. Voska’s spies 
uncovered several. Many were from borderlands areas or had mixed identities. One 
medical doctor in New York City, still a reserve officer in the Austrian army, lamented 
all the treason among his fellow migrants against the Empire and offered confidential 
information against separatists.291  Other imperial loyalists, too, showed up at Austro-
Hungarian consulate in New York, before the United States had entered the war, asking 
for help in dealing with consequences of problems with their loved ones in the troubled 
homeland, or offering to help stop those trying to break it apart.  
 Reflecting back on his work for the American war effort and the creation of the 
Czechoslovak state, Voska was confident about what “our patriotic Czechs and Slovaks” 
had accomplished: “popular acceptance of Habsburg rule . . . [was] as full of holes as a 
honeycomb.” By his estimates, 50,000 “aliens belong to the subject Slav people of 
Austria” and had joined the American army, and 320,000 immigrants had joined the 
Bohemian National Alliance or Slovak National League.292 “To a degree with few on this 
side of the water realize, the young Czechoslovakia regarded the United States as her 
motherland. The influence which made her a republic, not a monarchy . . . , came from 
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the Czech and Slovakia colonies in the United States.”293 Voska’s own position as a 
migrant — an ardent Czech nationalist but U.S. citizen — had given him the ability to 
work in many circles and even to be a hero for his nation without being a resident or a 
citizen. Voska described his status during the war as a “peculiar position,” “under 
command of the American army but responsible also . . . to the Czechoslovak provisional 
government.”294 In much the same way that it was only a small handful of nationalized 
individuals who emigrated from Austria-Hungary to the U.S. because of nationalist 
reasons, it was likewise a small group of devotees like Voska who would return to take 
part in the national triumph. “I , for one, wanted to watch the baby grow up and to lend 
what help I could,” he recalled, referring to the new Czechoslovak state. Having 
bankrupted himself in the cause of establishing that state, he sought in the post-war era to 
capitalize on his transnational connections now as a return migrant. And yet, he could not 
so easily abandon his identity as an American, cultivated over several decades of living in 
the United States and serving the US army and government. “The feeling of a naturalized 
Czech or Slovak toward the country of his birth and that of his adoption was not so much 
a divided allegiance as a welded allegiance.” He kept his American citizenship, alongside 
acquiring Czechoslovak citizenships, and established in Prague the most New York of 
businesses: the city’s first large taxi company.295  
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 While Voska comfortably embraced the fuzziness of simultaneous Czecho-slovak 
and Czech and Slovak identities at home and abroad, migrant communities struggled to 
make sense of a single Czechoslovak identity, as ethnic divergence had been a strong 
feature of their ethnicization in the United States. At the second anniversary celebration 
of the Pittsburgh Agreement in Chicago in 1920, a Slovak speaker addressed the 
continuing divide, blaming the Austro-Hungarian past for the belated discovery of 
Czecho-Slovak mutual support. But the article reveals continued unease with the question 
of whether Czechs and Slovaks and Czecho-Slovaks were indeed one and the same. “He 
assured us, the Bohemians, that every Slovak is a sincere brother of ours, a son of one 
mother - Slovakia. He referred to the frequently overlooked fact that until recently, the 
Slovaks did not have their own Slovak schools, that ever since childhood they were 
brought up to hate Bohemians and everything Slavic. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
many of them are still against us today, especially when they are continually instigated by 
hired or voluntary agents."296  
 “Failed” migrant nationalists licked their wounds in the aftermath of war. Many 
Hungarian Americans watched with dismay as Károlyi’s democratic government fell and 
the kingdom was reduced to one-third its former size, putting many of their home villages 
outside of Hungary’s new borders; those same Hungarian-American socialists saw 
opportunity in Hungary’s 1919 Bolshevik revolution to bring about a classless society, 
even if in a much smaller territory, before that too fell to a conservative resurgence under 
noble-born Miklós Horthy, who ruled as Regent of Hungary through World War II. Rusin 
nationalists in the United States mourned the loss of Rusin nationalists at home who died 
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while interned during the war at the Austria’s Thalerhof camp, after being accused of 
association with Russia. The Thalerhof experience prevented any cooperation between 
Rusin nationalists in the US and those in Austrian Galicia and Hungary; their national 
projects would develop instead under the circumstances of the interwar period, having 
missed the war-time opportunities to make a claim for a state.  
 166 
Chapter 5 
Quotas and Borders: The Dual Effects of the Paris Settlement and American 
Immigration Quotas 
After the First World War, two factors drastically changed how Eastern 
Europeans might migrate to the U.S.: first, new geopolitical borders in the region, 
outlined in the Paris Settlement treaties; and second, restrictive immigration legislation in 
the United States. While numerous historians have studied the effects of the break up of 
Austria-Hungary and the effects of U.S. quotas on East European migration separately, 
rarely have they explained the effects that these two major post-war developments had on 
transatlantic migration together.297 It is a curious oversight, as the combination of new 
state borders and quotas were of huge significance for many would-be emigrants and 
return migrants.  
An American quota system was first passed in the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 
and then revised in the Immigration Act of 1924 (also known as the National Origins Act 
and the Johnson-Reed Act). This quota restricted emigration to the United States just as 
new political borders impelled many to leave. Especially in borderlands areas, thousands 
of individuals’ home villages did not end up in the new state they identified with 
nationally. For migrants who had gotten stuck in Europe for the duration of the war, the 
location of new borders determined, in part, whether they desired to remigrate to the 
                                                       
297 For the effects of new borders on the region, see, for example, classics Oszkár Jászi, 
The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1929). The most recent treatment, forcefully arguing against a decrepit monarchy torn 
apart by rival nationalisms, is Pieter M. Judson, The Habsburg Empire: A New 
History. For U.S. immigration restriction, see, in particularly, Mae Ngai, Impossible 
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), and Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American 
Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004).  
 167 
United States afterwards. New borders also mattered tremendously for migrants already 
in the US deciding whether to return to Europe. Before the war, migration to the United 
States had served as a safety valve in Austria-Hungary for economic hard times. After the 
war, as the European economy was still reeling, the valve had been pulled almost shut. 
As historian Mae Ngai has argued, and Nicole Phelps has greatly expanded, “The U.S. 
immigration quota system helped to reinforce categories of racial nationalism, and the 
border controls it involved helped to discourage international movement, contributing to 
the governments’ desires to align of citizenship, race, and place.”298 
One of the great ironies of the Paris Settlement was that, rather that creating 
homogenous nation-states aligned with so called self-determination, it instead reshuffled 
heterogeneous Eastern Europe into new states that had massive minority populations. 
This situation heightened irredentism, or a desire for border revision based on 
ethnographic or historical claims to territory. Indeed irredentism became one of the most 
prominent political ideologies in interwar Europe. While the United States’ entry into the 
war ground transatlantic migration nearly to a halt, the war’s end and the Paris Peace 
Settlement brought no definitive resolution to questions of migration, nationalism, and 
sovereignty. In fact, the immediate post-war period saw widespread upheaval and 
attempts by individuals and families to migrate quickly to reunite war-torn families, 
finally pursue pre-war migration plans, move across new borders to end up on the “right” 
side, and get to the United States before legislation made it impossible. 
Furthermore, as historian Tara Zahra explains, the new states of East Central 
Europe sought to “‘filter’ their populations, retaining only the most desirable national 
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citizens.” As a result, she continues, “Emigration policy became an explicit tool of new 
and more violent forms of nation building and population politics.” In some cases, 
therefore, minorities might have greater mobility to leave, but were not welcome to return 
home.299 In other ways, however, access to migration services were often more accessible 
to member of the titular nation than to minorities. Nevertheless, Zahra’s observations 
offer a useful starting point for digging into deeper detail about the consequences of the 
First World War on transatlantic migration from former Austro-Hungarian territory. 
As transatlantic migration became possible again after the war, nativists in the 
American Congress rode a wave of isolationist, xenophobic, and anti-Bolshevik 
sentiment to pass laws reducing the sanctioned arrival of migrants to the United States, 
including those from “ex-Imperial Austria.” Representative of the genre of racialized 
exclusion in the 1920s quota laws is a report collected by the Secretary of Labor. The 
author concluded that continued “immigration of German and Magyar elements  . . . 
would certainly . . . be appreciated due to the good elements of civilization, of 
intelligence, and activity of the two mentioned races,” but also warned of the “migratory 
flux” of the “numerous element of the Slav ex-Austrian peasantry, now all united in the 
two Republics of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and in complex, Serbian-Croatian-Slovene, 
composing the Yugoslav Kingdom.” “Almost all the Slavs can, for the present at least, be 
considered as dangerous vehicles for bolshevik infection.”300 (Other commentators were 
far less generous toward Germans and Hungarians.) The House Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization, chaired by Congressman Albert Johnson of Washington, 
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became an active agent of restriction, despite the staunch dissent of select Congressmen 
representing their immigrant constituents.  
Across the Atlantic, European lawmakers, too, turned to questions of whether and 
how to legislate mobility in the post-war era. Czechoslovak Minister of Welfare Gustáv 
Habrmann argued in a 1922 speech that it was necessary to differentiate between 
Czechoslovak emigration before and after 1918, reinforcing that the conclusion of World 
War I had altered migration. Habrmann retold Czechs’ and Slovaks’ history of 
emigration for the last three hundred years in light of the recent developments. In the 
former period, Slovaks “groaned under the Hungarian yoke.” The reasons behind the 
1905 peak in emigration, he argued, could be found in Hungary’s “political and cultural 
repression”; “no wonder the Slovaks left home lightheartedly to search for a new home 
for themselves in America.” But after the “grisly war” had concluded, he argued, Slovaks 
emigrated because of poor “European conditions.”301 Habrmann’s argument that 
economic privation was a new factor ignored the importance of economic considerations 
before the war, and the fact that that many Slovak nationalists objected to the 
Czechoslovak state’s handling of Slovak autonomy after the war. We see in both periods 
an interplay between economic well-being and cultural questions, not to mention the way 
in which laws produced and constrained emigrants’ decisions. 
The far-reaching effects of new East European borders and restrictive 
immigration legislation in the United States opened a new chapter in the issues that we 
have explored over the previous several decades, including home governments’ 
relationship to migrants, return migration, and new phases of nationalist projects. These 
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issues now confronted the postwar issues of self-determination and the expanding and 
protecting of new states. The successor states to Austria-Hungary continued many of the 
practices of the pre-war period, and now migrants had to contend with greater restrictions 
from the American government alongside their home governments.  
 
Legislating Nativism, Restriction, and Isolation  
At war’s end, in November 1918, it was not clear where the victorious Allies 
would draw the borders of new states to succeed Austria-Hungary and how far the United 
States would go in restricting the entry of migrants from the Eastern hemisphere. The 
unsettled details in both of these matters created a prolonged period of confusion, as 
potential migrants tried to maneuver how best to end up where they wanted to be while 
the opportunities existed to do so.302  Further, the perceived radicalism of the Russian and 
communist revolutions in Eastern Europe strengthened the position of isolationists in 
restricting the continued arrival of Southern and Eastern Europeans, who might bring 
what historian William Appleman Williams has called a “rising tide of Revolution” to 
American shores.303 
Especially for potential first-time migrants, the American quotas were a game 
changer. Already before the U.S. entry into the war, the Immigration Act of 1917 largely 
barred migration from Asia and the Pacific Islands, as well as some categories of 
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individuals labeled “homosexuals,” “idiots,” “feeble-minded persons,” "criminals," 
“insane persons,” “alcoholics,” and the illiterate. Prostitutes and anarchists were already 
barred. Building on previous legislation, Congress imposed new quotas on migrants from 
Europe.  
The 1921 Emergency Quota Law capped immigration to the U.S. at 350,000 
annually, assigning each country a quota of 3% of the population of its nationality in the 
1910 census. The crafters of the law, most notably Washington Senator Albert Johnson, 
argued that post-war conditions in Europe were causing the “influx” in post-war 
migration that went against the United States’ best interests. The legislation allowed for 
just over 50,000 migrants from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire to enter each year 
(down from 200,000 some years), divided between successor states and neighboring 
states:  7,451 from Austria, 14,557 from Czechoslovakia, 71 from the port city of Fiume, 
5,638 from Hungary, 5,786 from Eastern Galicia, 7,419, from Romania, and 6,426 from 
Yugoslavia.304 “To allow any great portion of the discontented millions of Europe to 
come here is not likely to aid the constructions of Europe,” the report accompanying the 
bill argued.305 The reasons for the act included American unemployment, a shortage of 
housing facilities in the United States, “the presence . . . of 10,000,000 or more 
unnaturalized aliens,” “the danger of spreading contagious and loathsome diseases,” and 
“the inadvisability of admitting aliens of the nationalities of the world, speaking their 
various languages faster than they can be assimilated.” In the committee phase the bill 
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was amended to allow migrants claiming “religious persecution in the country of their 
last permanent residence, whether such persecution be evidenced by overt acts or by laws 
or governmental regulations that discriminate against the alien or the race to which he 
belongs because of his religious faith” to enter outside the quota.306 This important 
provision later facilitated entry for several thousand Jews displaced by earlier pogroms 
and new bursts of anti-Jewish violence like Hungary’s White Terror. 
The 1921 legislation had to account for new borders in Eastern Europe, since the 
map of the region in 1890 and in 1921 was markedly different. The law stated as follows: 
“In case of changes in political boundaries in foreign countries occurring subsequent to 
1910,” the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Labor would jointly “estimate the 
number of persons resident in the United States in 1910 who were born within the area 
included in such new counties or in such territory so transferred, and revise the 
population basis as to each country involved in such change of political boundary.” The 
birthplace of those individuals would retroactively become whatever country the physical 
territory of their birth now belonged to.307 But as we will see below, the information in 
the U.S. Census and other government documents made approximating birthplaces 
difficult. While seeming so precise, they were entirely figures of “guesswork.”308  
Complications from the new borders and quotas were apparent in the bill even 
before it passed. State Department documents apprised the Committee on Immigration 
and Naturalization during their deliberations that while Jewish Romanians had “no 
difficulty in securing permission to depart, Transylvanians,” previously citizens of 
Hungary but now suddenly of Romania, “encounter great difficulty in obtaining the 
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authorization to emigrate.” The Bucharest consulate saw a marked uptick in these 
applications specifically “due to the fear of anti-immigration laws” in the United States. 
Reports from Zagreb indicated that in Yugoslavia, the number of prospective emigrants 
would double if the restrictions against the emigration of former Austrian soldiers were 
lifted,309 presumably because men who had fought for the Emperor were less likely to 
support a Yugoslav state in their political sentiments. The Commissioner General for 
Immigration for the Department of Labor Anthony Caminetti noted that peasant 
migration was likely to be higher from the “ceded districts” of Hungary, again tying 
migration explicitly to territorial change.310 
As the United States Congress debated immigration restriction in 1921, two 
notable voices of opposition were Jewish-American Representatives Democrat Adolph 
Joachim Sabath of Illinois and Republican Isaac Siegel of New York. Sabath had been 
born in Zabori, in Bohemia, and became a U.S. Democratic senator for Illinois in 1907. 
Although best remembered for his opposition to the Volstead Act, financial contributions 
to Czech-American girl Elsie Paroubek’s 1911 kidnapping/murder investigation, New 
Deal work, and promotion of American military action against Germany early in WWII, 
Sabath was a voice of continued opposition to Johnson. Siegel had been born and raised 
in New York, but had thousands of Eastern European migrants among his constituents 
and sought to aid Europe’s Jews, in particular, in successfully immigrating to the United 
States through organizations like the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and U.S. law. It was 
Siegel who successfully argued for the reclassification of the Polish and Russian quotas 
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in 1923, as the status of eastern Galicia and Bessarabia were still contested at the time 
that the 1921 quotas had been drawn up,311 a single instance of remediation for a 
widespread new problem. 
The dissenting members of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization -- 
Siegel, Sabath, and their colleague Rep. Robert S. Maloney – argued that Congress 
“should deliberate first and legislate afterwards.” If existing laws were “properly 
enforced,” there would be no need to put such restrictive new measures in place. They 
argued that “practically all who are coming to the United States are leaving Europe in 
order to join their families” and that “the reunion of families who have been separated 
since the war will be retarded, if not in many cases practically prevented” by the 
legislation.312  Because of a continued belief in family reunification, a number of 
different categories of potential migrants fell outside the quotas or allowed family 
members to receive preference for visas; for example, wives’ and children’s citizenship 
was usually dictated by the head of the family, often allowing them to arrive outside the 
quota. But Siegel, Sabath, and Maloney were firmly in the minority. In Congressional 
hearings, Sabath regularly defused hostile questioning against immigrant witnesses. He 
argued openly against the division of Europe into northern and southern and eastern 
categories and the racial assumptions that imbued those divisions; “I do not like to have 
any reflection cast upon people who do not deserve it,” he retorted.313 But the Emergency 
Quota Act was just the beginning, and Johnson’s policies would become even more 
restrictive in the coming years.  
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The debates preceding the passage of the National Origins Act of 1924 continued 
to grapple with the problem of new Eastern European boundaries in assigning quotas to 
Austria-Hungary’s successor states. The law further reduced the quotas, allowing each 
country a quota of just 2% of the population of that territory in the 1890 US census, 
rather than 3% of the 1910 census, and renewed debates about how the quota system 
discriminated against the region. The most significant debates in deliberations over the 
law were whether the 1890 or the 1910 census should be used in determining the quotas. 
While the 1910 census already listed hundreds of thousands of East European migrants 
arriving for industrial jobs, the 1890 census mostly encompassed only older, significantly 
smaller waves of migrants from Austria-Hungary, like agricultural Bohemians attracted 
by the Homestead Act, before industrial migration had really taken off. The switch to an 
earlier census was clearly intended to limit Central and Eastern Europeans at a time when 
the region was still facing massive upheaval with new borders. 
Johnson and his fellow nativists thoroughly succeeded in putting a racialized 
rationale for exclusion into U.S. law. Johnson explicitly sought to “maintain the racial 
preponderance of the basic strain on our people and thereby to stabilize the ethnic 
composition of the population.”314 The apportioning of nationality quotas for new states 
based on geography as opposed to ethnicity in Europe was clearly inconsistent with the 
logic of trying to maintain a “basic strain” of American “ethnic composition,” but such 
inconsistencies did not trouble American nativists. As Ngai concluded, “race and 
nationality disaggregated and realigned in new and even ways” under the quota 
                                                       
314 Quoted in Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960), 277. 
 176 
system.315 In the end, the annual quotas for the region were set at 785 for Austria, 3,073 
for Czechoslovakia, 473 for Hungary, 5,982 for Poland, 603 for Romania, and 671 for 
Yugoslavia. 
In congressional hearings, questions about how to handle the problem of 
assigning quotas based on new borders continually popped up. While Johnson and his 
allies insisted that the necessity of restriction outweighed the finer details of quota 
allocation, even staunch restrictionists on the Immigration and Naturalization Committee 
occasionally betrayed their skepticism about the portioning of quotas for new states. 
Colorado Congressman William Newell Vaile noted that changing territorial borders 
made the census nearly useless for quota figures. “It is impossible to carry the country 
along for either Poland, Austria-Hungary, Germany, or Russia,” he complained. “Are 
those figures available elsewhere—the actual immigration from those four countries from 
the year 1890 on?”316 “Do you think it would be all right to let the boundaries . . . [of] all 
of Austro-Hungary be Austro-Hungary for the purpose of determining the quota?” 
Johnson asked one witness. “How, then, would you determine?” Mr. Nathan Grosshand, 
a printer and newspaper publisher from Youngstown, Ohio, replied. Forcing the former 
empire to share a quota, Grosshand explained, would create even bigger problems than 
bad estimates for each country. “Your fight will come in between Yugoslavia, Hungary, 
Austria, and Czechoslovakia; each will claim more; that is the trouble you will have, 
Congressman.”317  
Committee members Congressmen Raker and Watkins displayed their utter lack 
of knowledge about the map and peoples of Europe on numerous occasions throughout 
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the hearings. “What do you mean by Bohemians,” Raker asked one witness; “What are 
they? Bulgarians?” “What kingdom and what king did they renounce when they assumed 
naturalization in this country?”318 Watson questioned. O.D. Koreff, a Pittsburgh 
newspaperman speaking on behalf of the Slovak League of America, called to testify in 
favor of basing quotas on the 1910 census rather than the 1890 census, faced an uphill 
battle getting the committee members to even understand the concept of Czechoslovakia. 
Speaking about the low crime rate among Slovaks in Allegheny County, PA, he was 
asked, “You mean including the Czechoslovaks?” “I am coming to the Czechoslovak part 
of it in a short time,” he replied; “I am at present speaking of the Slovaks only, as a 
distinct national group. . . . It is for them that I am asking consideration in the shaping of 
this bill, because if it should be based on the quota of 1890 it would not give them a fair 
showing.” Koreff argued that, even by the 1921 law, the figures for calculated the quota 
for newly created states were “not reliable and [were] unjust to Czech and Slovak 
immigration.”319  
The representatives of the Census Bureau had to admit several times during their 
hearing that data from the 1890 census made setting European quotas nearly impossible. 
While the 1920 census asked for the province or city of birth, earlier censuses had asked 
only for country.320 In the 1890s the list of options for nationality on the U.S. census had 
included “Bohemian” and “Slovak” as separate language categories. This made it easy 
enough to merge for a Czechoslovak quota, but it is unclear how many “Ruthenian”-
speakers -- now divided into several new states -- could emigrate. The Immigration 
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Bureau’s reports in the 1880s and ‘90s had complained of widespread irregularities in 
assigning nationality, mother tongue, and home place names to arrivals – such as 
sometimes continuing to list Bohemia as a country of origin long after the Immigration 
Bureau and Census Bureau had agreed to classify those migrants as coming from 
“Austria.” Now, this highly problematic data from the late 19th century was being used to 
set firm caps on the number of entrants from Central and Eastern Europe in the 1920s. In 
response to Sabath’s questioning, Census Bureau representatives also admitted that while 
the 1910 census collected information on mother tongue, the 1890 one did not, and that 
census data on mother tongue had not been used in drawing up the nationality quotas for 
the 1921 Quota Act anyway. Estimates were further off, questioning eventually revealed, 
because wives’ naturalization followed their husbands’ and therefore added and removed 
them from the rolls of the foreign-born depending on who they married.321    
Hungarian officials kept tabs on unfolding debates in the U.S. Congress 
surrounding Johnson’s bills, noting Siegel and Sabath’s objections on the grounds that it 
was an “injustice” to categorize individuals by race and religion and went against the 
“American spirit.”322 Nevertheless, the era of mass transatlantic migration was ending.  
 
The Post-War Transformation and Truncation of Migration Bureaucracies  
 In the early twentieth century both Austria-Hungary and the United States had 
created massive governmental bureaucracies devoted to migration; the restrictionist 
period and the reshuffling of states in Eastern Europe would bring about a thorough 
revision of these arms of government on both sides of the Atlantic. Given Austria-
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Hungary’s long arm in managing migration and migrant loyalty, the end of the Empire 
required the dismantling of Austria-Hungary’s wide support networks for migrant 
institutions. The war had ceased nearly all official Austro-Hungarian governmental 
activity in the United States, but supposedly only temporarily; even if Austria-Hungary 
lost the war, there was little reason to believe, at the outset, that it would not survive it. 
Now, Austria and Hungary had to disentangle the Austrian and Hungarian strands of their 
joint foreign office, while the governments of the new successor states had to formalize 
their acting war-time governments and foreign ministries into legitimate post-war 
governments. And at war’s end, the exclusionary terms of the 1924 National Origins Act 
were still far ahead in the future. 
Once the war ended, European and American shipping companies immediately 
set out to resume passenger travel across the Atlantic for migrants. Companies required 
permits from the new governments of the post-Habsburg states to operate. Hungary, as 
before, serves as an instructive case study, even if now a much smaller country. U.S. 
Consul Grant-Smith worked hand in hand with American shipping companies to try to 
assure that they would have rights to carry Hungarian passengers to American shores. 
One American company objected vehemently that the British Cunard Line, which had 
enjoyed a monopoly contract for Hungarian emigration for several years out of the 
Hungarian port of Fiume, once again had the first and preferential permit from the 
Hungarian government to carry Hungarian citizens, even though Hungary no longer had a 
domestic port. Even war had not disrupted the economic interests between passenger 
liners and Hungarian governmental officials engaged in the business of emigration. To 
counteract the Hungarian government’s measures, U.S. Consul Grant-Smith went as far 
 180 
as to give visa preference to Hungarian emigrants who purchased their tickets with 
American shipping lines. Grant-Smith was chastised by officials in Washington for the 
action, but defended himself, saying that it was necessary to protect the United States’ 
economic interests.323  
 When the Emergency Quota Act took effect in 1921, Hungary’s quota was still at 
5,638, but by the time the Johnson-Reed Act went into law in 1924, Hungary’s quota was 
down to 437 migrants annually, making all the work that Grant-Smith and American 
shipping lines had put into obtaining permits nearly worthless. While obviously more 
than 437 individuals would travel each year —previous migrants or family members 
visiting, tourists, business travelers — the low numbers made Grant-Smith’s extensive 
economic-diplomatic efforts moot. In this way, the post-war era posed unique challenges 
to migrants, businesses, and governments alike.  
 Austria-Hungary’s prewar network of eleven consulates and three branch offices 
was shut down in late 1917 when Austria-Hungary and the United States declared war on 
each other. Until the fall of 1921 the neutral Swedish legation handled the affairs of 
Austro-Hungarian citizens in the U.S. to the extent they could. Austria and Hungary, now 
both independent, had to establish separate offices in cities where they both wanted to 
maintain a presence, while new states established offices for the first time. Austria-
Hungary’s sprawling, far-reaching system serving its diverse constituents all over the 
country was replaced with several offices for small Eastern European countries in big 
cities, with far less reach outside of major metropolitan areas.  
Austria reestablished consular offices only in Washington, New York, and 
temporarily in Chicago, despite earlier plans to reopen permanent operations in 
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Washington, New York, one major Midwestern city (Chicago, Minneapolis/St. Paul, or 
Milwaukee), Pittsburgh, and San Francisco. Imprecise US Census statistics made 
estimates of Austrian citizens difficult for Edgar Prochnik, sent to the United States in 
1921 to assess Austrian consular needs. On the one hand, Prochnik argued that the US 
Census “was of particular value for us. It finally touches on the theory to which we 
adhered for many years with an incredible thoughtlessness,” he explained, “that of all 
nationalities of the former Dual Monarchy the German element had been the smallest and 
completely unimportant.” The number of Austrian Germans, it seemed, was higher than 
Habsburg authorities had thought. The census, he continued, “eliminates a fable, which 
until now has been responsible for the gross neglect of purely Austrian interests in the 
United States.”324  On the other hand, the 1920 US Census failed to make many of the 
distinctions he needed: it was impossible to distinguish between Austrians who had been 
naturalized as US citizens and those that were now Austrian citizens; distinguishing 
between Germans and German Austrians was still exceedingly difficult to do accurately; 
and “Ruthenes” and “Eastern Jews” in Pennsylvania and New York had “obstinately 
declare[d] [themselves] Austrian,” in protest of new Polish and Czechoslovak borders. 
This supranational Austrian imperial identity was, in fact, what the Habsburg Empire had 
desired from its subjects for generations, but Ruthenes, Galician Jews, and non-Germans 
broadly were not to be part of the independent new Austrian nation. The Empire’s former 
minorities, Prochnik wrote to his superiors in Vienna, were “persons who today can be 
disregarded.”325 
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Dismantling the old Austro-Hungary consular system required physical 
considerations, too. Hungary took its half of the consular furniture from the joint offices 
to its newly established operations in Washington, New York, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and 
Cleveland, while Austria retained some for its new offices in New York and Chicago and 
sold off the remainder to Czechoslovakia.326 Although quicker to reopen operations in the 
United States than Austria, Hungary was operating two consular offices out of hotel 
rooms in 1922.327 Czechoslovakia replicated more of the geographical breadth of Austria-
Hungary’s former networks, establishing consulates in Washington, New York, Chicago, 
Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Omaha, as well as a short-lived office in St. Louis.  
 The fate of properties and assets in the United States seized from the Austro-
Hungarian government and former Austro-Hungarian citizens remained contested for 
years, even decades, after the war’s end. Austro-Hungarian Consul Alexander von Nuber 
became embroiled in one of the most notable of the alien property cases because of 
confusion over what was Austro-Hungarian consular property, held in his name as the 
leading governmental official, and what was his own personal property. Also tied up in 
the courts was $16,000 that Count Mihály Károlyi had collected from Hungarian-
Americans to support his campaign for democratic reforms in Hungary, well before the 
declaration of war between the United States and Austria-Hungary. Once war was 
declared, the balance of the account was seized by the U.S. Alien Property Custodian. 
“Legally, this money is mine,” Károlyi explained, “as it was given to me with out any 
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restrictions.”328 Károlyi had served as Prime Minister and then president of Hungary for 
five months, until rival conservatives established a regency under Admiral Miklós 
Horthy, whose administration waged a “White Terror” against liberals, socialists, and 
communists. Four Hungarian-Americans had filed requests with the Alien Property 
Custodian to have their contributions returned, as Károlyi had been exiled from Hungary 
in 1923 and his movement was essentially over; their claim was dismissed by the District 
of Columbia Supreme Court, but was not awarded to Károlyi at that time.329 Six years 
later, in 1931, Károlyi was still requesting the money, eventually filing suit in the District 
of Columbia Supreme Court.330  
 Although consular services slowly resumed operations, the wartime absence of 
assistance from homeland bureaucracies for over five years had left many ethnic 
institutions in the United States in the lurch. In particularly, the extensive financial aid 
that the Hungarian government had extended to American churches, national clubs, and 
newspapers under the “American Action” was sorely missed and had to be renegotiated. 
While the end of the war and the loss of much of its historical kingdom might have 
served as a natural moment for Hungary’s American Action to begin to deal with 
Hungarian-speakers alone, this was far from the case in reality. Hungarian irredentists 
sought to reinforce Hungary’s claim on adjacent territories by courting the former 
Empire’s minority populations in the United States.  
Unlike Austrian officials like Prochnik who proposed turning inward, Hungarian 
officials continued to promote pro-Hungarian political sentiments not only among 
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Hungarian-speakers but also Slovenes, Slovaks, Ruthenes, and other Slavic minorities. 
The post-war Hungarian government continued to use the tactics of the long nineteenth 
century in its post-war quest to right some of the wrongs of the Trianon Treaty. In a 1923 
report, a Hungarian governmental official blamed British historian and political activist 
R.W. Seton-Watson’s Racial Problems in Hungary for misleading Western opinion on 
Slovak-Hungarian relations and argued that everyone was underestimating “Czech 
imperialism” and that Slovaks had been “chased into the Czech net.”  The report argued 
that, if possible, the Hungarian government should support and even “exploit anti-Czech 
sentiment” among American Slovaks. So long as disagreement continued between 
Czechs and Slovaks, the commissioner believed, Hungary would still have a chance to 
gain back Slovakia.331 For at least the next sixteen years, the government retained a 
Hungarian Royal Commissioner for Hungary’s Slovak Speakers, who kept abreast of the 
actions of the Narodny Slovensky Spolok and the Slovak League of America. 
In addition to surveillance and propaganda, Hungarian officials attempted to 
resume many of the pre-war services that Austria-Hungary used to provide for its people 
in America while it still had the jurisdiction to do so. Governmental and religious 
authorities endeavored to comply with requests to supply priests speaking the Prekmurje 
dialect of Slovene to a congregation in Bridgeport, Connecticut, a community of 4,000 
Slovene-speakers, 2,500 of whom were Catholic, and another in South Bend, Indiana, a 
community of 3,000. The majority of the former Empire’s Slovene-speakers, often 
referred to as Vends, now resided in the new Kingdom of Croats, Serbs, and 
Slovenes/Yugoslavia, though the new borders retained a minority in Carinthia in Austria 
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and in Vas County in Hungary.332 Slovene Americans were increasingly mirroring this 
split of more pro-Hungarian Prekmurje Vends and Yugoslav-oriented Krajina Slovenes in 
their church and social affiliations. At the same time, American religious authorities were 
now in a more powerful position to assert control over ethnic institutions in the United 
States. In many ways, the key figures to win over to the Hungarian side were no longer 
the leading Slovene-Americans, but the Bishop of Hartford.333  
The jockeying for affiliations suggests how many migrant institutions continued 
to depend on homeland support. József Krampáts, publisher of a historically pro-
Hungarian Slovene-American newspaper, wrote a scathing letter to the Royal Hungarian 
Legation in 1922 about the betrayal he felt that his entreaties for financial support for the 
newspaper now fell on deaf ears at the Hungarian consulate, while the new Yugoslav 
government had pledged over $15,000. “Because from Hungary I receive nothing and the 
Hungarian consulate now does not consider me worthy of even correspondence, I am 
forced to change sides,” he explained, after faithfully serving Hungary for seven years. 
The “Prejkmurje American Vend Society’s” new banner was to be red, white, and green, 
modeled on the Hungarian flag, with a star in the center to represent the Vend people and 
rays emanating from it representing their continuing “fidelity and loyalty to Hungary.” 
But now, he would have to change the flag’s colors and send it to Belgrade rather than 
Budapest. He gave the Hungarian consulate a deadline of May 20 to comply with his 
requests for $6,000 in support to  “stay what I was: a Hungarian-Vend.” Krampáts was 
apparently well aware of the post-war restrictions on the Hungarian government to 
continue to engage in propaganda in the United States. “Don’t think: we won’t give 
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anything to Krampáts, in place of Zvejzda [Vogrszki Szlovencov] we can put other 
another newspaper instead. . . .  You know well that Hungary cannot exert any kind of 
propaganda and if you put out a newspaper, deportation awaits you. For this reason it 
would be much better to come to an agreement with me and everything will be in order.” 
Krampáts’s words bordered on blackmail, and at the same time argued for a continuation 
of a stance that Austria-Hungary had espoused for decades: that soft power diplomacy of 
behalf of the homeland in the United States was work, and should be compensated as 
such.334  
The care that Hungarian governmental and religious officials had put into migrant 
churches in the U.S. suffered the greatest difficulties in separation after the war. Many 
Hungarian Reformed churches, in particular, we saw in chapter 2, had officially joined 
and taken out or refinanced their mortgages with the National Bank of Budapest, and now 
had to make new arrangements for both their churches’ ecclesiastical membership and 
finances. As we saw, the Hungarian government had the closest relationship with 
Protestant churches because there was no centralized equivalent of a Vatican to contend 
with; now, those churches had to completely separate from the religious bureaucracy in 
Hungary. But how? Hungarian American congregations eagerly awaited the advice of the 
home church on how to move forward.  Hungarian Consul János Pelényi supported union 
with the Presbyterian church body in the United States, who had supported several 
Hungarian-American congregations as “home” (domestic) missions; prominent minister 
Rev. Sándor Kalassay with the Reformed Church, with which they shared Calvinist 
theological views; and Rev. Zoltán Kuthy, with whom the Hungarian government had a 
decades-long working relationship, proposed an independent Hungarian Reformed 
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Church body.335 The decision was pressing, as the ministers of several smaller 
congregations had been forced to take day jobs to support their families during the war 
when their salary supplements from Hungary stopped coming. Although the Reformed 
Church offered the Hungarian-language congregations greater autonomy, the bigger 
coffers at the Presbyterian Church made them more able to stabilize the churches’ loan 
situations. Hungarian officials recognized that giving up a formal relationship with the 
American congregations would mean “radically changing our church politics.”336 
In the end, the Reformed Church of Hungary decided not to choose at all, but to 
sign an agreement with both the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and the Reformed 
Church in the U.S.A., and leave it up to American synods and congregations to decide 
where to go. Under the terms of the agreement, the Reformed Church of Hungary would 
receive payment in full for all of the outstanding loans on all of its churches in the United 
States, and the new American denominations would also pay ministers’ back pay for 
1919! Furthermore, the Hungarian American congregations would “be free to maintain 
and to cultivate amongst themselves such a unity as would serve best their common 
interest,” as well as to “maintain a free and frequent intercourse with the Reformed 
Church of Hungary.” Ministers at these congregations would have to acquire knowledge 
of the history of Protestantism in Hungary, with candidates from both the United States 
and Hungary eligible if they met this requirement.337  
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The consequences for churches on the local level could be dire. While dozens of 
immigrant congregations had remained multilingual communities up through the end of 
the war, the break-up of homeland religious governing bodies had ripple effects in the 
United States. The Perth Amboy Hungarian Reformed Church, founded in 1903, serves 
as a useful example. In the album for the church’s 25th anniversary, celebrated in 1928, 
the historical profile for the church noted that “the Slovak speaking Reformed element 
took an active part in the churchlife from the very beginning.”338 Slovak language 
services were offered one Sunday a month and even expanded as late as 1911. But “in 
1924 the Slovak members, who had been connected with the church from the very 
beginning, seceded from the church. This action was taken by them on account of the 
political troubles and antagonism in Europe,” the yearbook explained. “The great 
majority went into the [Slovak] Presbyterian Church and a few remained with us who 
were satisfied with Magyar services.”339 The 1951 Golden Jubliee Book of the Slovak 
Calvinist Presbyterian Union reveals more of the story behind the post-war Perth Amboy 
split. When the Perth Amboy pulpit became vacant in 1923 with the bilingual pastor, 
Rev. Nánassy’s, return to Europe, there was no longer a mechanism to secure a bilingual 
minister and only Hungarian-speaking candidates applied for the position. It was then 
that Slovak speakers withdrew from the church and arranged for a Slovak Presbyterian 
minister from Jersey City to hold weekly services for them, founding the Slovak 
Presbyterian Church of Perth Amboy.340  
In dismantling the Austro-Hungarian consular network and the overlapping 
networks of support for migrant institutions in the United States, Austria and Hungary 
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disambiguated their joint offices into separate ones, but resumed many of the same 
activities on a smaller scale. The Hungarian government continued to collect intelligence 
on and attempt to influence Hungarian-speakers, as well as the minorities that had 
belonged to the Hungarian kingdom historically, even if it could not match pre-war levels 
of financial support. Hungary endeavored to begin anew its support of leaders in ethnic 
communities loyal to the Hungarian state and their publications, even if on the level of 
“child’s play” compared to pre-war initiatives.341 And they were joined in this 
transatlantic propaganda effort, now, by new states like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 
looking to consolidate their own perceived migrant communities in the United States and 
protect against any threats to their generous new borders at home.  
 
Leaving and Returning to the European Borderlands 
Putting counts and percentages aside, the personal experiences of post-war 
migrants and their post-war relationships with governments reveal the many 
complications that new borders, quotas, and mixed identities created for individuals who 
did not fit neatly into national categories or new states. The lived experiences of 
migration after the war, as before, often defied the ethnic categories of the census and 
highlight the non-alignment of post-war nations and states.   
The Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon guaranteed most residents of the Austro-
Hungarian successor states the right to repatriate to their ethnic homeland if they found 
themselves residing outside of it after the borders were redrawn. However, most of these 
ethnic minorities (primarily German- and Hungarian-speakers) were encouraged to 
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remain where they were by their “homeland” governments in order to provide 
ethnographic justifications for future territorial revisions. Post-war governments, like pre-
war Austria-Hungary, largely sought to keep people of the titular nation at home rather 
than migrating. As Zahra explains, “While claiming to represent the nation in a liberatory 
revolution in 1918, many national leaders worried that citizens would not stick around for 
the hard work of reconstruction. More than just a matter of national security or labor 
supply, emigration was now considered a threat to the very existence of Eastern Europe’s 
new states. Jan Žilka, from the Czechoslovak Masaryk Academy of Labor, praised the 
“positive consequences” of the quotas keeping people home.342 
 “In their determination to create nationally homogeneous populations,” Zahra 
explains, “East European governments also sought to reverse the prewar exodus to the 
West, encouraging ‘valuable’ expatriates to return home.”343 Czechoslovak officials 
hoped for at least 100,000 returnees from America. Hungarian officials initially estimated 
300,000 return migrants, and eagerly awaited the capital they would bring home.344 As 
early as 1916, Hungarian Minister of Commerce and Professor of Economics Béla Földes 
was already planning a labor exchange and ways to save Hungarian migrants from the 
wartime discrimination they were facing in the United States. Földes reported that “many 
of the Hungarians now in America did not feel at home there and that such people should 
be the first to be repatriated and that opportunities should be given them to make a 
satisfactory living in Hungary.”345 Dr. Károly Mészáros had been working on return 
migration for the Hungarian government since 1914, and in 1919 embarked on a renewed 
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campaign to draw migrants home after the war. Mészáros recognized that there were both 
pessimistic and optimistic interpretations of post-war return migration: pessimists would 
argue that migrants need not return home now to share in Hungary’s sorry post-war fate, 
but Mészáros was an optimist. After a five-year hiatus in transatlantic travel because of 
the war, thousands of Hungarian-Americans would return home to help aging family, to 
mourn the loss of loved ones who had died in the interim, to feed their curiosity, and to 
help rebuild the homeland. He estimated that up to 200,000 might return, and crunched 
the numbers also for the counties in northern Hungary that had produced large numbers 
of emigrants and were now under Czechsoslovak control. Writing to the ministers of the 
Interior, Finance, Commerce, and Agriculture, Mészáros calculated each return migrant 
would reliably bring a thousand dollars into the Hungarian economy, as workers in the 
United States all had had good-paying wartime jobs.346   
But emigration continued even as European governments sought to draw migrants 
home, necessitating a two-pronged plan that simultaneously curbed continued emigration 
and promoted return migration, or at least compensated for the former with more of the 
latter. The Hungarian government found that opportunities abroad like employment in 
Westphalia mines and rebuilding projects in France could draw Hungarian workers away 
for as long as 16-20 years. “Tempting promises” of opportunities in the United States, 
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Australia would also entice migrants to leave Hungary, 
especially in areas where there was a dearth of work. The Hungarian Interior Minister 
feared that the intelligentsia and the most valuable workers would leave, while those most 
likely to engage in return migration were “former peasants.” He also recognized that, 
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though many emigrants had gained industrial experience working in factories in the 
United States, they were coming home to escape that kind of work, pay off their debts, 
and buy a house and maybe some land, not to continue in hard industrial labor at home. 
Thus, the best way to encourage return migration was to potentially reauthorize the 1909 
law setting up a migration council, rebuild the Hungarian consular network in the United 
States as quickly as possible to expedite return migration, and facilitate the process for 
return migrants for acquiring land.347 Not surprisingly, these plans harkened back to the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s plans from before the war, discussed in the previous chapter, 
emphasizing the sale of estates rather than acreage here and there, as well as putting 
migrants’ dollars to work “for the home economy.”348  
And so the Hungarian government and allied organizations began rebooting some 
of their migration-related initiatives just as the American Congress was working on 
legislation to staunch immigration, despite the fact that Hungary was still dealing with a 
postwar refugee crisis and land shortage. The Hungarian League for the Protection of 
Territorial Integrity issued a 1920 pamphlet titled “What does the aspiring return migrant 
need to know?,” sending 19,000 copies to the United States from the first printing 
alone.349 The Hungarian Emigrants’ and Return Migrants’ Protection Office (not unlike 
American Travelers Aid Societies) began operations again in July 1921, as part of these 
Hungarian efforts. Their yearbook offered concrete advice on sources of mortgage 
providers for setting up a farm back in Hungary, listing at least five land credit agencies 
and advertising cheap, easy credit. “We would like for every return migrant to find once 
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again a happy and warm home here and not to deal in uncertain and adventurous plans.” 
That said, the Migrants’ Protection Office seems to have aided migrants whatever 
direction they desired to travel in: advice for emigrants was listed before advice for return 
migrants, and among their listed services was helping Hungarians over the new border 
with the acquisition of Czech visas.350 
In reality, however, the number of returners never came close to European 
governmental imaginations and border dissatisfaction added strongly to the emigrating 
side of the equation. “In the first few years of our state’s existence, everyone in America 
was saying: don’t go back,” one Czechoslovak stated.351 The reasons were manifold, but 
the implementation of quotas encouraged those already in the United States to stay, since 
it became increasingly uncertain whether they would be able to return to America later. 
From the beginning of July 1921 to the end of February 1922 (after the 1921 Quota Act 
but before the 1924 act), 2,913 Bohemians and Moravians came to the United States 
while 3,203 returned, a net gain for Czechoslovakia of only 290 individuals in an eight-
month period. This was more than offset by the continued emigration of Slovaks, 5,859 
of whom came to the United States while only 2,311 returned.352 The Slovak-American 
paper Obrana reported in 1925 that among the Slovak Americans who did return home to 
Czechoslovakia, many trickled back to America.353 The Czechoslovak quota for 1922 had 
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filled before October,354 with Slovaks taking a significantly higher proportion of the 
quota, in part because of unfulfilled promises for Slovak autonomy. According to 
Hungarian reports, the Slovak League of America received a plea from Slovaks in 
Slovensko, who were frustrated at the continued shortcomings of the Czechoslovak 
government in ensuring rights and behaving democratically, and that they were “morally 
and spiritually decaying.”355 
Other new states fared no better. Among Croatians and Slovenians, the numbers 
of migrants entering and leaving the United States were nearly equal.356 Poles, 
Romanians, and Serbians – winners in the peace treaties after the war – saw higher 
numbers of people returning to Europe than leaving, but Hungarians were fleeing, with 
5,866 arriving to the United States and only 3,633 returning in the same period.357 
Emigrants from Burgenland, the small section of former Hungary that had been 
transferred to Austria after the war, reportedly made up just over 50% of Austria’s 
emigrants in 1922, which the Hungarian government ascribed to the change in territorial 
sovereignty.358 A year later, another Austrian report indicated that Burgenland had 
produced 42% of all of Austria’s emigrants since the war. “With the annexation, 
Burgenland’s inhabitants have befallen difficult circumstances,” a Hungarian report 
concluded; “otherwise so many of them would not have taken the wanderer’s staff into 
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their hands, to find a happier home for themselves. How wisely they arranged the 
people’s fate at Trianon,” he concluded sarcastically.359 
Even among those migrant nationalists who did decide to uproot themselves again 
and return to Europe from the United States, their time abroad could permanently mark 
them as somehow outside the nation. Dr. Charles Pergler, who had been among the 
Czech-Americans most ardently fighting for the Czech national causes during the war, 
returning to Czechoslovakia after the war, served several diplomatic posts, and then, 
upon winning a seat in the Czechoslovak Parliament, had his citizenship status 
investigated by political opponents. (Pergler had indeed been an American citizen, but 
renounced it after the war when he took a position as the Czechoslovak minister to 
Japan.360) Several Hungarian return migrants filed complaints about difficulties that they 
faced upon returning to Hungary. Post-war return migrant Antal Lindenberger had tried 
to buy a new home three times, only to have the local Housing Office invalidate the 
purchase each time as he was “unauthorized” to do so. Two other families bought new 
homes in Hungary only to receive eviction notices, while others were refused residence 
permits. Even this small samplings reveals the frustrations of both return migrants and the 
chairman of Hungary’s Emigration Council, Jenő Gaál. Gaál fumed at the pettiness of 
local officials in rejecting return migrants for the necessary permits because of small 
errors and omissions in paperwork formalities and at the long delays at the Ministry of 
Welfare in seeing to return migrants’ grievances. His documented cases feature dozens of 
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individuals who had made the move to permanently relocate to Hungary from the United 
States, only to be driven back.361 
The quotas were a deterrent to mobility even for those looking only to visit 
relatives, not relocate. In 1925, a group of Slovak American Catholics from Perth 
Amboy, NJ wanted to make a spiritual pilgrimage to Rome, followed by a return visit to 
Slovakia, but feared that, among those who were still not full-fledged American citizens, 
the Czech government would not allow them to leave and that the United States would 
not allow them to return! Father Szuchy reportedly wrote to President Coolidge asking 
for special visas for the non-citizen pilgrims assuring their reentry.362  
While some European governmental officials hoped to push minorities out 
through the limited quotas and keep members of the titular nation at home, more often it 
was migrants themselves who sought to find alternative paths to America through 
ambiguities in their ethnic identity or creative use of various quotas in the region. Mary 
Bócán Chaty was born in the village of Hardicsa, near Kassa, in Hungary in 1904, which 
was Czechoslovak territory by the time of her emigration in 1921. Despite identifying as 
Hungarian and coming from a village that was labeled as two-thirds Hungarian before the 
war, she came on the Czechoslovak quota. “I was in Prague,” she recalled, “because I 
couldn't go in Budapest because I was in the Czechoslovakia territory.” These changes in 
administrative centers between the old empire and nation-states made migration 
considerably more difficult in some ways for her but more convenient in others. Whereas 
Budapest is three hours from Hardicsa on modern highways, it is over seven from Prague. 
With quotas in place, migrants had to travel to their respective new capitals multiple 
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times before managing to get a visa. On the other hand, Mary’s migration was actually 
facilitated by coming on the Czechoslovak quota rather than the Hungarian one. 
Hungary’s annual quota was only 473, but Czechoslovakia’s was over 3,000. Chaty was 
able to join her uncle in Trenton in 1921, and the very next year married a man who 
happened to be from her village of Hardicsa who had immigrated to the US as a child, 
under a completely different immigration regime without quotas.363  
 In 1925 a Slavic coffee merchant based in Fiume managed to have his daughter 
and son come to the United States on the German and French quotas, respectively, both 
departing from Fiume/Rijeka, because of where the children had been born as the family 
traveled for his business. After the death of his wife from tuberculosis, he had gone to 
New York and, since he spoke five languages, had gotten a job at the Italian Commercial 
Bank in the Foreign Department, leaving his children to be raised by their maternal aunts. 
By 1925 Mr. Greiner sought to bring his family to join him in the United States, his 
children and his sisters-in-law. "You're out of your mind if you think four people can 
come from one country!" a local councilman told him. But examining their papers, he 
noticed that the children had been born in Germany and France, enabling them to enter on 
the significantly more generous western European quotas.364  
When Nick Frendreis and his family arrived in 1921, Ellis Island was still figuring 
out how best to deal with migrants who arrived after a quota had already been filled. 
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Frendreis remembered staying at Ellis Island for over a week waiting for the calendar to 
turn, to get in on the next month’s quota. Apparently authorities had decided that it was 
more effective to hold them at Ellis Island for a week than to send them home. The 
German-speaking Frendreises came from the Banát region where they had lived in mixed 
German-Serbian and Hungarian-Serbian village just miles from the new Hungarian-
Yugoslav border.365  
 Max Schnapp came to the United States in 1923 from Austrian Galicia, suddenly 
part of Romania (and now part of Ukraine), from a small city with a majority Jewish 
population and a largely Ukrainian-speaking surrounding countryside. The surviving 
Schnappses had wound up in Vienna as refugees during the war after crossing the 
Carpathian Mountains on foot to escape Russian occupation; with the signing of the 
peace treaties, they were forced to leave Austria and go back “home,” to Romania. They 
did not arrive in the approved window to retain citizenship, and so lost their citizenship 
and all their property. They identified culturally as German. One of the only men 
remaining in his family, his grandmother said to Max, "You're the only one that's left 
over. You will not be in the army if it's my last penny. You'll go to America.” Because he 
had relatives that emigrated in 1911 and with the help of the JDC, he and his sister were 
able to join their uncle there, but they could not get additional relatives over for several 
years. “Imagine, from 1924, according to your quota, they had to wait till 1936 to be able 
to come to America.”366 
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Examples like these confirm that so much of the ethnic categorization tied to 
migration before and after was fluid or even artificial, even in an era when new European 
states and the U.S. were trying to control the movement of people. The Greiners, 
Frendreises, Schappses, and others all arrived on quotas that did not match their personal 
ethnic identification but their new state affiliations, although the quotas were capping 
entry based on the concept of “national origins.”   
 
Conclusion 
 The complicated interplay between the Habsburg Empire’s dissolution, Trianon 
borders, and restrictionist US immigration laws continued to have similar consequences 
throughout the interwar era, as can be seen in Istvan Bacher’s case in 1940. “My mother 
was born in a town called Fiume, . . .  and that was the best thing she ever did,” he 
recalled later in life. Bacher himself had been born in Vienna and grown up primarily in 
Budapest, but his mother’s birthplace played the greatest role in his mobility as a migrant. 
“That had a lot to do with our ability to leave Hungary and get on the Italian quota,” he 
explained. Fiume’s wild history in the aftermath of Austria-Hungary’s dismantling shows 
the difficulty of ethnic disambiguation of a multiethnic port that served a vast empire. 
While part of the Kingdom of Hungary through the First World War, both Italy and the 
newly established Kingdom of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes made claims to Fiume at the 
Paris peace conference. After a two-year period as a free state with its own quota, Italy 
annexed Fiume practically in 1922, and officially in 1924 by treaty with Yugoslavia. It 
was because of this that Vienna-born, Hungarian-identifying Bacher and his family could 
come to the United States as Italians. When Bacher’s family sought to leave in the 1930s, 
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the Hungarian quota was already full for the next six or seven years. “The Italian quota,” 
on the other hand, was over three times the size and “… was open and relatively free,” he 
explained, “…because Mussolini discouraged any immigrations.” And so by this “fluke,” 
he, his mother, and brothers received their visas in 1940, just a month before Hungary 
officially entered World War II. But his father could not go with them. While Bacher’s 
father was “quite the patriotic Hungarian,” the interwar period saw the further 
racialization of ethnicity, making his status and his ability to emigrate precarious. The 
criteria for who counted as Jewish kept changing, too. “My father was Jewish,” Bacher 
explained, “And then he was non-Jewish. And then he was Jewish again.” Bacher’s 
parents divorced to make it easier for his non-Jewish mother Renee, István, and his 
brothers to leave on the Italian quota, since with the divorce and her custody they 
acquired her claim to Italian citizenship instead of retaining their father’s Hungarian 
citizenship. His first job in the United States, after arriving at Ellis Island as an “Italian,” 
was washing dishes in a Hungarian restaurant at the New York World's Fair in Queens. 
The Bachers serve as a prime example of the diversity of the Empire and its lasting 
consequences for migration. We know, of course, that the Trianon borders failed to create 
ethnically exclusive nation-states. We also see how the quotas – meant to be ethnic 
quotas – could only do so much to enforce ethnic criteria when applied geographically to 
new states that still featured mixed populations, as part of their Austro-Hungarian legacy. 
The oral history interviewer decades later asked Bacher what his mother’s maiden name 
was: “Levinsky,” he replied; “It sounds very Polish to me.”  
Both new state borders in Central and Eastern Europe and immigration legislation 
in the United States must be considered together to understand post-war migrants’ 
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experiences.  The view from Ellis Island and the view from European ports, both 
drastically different in the 1920s than the 1900s, was the result of developments on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The interplay between European geopolitical borders and American 
regimes of exclusion had profound effects on the mobility on several generations of 
Central and Eastern Europeans in the 20th century, and transformed the bureaucracies of 
migration in the region. While many migrants in the United States rejoiced that their old 
homes were now nation-states, others sought to rebuild the glory of their homeland as it 
was before the war. In the end, ironically, many migrant nation-builders contributed to 
the hardships that their communities in America and at home faced in the post-1924 era: 
tighter restrictions on mobility, more limitations and longer wait times in reuniting 




“Austria has the advantage of having kept her well-known name from the 
collapse,” soon-be-Austrian ambassador Edgar Prochnik explained to officials back home 
in 1921. “Austria is a name having a good ring to it, a name one was accustomed to hear 
and use . . . . It is not so foreign a name as e.g. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, . . . strange 
sounds foreign to an American ear.”   
After decades of migration and years of world war, with hundred of thousands of 
migrants from the former territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the United States, 
most Americans still had little understanding of the peoples of Eastern Europe. On the 
one hand, the categories of race, ethnicity, nationality, mother tongue, and other markers 
are all fluid and fraught, and the map of Europe changed dramatically in the World War I 
era – who could fault Americans for confusing Hungarians and Bulgarians, Slovaks and 
Slovenes? On the other, even American policy makers who made decisions with life-
changing consequences for Eastern European migrants displayed shocking levels of 
misinformation.  
The United States had played a hand in crafting the borders of new states to 
succeed the Austro-Hungarian Empire, only to fail to ratify many of the peace treaties or 
join the League of Nations; Congress passed legislation greatly restricting migration for 
southern and southeastern Europeans based on admittedly inaccurate estimates of their 
so-called “national origins.” The new borders, rather than easing ethnic tensions by 
separating peoples into different states, tried and failed to put people into neat ethnic 
boxes and ramped up irredentism to one of the most important political ideologies in the 
region. And in the United States, post-war labels for people took their place alongside 
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Habsburg-era identities, adding even more variety. 
Two institutions illustrate how starkly different views could be of the peoples of 
Eastern Europe: the University of Pittsburgh’s Nationalities Classrooms in the Cathedral 
of Learning and the Cultural Gardens in Cleveland’s Roosevelt Park. Both constructed in 
the 1920s-30s in cities well known for their Central and Eastern European immigrant 
communities, they nonetheless took completely different routes in enshrining those 
immigrant groups in public space. The Cathedral of Learning offered European states the 
opportunity to decorate “nationality classrooms,” based on political sovereignty in the 
post-war era. The Cleveland Cultural Gardens, conversely, offered local communities the 
opportunity to design gardens by self-proclaimed ethnic groups. The Cathedral featured a 
single Czechoslovak classroom; Roosevelt Park featured separate Czech, Slovak, and 
Ruthenian gardens.  
Both projects stemmed from a post-war impulse to celebrate American 
multiculturalism and the triumph of America’s melting pot over the kind of nationalist 
conflicts that World War I had just wrought, serving as multicultural spaces in an era of 
restriction. The Cathedral and the Gardens are not simply proxies for American opinions 
of state legitimacy, but the fact that two projects chose such different methods to 
represent and codify the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrates that 
ethnicity and its place in defining people was still actively being constructed.  
The University of Pittsburgh’s Cathedral of Learning was commissioned in 1921 
and began being used as a place of instruction in 1931. The nationality rooms were 
designed to celebrate a different culture that had an influence on Pittsburgh's growth, 
reflecting the significance of the city’s immigrant population. “Each group had to form a 
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Room Committee, which would be responsible for all fundraising, designing, and 
acquisition.” Thus, while the Cathedral as a whole was a unifying project, the distribution 
of classrooms based on new political borders in Europe formally divided Pittsburgh’s 
immigrants. Pittsburgh residents hailing from Austria-Hungary could be represented by 
Austrian Nationality Room, Czechoslovak Nationality Room, Hungarian Nationality 
Room, Polish Nationality Room, Romanian Nationality Room, Ukrainian Nationality 
Room, or the Yugoslav Room. Governments contributed financially to some of the 
rooms.367 
Cleveland’s Cultural Gardens differed markedly in their apportioning of the 
peoples of Eastern Europe after the Great War. The Cleveland immigrant communities 
represented with individual gardens include Polish, Czech, Rusin, Slovak, German, 
Hungarian, Hebrew, Ukrainian, and Romanian gardens. The Hebrew and German 
gardens were built first, both in 1926. Unlike the Czechoslovak Nationality Classroom, a 
Slovak Garden was dedicated in 1932 and a separate Czech one in 1935. Similarly, a 
Rusin Garden was dedicated in 1939 and a Ukrainian Garden was dedicated in 1940. The 
gardens “reveal the history of immigration to, and migration within, the United States,” 
historian Mark Tebeau explains. “They comment on how we have built communities and 
constructed our identities as individuals and collectives. The gardens reveal the stories of 
the major conflicts that gave shape to the century. . . . The gardens often have 
incorporated symbolism or design elements that subverted the message of unity and 
reflected ethnic tensions in Europe and Cleveland.” “It was no mistake,” he continues, 
                                                       
367 For an analysis of governmental participation in the creation of the Czechoslovak, 
Hungarian, and Romanian classrooms, see Zsolt Nagy, “National Identities for Export: 
East European Cultural Diplomacy in Inter-War Pittsburgh,” Contemporary European 
History 20 (2011): 435-453. 
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“that the Czech, Slovak, and Rusin gardens were arrayed themselves across a boundary 
street from the contiguous German and Hungarian gardens, suggesting how powerfully 
old cultural conflicts were felt.”368 More recently, the Yugoslav garden, dedicated in 
1938, was refashioned as the Slovenian garden in 1991. A new Serbian garden dates to 
2008, a Croatian garden to 2011. 
 The Nationality Classrooms at Pitt and the Cleveland Cultural Gardens are just 
two examples of the American spaces where debates about Eastern European immigrant 
identities continued to be played out in the United States, even as the numbers of brothers 
and sisters who could join them from overseas was greatly diminished. Migration from 
Austria-Hungary to the United States (and often back again) had a tremendous influence 
on the societies, and governments, of both places.  
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